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ABSTRACT
Since 1974 there has been an increasing amount of debate about the way
in which domestic capital markets operate and influence local economic
development. These concerns have intensified since 1978 with the gradual
deregulation of the banking and thrift industries and increased competition
for liabilities. Commercial banks, thrift institutions and money market funds
are now competing for savings. These liabilities have become much more ex-
pensive and volatile. These two forces promise to greatly change the insti-
tutional structure of the capital markets. This thesis examines a small but
important portion of the puzzle: how does local market concentration in the
commercial banking industry influence local economic development?
The thesis contains seven chapters. The first two chapters establish
the reasons for examining the commercial banking industry. It is shown that
this industry is the most important intermediary for local economic develop-
ment. The third and fourth chapters provide institutional detail and des-
cription of the banking industry. The third chapter presents the major
regulations under which the industry operates. The fourth chapter is a compar-
ison of the industry in New England and the nation as a whole.
In the fifth chapter this information is used to construct a theoretical
model of the way in which commercial banks will allocate their assets in con-
centrated local markets. Essentially the model is a portfolio model where
the supply of one class of assets is restricted. The model demonstrates that
a bank in a monopolized local banking market will hold a portfolio with a
smaller, but riskier, share of local assets than would a bank in a competi-
tive market.
The sixth chapter contains two econometric models of bank behavior.
The first is a model of the behavior of individual banks in New England and
the second is an aggregate model of the 57 banking markets in New England.
The estimating equations demonstrate that concentration in.local banking
markets influences the rate of return from the local risky asset more than
the composition of the portfolio per se. It is also demonstrated that struc-
tural variables exert a strong influence over the portfolio behavior of bank-
ing firms in New England.
The final chapter summarizes the thesis and speculates as to its relevance
for regulatory reform in the industry and the impact of the structure of the
banking industry on local economic development.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Associate Professor of Economics
and Urban Studies
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Chapter 1
BUSINESS FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Popular sentiment and political action often predate academic
awareness of a problem. Politicians in such an environment know that
something is wrong and that they need to act. The trouble with such an
environment is that the problem is often not well identified; actions
are directed at the problem's symptoms and actions are most often based
on the "conventional wisdom" or on the application of theories that are,
at times, inappropriate, outdated, or wrong. However, politicians are
often correct in their initial impression that something is amiss, and
they can often recognize this fact at an earlier stage than academicians
because they are not constrained by the academicians' theoretical
blinders. Since 1974 there has been an increasing amount of political
activity centered around the way in which capital markets operate and
influence local economic development. The New England Regional Commis-
sion sponsored a capital market task force in the mid-1970s which stud-
ied the existence of a capital gap. Two New England states founded
state-wide investment banks and a raft of state-sponsored intermediaries
were proposed. The federal government has proposed to greatly expand
the small business guarantee program of the Economic Development Admin-
istration and a proposal for large scale reorganization of bank regula-
tions was due to be released by the White House in the early fall of 1980.
Politicians are pursuing two arguments in separate areas. There is
concern over the existence of a capital gap; it is felt that small to
medium sized firms and new ventures are being rationed out of the market.
A separate stream of activity is based on the argument that the domestic
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banking industry is over-regulated, is being put in an unfair position
vis-a-vis foregin investors in terms of bank ownership and that the
small saver is being hurt as a result. The impacts on the demand side
are not being discussed.
The symptoms of a problem in the way in which capital markets
influence local economic development have been presented by several dif-
ferent authors.1 All of these sources agree on the symptoms of the
problem. All allude to the fact that capital markets are not working
perfectly. By this they assert that the credit and capital market is
not financing socially desirable investments -- investments that offer
a stream of returns to society superior to those that are currently
being funded. But they all disagree as to which components of the
market are not operating in a socially efficient manner. The implica-
tion is that because this higher stream of benefits would go to society
as a whole and not necessarily to private investors, the latter discount
the benefits that they cannot recoup.
The "capital gap" was discovered during the recession of 1969 when
venture capital began to dry up and the rate of new business start-ups
fell to historical lows.2 This was especially acute in the Northeast
and in areas with older capital stock because their comparative economic
advantage was assumed to rest on their capacity to generate new firms and
activities.3 Accompanying the decline in venture capital was a perceived
lack of buy-out money to finance acquisitions and reinvestment in older
industrial plants. James Howell, Beldon Daniels, and Lloyd Brace (they
are respectively, a bank economist, an academic, and a bank consultant)
agree that two of the most serious consequences of the capital gap were a
contraction in the pool of longer term money for plant expansion that was
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available to medium sized firms, and the difficulty that medium and small
firms have had in obtaining financing for inventories and daily opera-
tions that was not secured by personal assets or government guarantee.
Bearce, for example, quotes from the President's 1977 Urban Report
indicating that the capital market problem has important spatial conse-
quences. So that "...special incentives are required in the early
stages of urban redevelopment to make cities in transition competitive
for new investment." A major theme of the report is that "...several
aspects of the overall urban policy problem are heavily conditioned by
capital flows: that is, the accumulation, mobilization and investment
of capital resources in some industries, firms, and activities rather
than others...." 4 Similarly, Howell notes that producers in New York
City have recently been investing 9% less than their depreciation allow-
ances. He states this is symptomatic of disinvestment that is occurring
throughout the Northeast.
These statements imply that there are three sets of problems in the
way in which capital markets operate in an advanced capitalist economy.
First, there is said to be a shortage in the availability of longer term
buy-out and reinvestment money. This is said to be especially true in
sectors of the economy that have slower rates of growth. Secondly,
there appear to be problems in the way in which capital is allocated
spatially. Inner-city areas and areas that are experiencing a transi-
tion in their economic base appear to be having problems attracting
capital. Thirdly, there is scattered anecdotal evidence throughout
New England that smaller ventures are having trouble attracting start-
up capital. The result of all of this is that declining or transitional
regions (such as New England) are experiencing abnormally low levels of
capital formation as a result.
Answering questions about the efficiency of regional and local
finance capital markets is difficult due to the lack of data and a
rigorous definition of the problem. Work that was sponsored by the
New England Regional Commission has responded to the data scarcity by
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identifying sources of demand for credit and capital. They then
recommended that each source of demand deserves a sheltered window for
borrowing. For example, Brace, in his study of the capital market in
Maine, argued that the market lacked intermediaries which specialized
in local venture capital financing. However, while it is true that he
has identified potential demand for such an investment vehicle, he still
has not demonstrated whether the demand is effective, i.e., demanders
can afford to pay the market price for its services if the financing
were to be accessible.6
Two questions must be asked about the efficiency of local capital
markets, and their impact on economic development. Are the differences
in access to capital indicative of a market failure; or are they the
traumatic result of a market rationing a tight supply of funds effi-
ciently? Capital must be shown to have been allocated according to
criteria other than price and risk for there to be a valid claim of
market failure. If it is true that capital markets are structured in
such a way as to systematically exclude segments of demand, we must ask
who is being excluded and why is this occurring.
These are important policy questions for several reasons. Creating
new capital market institutions is an expensive policy prescription and
altering the market-determined flow of capital is a fundamental intru-
sion into one of the economy's two basic markets: capital and labor.
One had better be able to demonstrate, at least qualitatively, that the
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demand for the capital is really there. It is very important that
policy analysts do not forget the fallacy of Say's Law. J. B. Say was
a nineteenth century French economist who became famous for stating that
supply creates its own demand and that general overproduction was
impossible. Several major depressions have proved this nineteenth
century pronouncement to be incorrect. A variant of this law has been
lurking at the edges of discussions about the role that capital markets
play in local economic development: that there exists a large pool of
pent-up demand for finance capital being denied to economically deserving
entrepreneurs. If a sheltered pool of funds were established -- it is
asserted -- viable demand for it would quickly surface.
In fact, businesses have a wide variety of intermediaries from which
they can obtain external finance capital: formal and informal equity
investors, commercial banks, the commercial paper market, and other large
institutional intermediaries such as insurance companies and pension
funds. However, questions as to how the capital markets allocate credit,
and if segments of the business community are systematically discrimi-
nated against, are too broad and intractable to be answered in the
thesis. Instead a key sector of the capital market has been chosen for
study, the commercial banking industry.
The commercial banking industry was chosen for two reasons. First,
we know that commercial banks are the primary source of finance for small
and medium-sized businesses. The latter are usually demanding loans
that are too small for other intermediaries, especially the commercial
paper market and insurance companies. These banks are also connected to
national credit markets and tie local markets to the larger regional and
national markets. Secondly, the demand for smaller business loans is
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primarily local. A survey by the Federal Reserve System indicates that
over 90% of the commercial and industrial loans that are smaller than
$100,000 are placed by local commercial banks.
Before the Great Depression commercial banks, and their affiliated
investment banks and insurance companies, were the only source of this
type of credit. After the Second World War there was a growth in alter-
native institutions which competed for the credit demands of large
corporate and industrial customers, primarily through the commercial
bond and paper market.
Commercial banks participate in new capital formation either by
financing mortgages or by making loans to commercial and industrial
customers, which have consistently absorbed 19% of the assets of all
commercial banks during the post-war period. Two types of commercial
loans are made, differentiated by their term structure. The total
volume of loans is fairly evenly split between the two. The first are
short-term secured loans. These are used to finance inventories and to
meet seasonal credit needs. The other type of commercial loan is a term
loan; this is a loan that is for a time period that is greater than a
year, but usually less than five. These loans are made to finance
expansion plans and other longer term activities of the firm. There are
few alternatives to term loans for smaller businesses. Large firms can
float bonds but this is.an expensive enterprise that is only justifiable
for the largest debt issues. The firm can also sell equities or take advan-
tage of a capital subsidy program that is run by a state agency (such as
an industrial revenue bond).
It is hypothesized that concentration in local banking markets has
had, and will continue to have, a direct effect on the way in which banks
invest their asset portfolios between three types of assets. The asset
classes are the risk-free asset (U.S. government issues), ubiquitous
risky assets (widely traded issues which are equally available to all
banks), and local risky assets (assets which banks invest in but which
do not have well developed secondary markets). Concentration will cause
banks to underinvest in local risky assets. This is especially true for
those assets without close substitutes being offered by other inter-
mediaries, for example commercial and industrial loans as opposed to
consumer credit. This in turn will influence the way in which the econ-
omy develops, making it harder for local firms to obtain adequate levels
of finance. It is also argued that this is the outcome of normal com-
petitive behavior, reinforced by the way in which the industry is
regulated. The data in the thesis are drawn from New England's commer-
cial banks in December of 1977. The region was chosen for several
reasons. The distribution of banks by asset size is representative of
the nation as a whole. This is coupled with the diversity of economic
activity in the region. New England's economy has completed the transi-
tion from a declining mill-based economy to one that contains a mixed
economic base with local market areas which are expanding and others
which are declining.
Much is known about the American commercial banking industry in the
aggregate. But little quantitative work has been completed on the inter-
relationship between the structure of the industry, spatial economics
and local economic development. It is easy to find general statements
about the way in which the industry is organized, such as "...The
(organizational) pattern in banking is one of loose oligopoly in nation-
wide credit markets and large cities, with very tight oligopoly or even
monopoly confronting individuals in smaller cities and towns..."8
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But the basic description of the asset holdings of commercial banks,
segmented by size and location, are not well known to those who are not
industry "insiders," i.e., either those who operate the firms or regu-
late the industry. Policy decisions and theoretical discussions about
the performance of banking firms are being conducted with little infor-
mation.
The thesis must, therefore, proceed in three directions. First the
broader policy problem is discussed: what is the role of the commercial
banking industry in the capital markets and in the process of local
economic development. Secondly, how do commercial banks in New England
compare to those in the United States as a whole and what is the com-
position of their asset portfolios. Third, what is the impact of in-
dustry organization and concentration in local banking markets on the
asset portfolios of commercial banks; specifically does the share of a
bank's total assets which are invested in local risky assets vary
systematically with differences in local market structure.
The questions about local bank behavior are of interest for several
reasons. There is anecdotal evidence that a capital gap exists in the
finance capital markets and this will influence the way in which this
economy develops. Empirical evidence which can be used to directly
test the hypothesized existence of such a gap does not exist. In the
thesis another approach is taken. The function of different intermed-
iaries in the capital markets are examined to identify which intermed-
iaries are active in the segments of the credit industry where the
existence of a gap is likely to occur. Then a theoretical model is
formed to discover the local credit market conditions which are likely
to breed a capital gap. Then a likely data source is used to test the
model.
There is a second reason for examining the impact of the structure
of the banking industry at the local level. The industry is under a lot
of strain. Disintermediation has been rampant and the cost of funds for
banks has increased markedly. Regulators and large banks are arguing
that the spatial expansion of banking systems coupled with elimination of inter-
est rate ceilings will bring stability to the supply of funds to the
industry. Foreign entities, mostly banks, are actively trying to pur-
chase American banks. They are not restrained by the McFadden Act and
they can cross state boundaries when they purchase banks. American
money center banks are claiming that this is unfair and they should be
able to cross state lines and purchase banks. The combined cry for equal
treatment and concern over small savers has led to a review of banking
regulation which should result in legislation being filed in late 1981
or early 19E2. This work raises a number of issues on the demand side
of the credit market which have not yet appeared in the public debate.
A third reason for undertaking the study reflects more academic
concerns. The Markowitz portfolio model is an important development in
the theory of finance and in the economics of uncertainty. The model is
aspatial and it embodies the assumptions of a perfectly competitive
market. The two models which are developed in the fifth chapter start
with the Markowitz model and adapt them to markets where there is imper-
fect access to assets, that is the demander is a monopolist. This model
is developed to investigate the behavior of banks in local credit
markets.
There are six chapters following this one. The second chapter
describes the role of various financial intermediaries in private
capital formation. This is followed by a chapter which describes the
'B
major regulations under which the banking industry operates. The
fourth chapter is a statistical comparison of the banking industry in
the nation as a whole and in New England. The fifth presents two micro-
economic models of bank behavior in local credit markets which are
monopolized and perfectly competitive. The sixth chapter statistically
tests this model for banks in New England. The last chapter summarizes
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Chapter 2
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND PRIVATE CAPITAL FORMATION
Before we can successfully understand the ways in which the orga-
nization of the commercial banking industry has influenced private
capital formation and local economic development we must first examine
the importance and role of the industry in the economy, and compare it to
other intermediaries. The financial capital markets are unusual in
several ways. There are several industries which act as intermed-
iaries in these markets. Each has a specialized function, a different
set of regulators and different customers. Yet they serve
as substitutes for one another, with varying degrees of success. The
capital markets also differ from other markets due to the prominent
position of the intermediaries. Suppliers and demanders of the product
rarely approach each other directly. Productive capital, the stock of
equipment, buildings, inventory and claims on these assets are not
easily traded. In response to this fact, financial capital markets have
been established where claims to physical capital can be traded. These
intermediaries act on both sides of the market. Savers place their funds
with a financial intermediary, which then loans them to a demander of
capital. The intermediaries alternate between acting as demanders of
funds from those in surplus positions (savers) and as suppliers of funds
to those in deficit positions (the end users who put the funds to use for
private capital formation); this form of trading is known as arbitrage.
Finance capital markets are often confused with money investment
markets, a distinction which is easier to make in theory than it is in
reality. Dougall and Gaumnitz see the two as part of a general market
for investments.2 Capital markets are of a longer term nature and they
exist at the local, regional, and national levels.3 A rule of thumb
that is commonly used to distinguish capital markets from money markets
is that the investment must have a term of at least a year. Instruments
which are traded on the capital market are either debt instruments,
personal mortgages, personal loans, corporate loans, corporate bonds,
corporate mortgages, and government bonds or equity issues such as a
stock offering. Each of these markets has two components. Newly issued
securities are sold in the primary markets. Existing securities are
traded among investors in the secondary markets. The bulk of the trading
occurs on the secondary markets. Whereas secondary capital markets trade
long-term claims on assets, the secondary money markets trade in short-
term debt instruments as well as currency. These near-money issues are
not considered to be part of the market for economic, or physical,
capital.
Intermediaries purchase primary securities as assets: mortgages,
bonds, and loans, issued by demanders of capital, and they issue their
own securities as liabilities to savers, such as certificates of deposit,
insurance contracts, and deposit accounts. The safety and liquidity of
the intermediaries' liabilities allow them to charge a higher price or
lower interest rate than they receive from their asset portfolio. The
intermediaries also sell packages of securities on the secondary markets
to maintain their liquidity and to balance the term structure of their
portfolios. They generally attempt to manage their assets and liabilities
so that they come due at the same time. This is the principle of
"hedging." In theory when an asset reaches maturity it is used to pay
off corresponding liabilities. Financial intermediaries which operate
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in the capital market have asset portfolios which are made up of longer-
term debt and equity issues,.such-as loana, bonds, and mortgages and
more liquid assets, such as government securities. Intermediaries mix
these assets to construct a portfolio which meets profit targets that
are established by the firm, subject to constraints (especially in the
banking industry) imposed by regulators as to the amount of risk that is
4
contained in the portfolio. The portfolio of the intermediary is
constrained by the term structure of the intermediary's liabilities, the
degree of risk-taking that is allowed by regulatory agencies, and the
competitive structure of the particular market in which the intermediary
is operating.
There are three groups of non-economic variables which influence
the behavior of financial intermediaries. These include the rules and
regulations which governmental bodies impose on the industry and rules
of thumb which have developed over the years to guide the way in which
the portfolios of the intermediary are managed. The latter may have
developed in response to economic factors but the impact of their exis-
tence must be examined. The last set is the impact of industry structure.
This is the number and size distribution of firms in the industry, the
markets which it operates in, and its spatial organization. These factors
combined with the different types of investment markets in which the inter-
mediaries are active are used to describe the functions of the different
institutions that operate in the American credit market. They are the
measures which are used to identify the commercial banking industry as the
intermediary of special importance to small and medium-sized business and,
through these firms, to local economic development.
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A. The Size of the American Credit Market: Sources of Demand
In 1977, $340.5 billion was raised in the U.S. credit markets, of
which $271.4 billion was absorbed by the private nonfinancial sector
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Of this amount, $35 billion was invested in
consumer credit and is not counted as part of gross capital formation.
Of the remaining $236.4 billion, almost 44 percent, or $103.8 billion,
was invested in residential structures and $4.7 billion of the $29.2
billion issued by state and local governments was issued as industrial
revenue bonds. The non-farm corporate sector of the economy absorbed
$96 billion on the credit market in 1977, or about 35 percent of the
total issue of credit.
Other data indicate that the corporate sector of the economy spent
$135.8 billion on plant and equipment alone, and that business inven-
tories increased by $15.5 billion dollars,5 all of which had to be
financed. These figures indicate that at a minimum the nonfarm sector
of the economy had to finance $151.3 billion worth of expenditures in 1977
from internal and external sources. The credit markets supplied the
funds which corporations had to raise externally. In so doing they met
63% of the effective demand for capital from domestic corporations. The
remainder of the demand was financed internally from two sources, un-
distributed profits and capital consumption allowances. Corporations had
a net cash flow of $164.4 billion in 1977, $58.4 billion in undistributed
profits and $106 billion in capital consumption allowances.
Data from the Federal Reserve System indicate that the nonfarm, non-
financial, corporate sector of the economy generated 62 percent of its
funds externally. These funds were used for all purposes, not just cap-
ital formation, and accounted for $121.1 billion out of the $257.5 billion
Table 2.1. Funds Raised in U.S. Credit Markets


























SOURCE: "Funds Raised in U.S. Credit Markets."















































Table 2.2. Funds Raised in U.S. Credit Markets by Nonfinancial
Borrowing Sector (Billions of Dollars)
1977 1978
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors 271.4 310.1
State and Local Governments 25.9 24.9
Households 139.1 161.3
Farm 14.7 17.2
Nonfarm corporate 12.6 17.2
Corporate 78.7 89.5
SOURCE: "Funds Raised in U.S. Credit Markets." Table 1.57. Federal
Reserve Bulletin (May, 1979).
raised. Slightly more than 20 percent came from undistributed corporate
profits which are usually called retained earnings.6 These shares are
typical of all of the recent years except 1975, when external sources of
funds were not heavily used.
In New England most financing in manufacturing takes place through
internal sources; either through retained earnings or from funds provided
by a parent firm's capital budget (see Table 2.3). The amount of internal
financing has fluctuated since 1963, depending on money market conditions,
but it has always been above 67 percent, and it has been as high as 85
percent. Loan financing, from commercial banks, is the second most pop-
ular debt instrument accounting for approximately 10 percent of gross
capital expenditure. Stock sales and lease financing play a clearly
subordinate role to the other two vehicles. The reason for the depen-
dence on internal financing by firms in New England is not entirely
clear. However it does appear that this dependence is due to several
causes. First, the average size of manufacturing establishments in the
region is smaller than the average size nationally. Size of firm is
correlated with market power and stability of earnings, therefore the
smaller firm size would lead one to believe that investments to firms in
New England are on average riskier. The second reason for the region's
dependence on internally generated funds is the product mix of manu-
facturing firms in the region. There are generically two types of
manufacturing industries in the region. The first is declining in
importance. These are the old, mill based industries, which appear to
have largely lost their comparative advantage to importers and have seen
waves of bankruptcies during the past two decades. Needless to say,
these firms are not the most desirable investment risks. The second type
of manufacturing firm is the eralded high technology firm. These firms
Table 2.3. Sources of Financing for Gross Capital Expenditure
for New England Manufacturers, 1973 to 1977




LOW 12.1 (instrumeto) 39.1 (mise.) 51.7 (lumber) 49.4 (instruments) 19.9 (inscruments)
High 96.8 (elec. equip) 94.9 (clay. etc.) 95.2 (alec. mach) 94.1 (pria. ets.) 88.7 (clay, etc.)
Mean 75.6 67.9 4.7 85.0 68.4
Noodurables
Low 62.0 (misc.) 46.3 (chemicals) 73.7 (textiles) 65.0 (misc.) 64.8 (misc.)
High 98.9 (pulp) 94.2 (food) 87.1 (food) 92.4 (food) 96.0 (food)
Mean 83.3 74.7 80.0 74.8 80.6




LoW 0.3 (pria. mets.) 2.0 (prim. mets.) 0.5 (clay, etc.) 3.3 (fab. mts.) 1.6 (instruments)
High 24.7 (instruments) 51.0 (misc.) 40.6 (lumber) 49.4 (instruments) 49.0 (prim. mats.)
MOan 9.1 23.3 9.0 11.1 17.9
Nondurables
Law 1.1 (pulp) 2.2 (food) 0.4 (chemicala) 11.6 (misc.) 2.0 (food
ign 17.2 (textilas) 46.4 (cheaicals) 23.7 (textiles) 26.2 (textiles) 31.2 (textiles)
Mean 8.6 19.2 7.7 13.0 15.5




LoW 0.3 (elec. each)
High 5.9 (clay. etc.)
Mean 0.2* 1.2* 0.6
Nondurables
LOW 2.6 (chebicale 13.2 (muac.)
High 13.1 (aisc.) 20.4 (chmcals)
Mean 0.40 3.9 9.5




Law 1.3 (pria. mte.) 0.3 (instruments) 0.3 (clay. etc.) 0.6 (Wlee. each) 2.7 (trans. equip)
High 39.0 (fab. mts.) 14.5 (lmber) 11.4 (feb. mets.) 38.2 (furniture) 16.6 (furniture)
Mean 6.2 4.0 3.4 2.5 3.2
Nondurables
LOW 0.8 (textiles) 0.7 (alec.) 0.7 (aise.) 2.6 (textiles)
High 7.7 (aisc.) 4.7 (chmica") 5.6 (food) U.6 (misc.)
Man 6.2 2.2 2.2 6.1 2.0*
Total Mfg. 3.9 3.4 3.1 4.2 2.6
SOURCZ: Research Dparrment; First National Bank of goston, Capital Expenditure Survey of New England
Vanufacturers. Sample sise 275 in 1974, 400 ie 1975.
* one industry reporting.
AMTE: Totals for "Total Manocturing" do sot ad up to 1.00 due to existence of a "=isca.LaneOuS" finance
category.
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attract external finance but they still rely heavily on re-
tained earnings.7
Table 2.3 shows the variation in financing by industrial sector for
manufacturing firms in New England. Durable goods industries tend to
use external finance to a greater extent than nondurable manufacturers;
but both generate more than 70% of their financing for capital expendi-
tures internally. Durable goods producers tend to make greater use of
loans.8
Data for New England are compared with data on the financial struc-
ture of manufacturing firms for the United States from the Federal Trade
Commission in Tables 2.4 and 2.5; these data have the advantage of being
categorized by the size of the firm's assets. The FTC data are for all
sources of funds; they are not restricted to funds used for capital
expenditures. Retained earnings dominate these figures comprising 45
percent of all funds used by manufacturers from 1972 to 1976. Short-
term and long-term liabilities, excepting bank loans, make up the next
largest category. This reflects the fact that large corporations are on
net paying back short-term bank loans resulting in a negative cash flow
from this source. It is interesting to note that these are firms that
are larger than $25 million in assets. Firms with assets of $1 to $10
million rely most heavily on short-term bank loans; they have not shifted
out of this area of borrowing to other instruments, as firms in the $25
million to $1 billion classes have done in wholesale fashion. Long-term
bank loans are crucial to firms with assets under $1 million and firms in
the $25 to $100 million class. The debt of the smallest manufacturing
firms is often secured by a government guarantee, the real property of
the firm, or the assets of the entrepreneur. This can be contrasted to
Financial Structure of Manufacturing Corporations by Ass.et Size:
1972-1976 Average (Size in $ Million, Figures in Percent)
















37.06 29.96 34.65 39.01 36.74 33.09 34.48 33.70 34.88 39.50
16.33 17.01 14.67 14.84 17.28 18.67 18.31 17.96 16.94 15.72
12.63 12.42 11.93 11.42 11.27 11.42 11.30 11.82 12.97 13.06
8.38 16.95 15.35 12.63 11.00 9.70 8.49
3.31 5.78 7.36 7.11 6.66 6.17 5.35










18.27 11.03 10.02 9.46 10.54 13.85 15.47 18.18 19.51 20.82
2.34 1.78 1.96 2/34 2.28 1.94 2.03 1.95 2.10 2.73
SOURCE: Quarterly Financial Reports of the
and Michael Kieschnick, Theory and Practice
Federal Trade Commiss ion, 1972-1976. from: Beldon Daniels
in the Design of Development Finance Innovation, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University, Department of City and Regional Planning, 1978. p. 34.
S.T. refers to short term.
L.T. refers to long term
Size All < 1 1-5
Table 2.4.
Sources of Funds for Manufacturing Corporations by Asset Size: 1958-1971
and 1972-1976 Averages (Size in $ Millions, Figures in Percent)























34.05 29.75 30.23 30.24 19.19 19.22 19.23 32.50 34.18 35.83
45.50 48.87 32.55 34.22 38.47 44.50 47.29 42.50 40.42 49.18
12.19 5.13 2.53 7.40 6.70 11.30 8.17
8.47 -5.78 7.56 5.25 6.39 4.20 -3.07
12.95 13.49 11.39 9.75 7.93 12.16 11.25
16.22 19.63 16.70 18.13 17.44 15.26 17.41
8.34 16.56 20.90 18.38 18.29 13.58 11.00
8.29 11.23 18.11 16.25 13.66 12.94 12.39
5.28 7.33 8.21 10.50 11.66 9.86
-2.87 1.59 7.86 7.75 4.33 -1.30
9.28
.71.
4.80 11.03 8.75 8.78 12.59 10.60 10.65





























58-71 22.39 16.75 18.00 14.94 23.64 23.28 30.40 21.51 22.18 22.79
72-76 20.46 2.19 8.01 10.29 8.46 11.23 12.52 18.73 24.52 23.67
SOURCE: Beldon Daniels and Michael Kieschnick. Theory and Practice in t
Finance Innovation, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Department of
1978. p. 88.
he Design of Development
City and Regional Planning,
All 1 1-5
Table 2.5.
loans that are made to larger corporations, which do not quite have the
financial moxie to break into the national short-term commercial paper
markets, which are secured on the expected cash flow of the firm.
The data indicate that manufacturing firms have three different
ways of raising funds, which vary according to their size. In the first
stage firms are small, with assets that are less than $10 million. Equity
capital as a percentage of total financing is below average, resulting
in a low equity to debt ratio. Firms rely heavily on trade debt and bank
loans for their financing. Manufacturing firms have a more stable finan-
cial profile in the second stage, assets ranging from $10 to $25 million.
The equity to debt ratio is near the mean, as firms begin to substitute
away from trade debt and short-term bank loans. Once the firm gets bigger
it acquires more long-term debt, us.ing the commercial paper market more
heavily. This is especially true for firms with more than $50 million in
assets.
Financial structure, as depicted in Table 2.4, is in some sense a
picture of the average indebtedness of firms. Table 2.5 shows where funds
were raised each year. As inflation began to accelerate in 1972 a major
shift appeared in the sources of funds. Reliance on retained earnings
became much more pronounced, especially among the smallest and the very
largest firms. There were two major differences in the way in which firms
reacted to the cyclical contraction in the credit markets and increases
in nominal interest rates. All firms relied more heavily on retained
earnings. The largest firms substituted financing from retained earnings
for short-term debt (in net terms they were paying banks back thereby
becoming negative borrowers). They also moved from long-term bank debt
to other sources of long-term finance. Smaller firms also used retained
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earnings as substitutes for short-term bank debt. But they were still
borrowing money. They were not able to replace banks for long-term
financing. In fact, they borrowed more heavily from this source. Small
firms used their retained earnings most often to replace other forms of
long-term liabilities.
Smaller firms are using retained earnings to finance their expansion.
This category includes firms with less than $50 million in assets. The
smallest of these are totally reliant on local sources of finance to meet
their demand for external finance; if they are to expand, the funds must
be raised internally from profits or from the commercial banking industry.
During the postwar period total debt in the United States has been
a fairly constant portion of total assets; this figure has ranged from
42 percent in 1965 to 52 percent in 1974 with the average being 47.6 per-
cent (see Table 2.6). The distribution of the source of debt has changed
during the postwar period. Since 1960 public holdings of the debt have
declined by 10.4 percent while the corporate share has increased by 7
percent. The share of debt held in mortgages accounts for most of remain-
ing reallocation. Corporations account for 42 percent of all debt in the
United States, mortgage debt accounts for another 20 percent, while
governmental debt is 22 percent of the total. The only sector of publicly
held debt that has increased appreciably over the past two decades is
that issued by federally sponsored credit agencies, which now account for
2.4 percent of total debt.9
It is clear that commercial debt dominates the financial capital
markets and that these are the investments that influence the development
of a region's economy. It is also clear that not all firms have equal
access to all of the markets, probably due to the relationship between
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Table 2.6. Distribution of Net Public and Private Debt:
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Total Debt
Current Dollar ($ billion) 486 666 874 1,253 1,882 2,067 2,300 2,562 2,794 3,029 3,355
1972 dollar ($ billion) 907 1,092 1,272 1,686 2,059 NA 2,300 2,422 2,409 2,381 2,506
Percent of Real GNP 173 167 173 182 191 NA 196 196 198 198 197
Percent of Assets1  48.3 NA 43.7 42.0 45.9 NA NA 48.6 52.3 50.7 49.5
Percent of Debt 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Public Debt (% of current dollar) 49.4 41.1 35.2 29.8 25.8 25.5 23.4 23.5 23.2 24.7 24.8
Federal 44.6 34.5 27.5 21.2 16.0 16.5 14.8 13.3 12.9 14.7 15.4
Federal sponsored credit agencies 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.7 2.6 2.4
State and local 4.5 6.2 7.4 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.7 6.9 7.6 7.4 7.0
Private Debt (% of current dollar) 50.6 58.9 64.8 70.2 74.2 74.4 75.6 76.5 76.8 75.3 75.1
Corporate 29.2 31.8 34.7 36.2 42.3 42.1 42.4 43.2 43.8 42.5 42.2
1ndividual and noncorporate 21.4 27.0 30.1 33.9 31.9 32.3 33.2 33.3 33.0 32.8 33.0
Farm 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2
Nonfarm 18.9 24.2 27.2 30.7 28.8 29.3 30.3 30.2 29.8 29.6 29.7
Mortgage 11.3 14.9 17.3 19.5 18.3 16.7 19.5 19.9 20.1 20.2 20.4
Commercial and financial 3.4 3.6 3.5 5.6 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.9
Consumer 4.5 5.8 6.4 7.2 6.7 6.7 6.8 7.0 6.8 6.5 6.5
SOURCE: Table No. 881 "Net Public and Private Debt: 1950 to 1977." Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1978.
Various tables: Economic Report iof the President.
1. Asset Data from Table 2.9
N.A. Not available
1950 to 1976
the asset size of the firm, the volume of credit demanded and the
transactions costs that are involved in placing a loan. It also appears
that firms with less than $50 million in assets are particularly depen-
dent on the commercial banking industry for funds which are raised
externally.
-B. Financial Intermediaries: Sources of Supply
There are a large number of institutions which serve as intermed-
iaries in the finance capital market. Each institution serves a differ-
ent type of saver: households, corporations, or some mix of the two.
They also specialize in serving different areas of credit demand, some
portion of which is used in capital formation. These intermediaries are
in varying degrees substitutes for each other. They overlap on both
sides of the money market. But they are often prevented from directly
competing for the same set of customers by regulation, tax laws, or the
way in which the specific industry is organized.
Several non-bank intermediaries are examined below to determine
their role in local economic development. This is done by examining who
has access to these intermediaries, how they are regulated and how their
funds are put to use.10
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 list the assets and investments of seven major
intermediaries. Pension funds, property and liability insurance companies
and real estate trusts are not listed in these tables. They are important
intermediaries, but together they have only half the assets of commercial
banks (see Table 2.8). Commercial banks are clearly the largest set of
intermediaries with 47 percent of the total assets of all seven intermed-
iaries. Their asset base and investments are twice that of any other
Table 2.7. Assets, Loans and Investments of U.S. Financial
Institutions: 1976, 1977 (Billions of Dollars)
1976 1977
Commercial Banks: Assets 1,004 1,041
Total Loans, Investments 785.1 870.6
Loans 538.9 617.0
Commercial, Industrial 179.7 201.4
Other 359.2 415.6
Investments 246.2 253.6
U.S. Treasury 98.0 95.6
Other 148.2 158.0
Savings and Loan: Assets 391.9 459.2
Total Loans, Investments 358.7 420.3
Mortgages 323.0 381.2
Cash, Investment Securities 35.7 39.1
Mutual Savings Banks: Assets 134.8 147.3





U.S. Government 5.9 5.3
State and Local 2.8 3.0
Other 37.9 39.6
Life Insurance Companies: Assets 321.6 351.7
Total (less foreign 296.4 322.4
securities)
Mortgages 92.0 96.8
Real Estate 10.5 11.1
Policy Loans 25.8 27.6
Securities 175.1 195.2
U.S. Government 5.4 5.3
State and Local 5.6 6.0
Foreign Government 7.0 8.2
Business Bonds 123.0 141.9
Business Stocks 34.3 33.8
Credit Unions: Assets 45.2 54.1
Loans 34.2 42.0
Investment Companies: Assets 45.0
Cash 3.3
Other 41.8
Domestic Finance Companies: Assets 89.2 104.3
Accounts Receivable 83.4 99.2
Consumer 38.6 44.0
Business 44.7 55.2
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bulletin. May, 1979. Vol. 65. No. 5. Table
1.23: "Loans and Investments, All Commercial Banks"; Table 1.38: "Savings
Institutions, Selected Assets and Liabilities"; Table 1.521: "Domestic
Finance Companies, Assets and Liabilities"; Table 1.522: "Domestic Finance
Comapnies, Business Credit": Table 1.49: "Open-end Investment Companies."
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Table 2.8. Distribution of Assets and Investments among Seven
Large Intermediaries in the United States: 1977
Dollars
(Billions) Percent
Total Assets 2,202.6 100.0
Commercial Banks 1,041.0 47.3
Savings and Loans 459.2 20.8
Mutual Savings Banks 147.3 6.7
Life Insurance Companies 351.7 16.0
Credit Unions 54.1 2.5
Investment Companies 45.0 2.0
Domestic Finance Companies 104.3 4.7
Total Investments 1,938.7 100.0
Commercial Banks 870.6 44.9
Savings and Loans 420.3 21.7
Mutual Savings Banks 142.3 7.4
Life Insurance Companies 322.5 16.6
Credit Unions 42.0 2.2
Investment Companies 41.8 2.2
Domestic Finance Companies 99.2 5.1
SOURCE: Table 2.7.
intermediary. Savings and loans and mutual savings banks hold 28 per-
cent of the assets of this group. The banking sector holds most of the
primary issues of mortgage debt and mutual savings banks and commercial
banks hold a large portion of intermediate and long term corporate debt.
The insurance industry holds a diversified portfolio but a significant
portion is invested in primary and secondary issues of real estate debt.
The importance of the insurance industry in corporate finance has been
increasing over time due to their increased holdings of corporate
securities. In 1977, this was 43 percent of the investment portfolio
of the insurance companies and 40 percent of the asset base. While this
portion of their portfolio is cyclically sensitive, it has been increas-
ing steadily over the current decade. In 1973 corporate bonds comprised
25 percent of the asset base. Investment companies and small business
investment companies are small relative to the other institutions and
they tend to concentrate on the secondary equities market. Domestic
finance companies have 5 percent of the investments of all intermed-
iaries but a large portion is invested in consumer debt. Nearly half
of the asset base of these firms is invested in business loans. However,
45 percent of this amount, or a bit less than 25 percent of their asset
base, is invested in wholesale and retail automobile financing. In all,
about 25 percent of the asset base of finance companies is invested in
private capital formation; this is not a trivial sum, amounting to more
than $27 billion in 1977.
It is worthwhile to examine the gross holdings of prominent non-
commercial bank intermediaries, which are displayed in Table 2.9.11
Life insurance companies, pension funds, credit unions and thrift insti-
tutions are the traditional rivals for the surplus funds of society and,
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Table 2.9. Distribution of Financial Assets by Sector: 1950 to 1978
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
All sectors
Current dollars ($ billion) 1,006 1,998 2,981 4,102 5,365 5,425 6,074 6,890 7,517 8,412
1972 dollars 1,877 2,908 4,012 4,488 5,071 4,677 4,783 5,149 5,309 5,531
Percent of assets1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Households 44.3 48.6 49.1 46.7 42.5 39.4 40.8 41.2 41.2 40.1
Nonfinancial corporations 10.1 9.1 8.9 9.0 9.3 9.8 9.5 9.3 8.8 8.8
U.S. government 4.1 2.1 2.4 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3
State and local government 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4
Monetary authorities 5.0 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8
Federal Sponsored credit 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.6
Commercial banking 14.9 11.5 11.5 12.7 14.5 15.9 14.8 14.3 14.2 14.5
Savings and loans 1.7 3.6 4.4 4.3 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.8 6.2 6.2
Mutual savings banks 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
Credit unions 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Life insurance 6.3 5.8 5.2 4.9. 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5
Other insurance 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5
Private pension funds 0.7 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5
Government pension funds 2  0.5 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7
Finance companies 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
REIT 3  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Investment companies 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5
Money market funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Security brokers 6 dealers 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
SOURCE: Table 847 "Flow of Funds Accounts - Financial Assets of Financial and Nonfinancial Institutions - by Holder Sector:
1950 to 1978. Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1978 and 1979.
1. Will not add to 100.0 due to rounding and omission of small holders.
2. State and local government.
3. Real Estate Investment Trusts.
as we have seen, they play important roles in the financial markets.
The newest entrant into the markets, money market mutual funds, will be
mentioned last, along with a series of comments about the bond and
commercial paper markets. Commercial banks are discussed in greater
detail in the following chapter.
Life Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
Life insurance companies and pension funds play a large role in
the credit market, holding 8.9 percent of total assets, which is equiv-
alent to 24% of the claims of private financial intermediaries (see
Table 2.10).12 Pension funds approximately equal life insur-
ance companies in size, nearly doubling their share of assets held since
1960. These two sets of institutions are similar in several ways. Both
hold long-term contracts with their savers as liabilities and they are
hedged with a variety of long-term assets. Each is heavily invested in
mortgages, bonds and federal securities. Insurance companies are more
heavily invested in secondary purchases of mortgages and primary com-
mercial mortgages. Private pension funds tend to be more specialized,
investing more heavily in corporate securities than do government pension
funds which tend to stress state and local securities. The distinction
between private pension funds and state and local pension funds has be-
come less distinct, now that many are using the same fund managers
(see Table 2.11).
Life insurance companies play a large role in the credit market,
holding 16 percent of total assets. They invest heavily in longer-term
debt instruments, primarily mortgages purchased on the secondary market,
although they make some direct investments in real estate and coprorate
bonds. The industry provides an important liquidity facility to banks
Table 2.10. Distribution of Assets of U.S. Life Insurance
Companies: 1960 to 1978
1960 1970 1977 1978
Total Assets ($ billion) 119.6 207.3 351.6 390.0
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gov't. securities 9.9 5.3 6.7 6.8
Corporate securities 43.2 42.7 48.8 49.1
Bonds 39.0 35.3 39.2 40.0
Stocks 4.2 7.4 9.6 9.1
Mortgages 34.9 35.9 27.5 27.1
Real Estate 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.0
Policy Loans 4.3 7.8 7.8 7.7
Other 4.4 5.3 6.0 6.2
SOURCE: Table 900. "U.S. Life Insurance Companies - Financial Items:
1950 to 1977." Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1979.
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Table 2.11. Distribution of Assets of Private and State and
Local Government Pension Funds: 1960 to 1973
1960 1970 1973
p S&L p S&L p S&L
Total ($ billion) 37.1 19.6 104.7 58.1 132.2 81.6
Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cash 2.4 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.2
Government securities 8.3 52.5 3.8 14.9 3.9 7.3
Corporate securities 82.0 36.2 87.0 70.8 88.9 82.8
Bonds 37.9 34.2 22.9 57.0 20.4 60.0
Stock 44.1 2.0 64.1 13.8 68.5 22.8
Mortgages 3.5 7.7 3.4 12.0 1.8 8.2
Other 3.8 2.6 4.1 1.4 3.6 0.5
SOURCE: Table 6-3 "Market Value of Assets of Uninsured Private Pension
Funds, 1960-1973" and Table 6-6 "Book Value of Assets of State and
Local Government Retirement Funds, 1960-1973," pp. 105 and 112. Dougall
and Gaumnitz, Capital Markets and Institutions.
p = private; S&L = state and local
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by purchasing mortgages which are made by banks. They are also important
investors in large commercial and industrial real estate projects. But
due to the size of the minimum investment made by this industry, they are
not closely affiliated with purely local or smaller investments. Some
national insurance companies require minimum investment of $2 million,
with regional firms having minimums that range from $750,000 to $2
million. 13
Insurance companies are regulated by the states in which they are
headquartered and those in which they write policies. Their investment
policies appear to be shaped more by their treatment under the federal
tax law then by state regulations, which are more concerned with the
rates charged on policies and the solvency of the company. Pension
funds are restticted by law and administrative ruling from participating
in any but the lowest risk investments. Pension funds were relatively
small as late as 1960, controlling 2.9 percent of privately managed
financial assets. In 1977 they held 4.3 percent; they now rival life
insurance companies in size. They have also hedged their assets in the
same manner as life insurance companies. Under the Pension Reform Act
of 1974 the Department of Labor is charged with examining the quality
of the portfolio and the degree of prudence embodied in the operating
rules of the fund. To insure that they are observing their fiduciary
responsibility, funds limit their portfolios to lower risk issues.
These are, for the most part, equity issues and the bonded debt of the
500 largest firms in the nation and low risk government issues. These
rules deter pension funds from investing in primary issues and any issue
from smaller firms.
There has been a fair amount of coverage given to the growth in
the holdings of pension funds in the popular press. The press has
tended to focus on how the deterioration in the share of the economy's
assets that is controlled by the household sector has been accompanied
by the rise in pension funds. This is old news. The relative holdings
of private pension funds have remained constant since 1965 and those of
government pension funds since 1970 to 1973. The shift occurred from
1950 to 1965 but at the expense of the asset holdings of the corporate
sector. However, the relative holdings of assets of the household
sector fell dramatically from 1965 to 1974 and it has not recovered.
The household sector experienced a 9% drop. At the same time the hold-
ings of the banking intermediaries have risen by 5.7%; federally spon-
sored credit agencies by nearly 2% and state and local government by
0.7 percent.
Credit Unions
Credit unions are highly restricted thrift institutions which are
chartered by both federal and state governments. They have grown abso-
lutely in terms of offices and loans during the post-war period. But
their share of total assets in the financial sector has not changed
appreciably between 1960 and 1977, growing from 0.4% to 0.7 percent.
Credit unions are highly restricted in terms of the type of loans that
they can make to their members. The bulk of their loans in 1977 was
placed on consumer installment debt. This form of debt is not usually
considered part of capital formation.
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Thrift Institutions: Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan
Associations.
Savings institutions showed substantial growth in their relative
share of financial assets during the 1970s. Mutual savings banks held
their traditional share of about 2% but the share held by savings and
loan associations grew from 4.3% to 6.2%. This is a response to the
higher interest rates on savings accounts that these institutions paid
as well as a major innovation in time deposits, high-interest certifi-
cates of deposit. They were also able to increase their holdings of
credit by 4.6% over the decade (see Table 2.12).
Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks are thrift
institutions. Historically they have differed from commercial banks in
their mix of assets and liabilities. They specialize in savings, or
time deposits as liabilities, as opposed to the demand accounts of
commercial banks. Savings banks are more closely tied to real estate
markets, with over 90 percent of their assets invested in real estate,
versus 36 percent for commercial banks.
Mutual savings banks are state chartered, depositor-owned institu-
tions. They are located in seventeen states and Puerto Rico, but the
majority are concentrated in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts.
These institutions offer a full range of account services, NOW accounts,
savings and trust departments. They also have access to a wider range
of assets than do savings banks. However 60% of their assets are
invested in real estate, the bulk of the remainder is invested in
government securities (31%).14 Even though mutual savings banks are
concentrated in the northeast they participate in the national mortgage
market. They use mortgage companies and correspondent banks to purchase
out-of-state mortgages. Out-of-state purchases have accounted for 28%
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Table 2.12. Credit Supply: Claims Held by Private
Financial Institutions
1950 1960 1970 1975 1977
Total ($ billion) 248 497 1070 1742 2127
Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Commercial Bank 50.8 39.8 41.7 42.8 40.7
Savings Institutions 15.3 21.9 23.7 26.2 28.3
Insurance, Pension Funds 30.2 32.2 27.3 24.0 24.3
Other 4.0 6.0 7.4 6.9 6.8
SOURCE: Table 854. "Flow of Funds Accounts-Structure of Credit Supply:
1950 to 1977." Statistical Abstract of the.United States.
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of the mortgage portfolios of mutuals. As a rule mutuals do not make
commercial and industrial loans; again this can vary from state to
state according to local regulations.16
Thrift institutions are vulnerable to disintermediation, as a re-
sult of the mismatch between the term structure of their asset and
liability portfolios. Their assets are primarily long-term and their
liabilities are of a short-term variety. This has led these banks into
placing a greater share of their funds into securities, especially tax-
exempt securities, to act as a secondary source of liquidity, or re-
serves, to back up their cash reserves. Thrift institutions face par-
ticularly severe liquidity problems when disintermediation is accompanied
by a sharp decline in bond prices (which often happens).
Savings and loan associations are the dominant form of thrift in-
stitution in the United States, especially in the far West and Southwest.
17
They are also the dominant source of mortgage credit. Savings and
loan associations usually hold more than 80% of their assets in mort-
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gages. They face the same problem with disintermediation that mutual
savings banks face, except that the problem is exacerbated by a greater
dependence on mortgage investments.
Several actions have been taken to lessen the exposure of savings
banks to wide fluctuations in deposit levels. State chartered associ-
ations are acquiring Federal charters to become members of the Federal
system's regional central bank, the Federal Home Loan Bank. This gives
the association a source of loans to draw on in case of a liquidity
crisis. The associations are also marketing money market certificates
and certificates of deposit to stem the outflow of deposits. But this
does not address the fundamental problem of the imbalance of the term
structure of their asset and liability portfolios. The associations
are prevented by law from investing in assets other than mortgages.
They are currently substituting among types of mortgages. Tradition-
ally the associations specialized in single family residential loans.
Now there is a greater involvement in mortgages that offer higher rates,
turn over quicker and are more marketable on secondary markets, such as
construction loans and commercial mortgages.
Allowing savings institutions to offer 6 month money market cer-
tificates has acted to temporarily stem the outflow of liabilities. In
the spring of 1980, $380 billion were invested in these instruments,
which is nearly 35% of the total deposits of all thrift institutions. 1 9
But at the same time it has not made the liability base of these insti-
tutions more stable. One-third of their deposits is very unstable and
the savers are currently aware of competition from other highly liquid
intermediaries, such as money market mutual funds which extract deposits
from the banking system.
Small savers were allowed to invest in money market certificates as
of June 1, 1978, and at the same time money market funds came into
prominence. At years end 1978 these funds only controlled $11 billion
in assets. However, in mid-May 1980, they controlled $60 billion. Most
of the growth was concentrated from May 1979 to the present.20 With the
shift in the shares of total liabilities that different institutions
hold comes a shift in the relative supply of funds to different sectors
of demand. Money market mutual funds must be very liquid because their
investors can use them as quasi-demand accounts. Regulation reinforces
their natural tendency to invest in highly liquid, low-risk securities.
William E. Donoghue, a prominent analyst, states that "...Today, money
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funds are permitted to invest cash only in money market instruments of
the most creditworthy issuers (e.g., large money center banks, major
corporations, and the United States Treasury). They are also forbidden
from investing in securities that do not have a secondary (resale)
market. For example, although the certificates of deposit of certain
local banks and thrifts may be of high credit quality, there is not a
well-established market for their resale...." 2.1
A Note on the Commercial Paper Market
Several major financial intermediaries depend quite heavily on the
bond market as a source of assets. These are mainly institutions with
long-term liabilities such as pension funds, insurance companies and
bank trust departments. The minimum issue size, ranging from $25,000
to $2 million, severely restricts the direct participation of the house-
hold sector.22 As the term of bond issues has dropped, from 10 and 15
years to five years, with many notes being of 30 day duration, other
intermediaries have become more active on the secondary markets. These
are primarily mutual funds. During the spring of 1980 there were $123
billion in corporate paper outstanding, compared to $156.2 billion in
bank business loans. However, these two intermediaries do not compete
over the entire market for business debt. Only 900 companies partici-
pate in the commercial paper market. Three-quarters of them carry
Standard and Poor's top credit rating. To enter this market the firm
must be large and well known.
Over half of the commercial paper that is issued is placed directly
by the issuing firms to the intermediary. The remainder is sold through
investment bankers on the open market. It is clear that thisis not the
market for small firms (see Table 2.13). Daniel' and Kieschnick present
50
Table 2.13. Costs of Bond and Stock Sales as a Percentage
of Proceeds, 1951 to 1955
Bonds, Notes, Debentures Common Stock
Size of Issue
in Millions Other Total Other Total
of $ Compensation Costs Costs Compensation Costs Costs
Under 0.5 20.99 6.16 27.15
0.5-0.9 7.53 3.96 11.49 17.12 4.64 21.76
1.0-1.9 5.80 2.37 8.17 11.27 2.31 13.58
2.0-4.9 2.37 1.41 3.78 8.47 1.50 9.97
5.0-9.9 1.01 0.82 1.83 5.31 0.86 6.17
10.0-19.9 0.88 0.64 1.52 4.20 0.46 4.66
20.0-49.9 0.85 0.48 1.33 4.98 0.38 5.37
50.0 up 0.88 0.32 1.19
SOURCE: Securities and Exchange Commission. From: Beldon Daniels and Michael Kieschnick. Theory
and Practice in the Design of Development Finance Innovations (Cambridge, Mass.: Department of
City and Regional Planning, 1978). p. 51.
U'
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information from the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the period
1951 to 1955, which indicates that these are substantial scale economies
in issuing corporate bonds, notes and debentures. The total cost, as a
percentage of sales, for issues of more than $10 million, in 1950 dollars,
was half that of smaller issues. There are continued cost reductions
shown up to the largest category.23
There are many institutions which act as intermediaries in the
capital markets but they are not all involved in new capital formation.
These institutions have three distinct functions and each tends to
specialize in one of them. The largest function is to provide a sec-
ondary market for a wide range of assets. They provide a liquidity
facility for the individuals, firms, and financial institutions which
are a primary source of funds for capital formation. This role is
especially valuable when the asset that is being traded is of long term
and the issuing institution has a shorter liability structure. The
intermediary which purchases the asset on the secondary market will have
a longer term liability structure to match the asset. Non-bank intermed-
iaries also become directly involved in new capital formation when they
issue new mortgages. This activity is accompanied by the bulk purchases
of mortgages on the secondary market. The third function is the provi-
sion of credit to commercial and industrial firms. We have seen the
importance of the commercial paper and bond markets as a source of
external finance for larger corporations. However it is inappropriate
for the vast majority of firms in the economy because of an insufficient
asset base. This is the function of commercial banks.
C. Capital Markets as a Barrier to Entry in the Product Markets
We have seen that there is a possibility of the existence of
significant scale economies in raising funds by business firms. It has
also been shown that not all financial intermediaries are structured in
such a way as to be amenable to making direct loans for commercial pur-
poses to small and medium sized firms, leaving the business firms'
demand for funds to commercial banking institutions. Earlier we had
stated that this demand is localized for smaller firms -- it does not
travel well. Therefore, at this point we must see why firms would
restrict their search for funds; and, how the structure of the local
market will influence the cost of loans. This discussion will then be
used to motivate the demand side of the model in Chapter 5.
An important determinant of the spatial size of the loan market is
the cost of obtaining information about the potential loan and the
average total cost of the loan. The cost of investigating a loan in-
creases less than proportionately with the size of the loan, and the
administrative costs are almost fixed. Once a loan becomes large enough
it can be floated in nonbanking markets. The flotation costs in these
markets are large but fixed and the interest rates paid on bonds and
commercial paper are lower.than rates charged by commercial banks. As
the size of the loan increases, so does the market and the number of
alternatives.
The search for money is dependent on the type of loan and debt for
which the firm is looking. The hardest type of funding to obtain is
long-term "patient" money of all kinds. These are equity funds, or long-term
unsecured debt which is a close substitute for equity. Venture capital is the
hardest of all to obtain because there is so much risk involved in the investment.
Venture capitalists demand a high return on their investments for this
reason. During the late 1960s, the years of a bullish Wall Street,
venture capitalists invested in firms hoping to reap huge capital gains
in the stock markets. This pool of money dried up in 1973 when the
market entered the doldrums and risky new issues were downgraded by
investors. During the past year, there has been a resurgence in venture
capital for two reasons. First, the capital gains tax has been cut in
half, making high growth investments very desirable. Second, investors
have shifted their sights from making their gains on the stock market
to selling the new firms to conglomerates once they have proven their
market. Jeffrey Wilson of First Venture Capital Corporation was quoted
by the Wall Street Journal as saying, "You can't look at the (stock)
market as a prime way out of an investment anymore... .You ask, 'Would
this fit as a product line for a major company?'" 2 4
Venture capital firms are also expanding their line of business.
They are starting to take equity positions in established firms that
are refinancing for rapid expansion. Traditional sources of money are
hard to come by for this sort of investment because the loan would only
be secured by the future stream of earnings from the company. Venture
capitalists are also reported to be attracted to another form of invest-
ment called a leveraged buy-out. This is a term applied to the purchase
of an enterprise which has (usually) been spun off from a multi-product
firm to a small group of its managers. These managers provide some of
the equity funds, the remainder of the equity is provided
by one or more venture capital firms and the long-term debt
is supplied by a commercial bank or an investment banking house. New
firms which have been formed through a leveraged buy-out are often
profitable, but they do not meet the selling firm's profit targets or
do not fit into the firm's management structure after it has been re-
organized.2 5
A problem with formal venture capital financing is that even
though venture capital firms have begun to form investment syndicates
the minimum investment required is most often greater than $100,000
and a minimum investment of $250,000 is often requested. Smaller equity
solicitations are usually made privately to family and friends.
Meyer's work on the way in which the banking industry is organized
leads to the conclusion that for larger firms, commercial bank credit
is part of a larger credit market, but they have many substitutable debt instru-
ments available to them.2 6 The range of options that is available to the
firm is in many ways restricted by the size of the firm. Larger firms, with
larger capital needs, have access to a larger network of financial institutions.
The interest rates that are available to the larger firms are set on
national markets or by large commercial banks, which are in direct
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competition with national commercial paper markets., Smaller firms
are restricted to local credit markets because of the paucity of infor-
mation which exists about these firms and the expense involved in a non-
local source of credit investigating the loan. For these firms inter-
regional loans become poor substitutes for local loans.
Several authors have argued that the capital market is a major
barrier to entry in the product markets.28 The arguments follow two
general tracks. First: large and powerful firms can attract capital
at more favorable rates.29 The second line of argument is behavioral
and is based on the banking relationship that is established between
the demanders of capital and the intermediary.
Large firms can generally obtain more favorable rates on credit
than smaller firms and this has been attributed to two sources of
savings. The first is some form of monopsony power. The firm is able
to obtain lower rates of interest on loans because they are an impor-
tant customer to a lending institution (the biggest fish in the pond).
Another form of savings is due to the capital market itself.
Firms which are large and well diversified, or those which operate
in concentrated markets, tend to have more stable earnings than do
other firms. This means that their cost of borrowing will be lower,
as lenders will not have to charge a higher price to maintain the
expected return from the loan.30 If the lower borrowing cost is due
to market power, the capital market is not operating imperfectly; it
is only transmitting an imperfection which exists in the product
market.
The lower borrowing costs of a broadly diversified firm are econom-
ically justified because the borrower is, in reality, offering a port-
folio of loans to the borrower and the safety of diversity is an econom-
ic good. When there is a savings in real resources, a lower price is
justified. However, when a lower price is not matched by a resource
savings, the transaction is only an income transfer from the lender to
the borrower.
Industrial organization economists are concerned that non-economic
savings on the cost of funds can solidify a large firm's position in the
market place by giving them a cost advantage that a potential competitor
could never overcome.31 Large firms also enjoy the economies of scale
in the capital market that were mentioned above. These economies are
justifiable and they are important in the way in which intermediaries
will view the security. Large firms tend to pay lower rates on debt
than smaller enterprises and they can float equity for less average
total cost. The advantage to larger firms stems from the fact that
costs of investigating a loan are essentially fixed; or at a minimum
they increase at a rate that is less than proportional with the loan
size. This is also true for the transactions costs that are involved
in floating equity issues or bonds. It has been found that flotation
costs are inversely related to firm size and the size of the issue. 2 2
Some of the savings may be pecuniary, but.there are real cost savings
in spreading managementpromotional and legal fees over a larger base.
Scherer claims that "investors are evidently willing to buy
securities of large firms at lower interest and profit yields than
similar securities of small firms."33 This pure size effect has been
confirmed in empirical investigations of systematic risk in securities
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markets. Large firms offer security to investors, but the real re-
source savings are not obvious. The real- question to be asked is why
do the returns from large firms vary less than those from small firms?
This is the connection between the output markets and the capital mar-
kets. The stability can come from monopolypower, which would lead to
more stable earnings, or a lower risk profile, and therefore lower costs
in acquiring capital.
Scherer and Sheppard both stress that a firm often needs a large
amount of capital to enter a market de novo. The lumpiness of the
investment alone creates risk, or increases risk, due to the debt struc-
ture of the firm, imperfect discounting, and the desire of investors to
diversify their asset portfolio. These imperfections may contribute
to concentration in industries which require large amounts of capital
5-7
toreach the minimum efficient scale of operation. Pure size, a large
pool of retained earnings, or superior access to capital reduces the
risk involved in lending to a firm in another way: i't has unusual
staying power in periods of active price competition.
Sheppard concentrates on the banking relationship which exists
between firms and lending institutions. The banking relationship is
the central means bankers have of appraising the risk of their loans.
The banking relationship embeds most leading firms and banks in a
strong, informal structure that resists competitive changes and benefits
both parties. The firm benefits because it will have preferential
access to funds in times of credit rationing and it can draw on the
bank's knowledge of the firm to accelerate the processing of loans.
The firm also receives some supervision when they receive the loan.
They would also tend to receive funds at favorable terms as they are
the bank's prime clients.
Banks beniefit because they lower their perceived risk when they
deal with firms over a long period of time. They know more about the
firm's operations, cash flow, prospects and management practices. It
is also less expensive to investigate a loan that is placed in a company
that the bank has been dealing with for an extended time period.
The key to risk aversion is that local bankers operate in an oli-
gopolistic environment, where bank failures have practically cased
since 1935. They have a stable set of clients and well-paying invest-
ment alternatives: government papers, securities, mortgages and loans
to stable companies. The non-quantitative industrial organization
literature depicts the banking industry as being made up of a group of
target earners, not profit maximizers. They can afford to avoid
3;8
investing in enterprises which may have higher expected returns but
at the cost of greater risk.
Sheppard stresses that the primary job of commercial banks is to
evaluate risk and to provide credit. They have an advantage in per-
forming this function at the local level because the information that
is needed to approve a loan is more easily and cheaply available than
it is for an investor who operates on a larger spatial scale. However,
the banker plays a permissive role in the development process. If they
grant the loan, the firm becomes less of a risk. Banks are not neutral
risk evaluators; they "make security by the very act of granting
credit."3 5
D. Summary
The structure of the assets of major non-bank intermediaries has
been examined in this section to determine their function in the finance
capital markets. None of the non-bank intermediaries is seen as having
a term structure, coupled with the legal authority, to engage in sub-
stantial amounts of financing to firms which are not nationally
prominent. The only possible exception is for mortgage financing.
Insurance companies and pension funds can aid the banking sector by
purchasing loans on the secondary market, thereby increasing the liquidity
of these firms.
The corporate paper market is not a reasonable alternative for
firms that are outside of the Fortune 1000. Thrift institutions have
the liability structure to allow significant participation in corporate
capital formation, but they are not allowed to participate by tax law
and regulation. This leaves the banking industry as the dominant
source of finance for smaller businesses, if firms with $50 to $100
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million in assets can be considered as small. The following chapters
examine the commercial banking industry in some depth. The goal is to
identify the economic and structural factors that influence the flow of
bank assets into commercial and industrial loans. The regulatory en-
vironment in which banks operate is reviewed, as is the literature
about bank performance. From this literature and portfolio theory a
structural model of bank behavior is constructed. This is done once the
behavior of banks is described. The last analytical chapter of the
thesis tests the model with data from New England banks.
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NOTES
1. There are two types of capital at work in the economy: financial
capital and physical capital (plant and equipment). In theory finan-
cial capital is just a more mobile form of physical capital which is
transferred, for a price, from those with surplus wealth to those who
need to finance new productive capacity. Departures between the two
occur almost as soon as the investment is made. Physical capital
yields a stream of returns to investors. However, once the project
has ended, or the capital becomes outmoded, it does not disappear. In
fact it requires the use of real economic resources to raze or re-
furbish existing plant and equipment. The problem is further compli-
cated by the fact that not all of the costs and benefits of the invest-
ment are realized by the investor. The deterioration of plant is felt
by adjacent owners. When equipment is not replaced, or gradual dis-
investment takes place, the labor force will experience decreases in
potential productivity. The presence of outmoded plant and equipment
has spatial implications because these private investments are not made
in isolation. They are usually accompanied by complementary public in-
vestments, called infrastructure or social overhead capital. Private
and public investments are a good match when they are put into place,
but twenty to fifty years later the public capital may not match new
plant designs. For example, many of.the older towns in the Northeast
have early twentieth century physical plants. The streets, sewers, and
buildings do not meet the needs of modern production and they are very
expensive to rehabilitate. In these cases the presence of outmoded
capital may inhibit reinvestment.
The problem of the negative externalities that are generated by decay-
ing capital stock is what most analysts mean when they say that there
is a failure in the capital market. See: Rothenberg, Jerome. "Urban
Housing Markets and Public Policy." Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Department of Economics Working Paper.
Bearse, Peter. "Influencing Capital Flows for Urban Economic Develop-
ment: Incentives or Institution Building." Journal of Regional
Science. vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 79-91.
2. Dougall, Herbert E. and Jack E. Gaumnitz. Capital Markets and
Institutions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975) pp. 1-14.
3. Capital markets may be formally or informally organized. Informal
markets are prevalent at the local level, especially for equity capital
investments for smaller businesses. These markets are hard, or nearly
impossible to keep track of, because the investments are idiosyncratic
and are as often made on the basis of family ties and friendship as on
narrow economic calculations.
4. The relevance of portfolio theory to the study of the impact of the
organization of the commercial banking on the composition of assets is
pursued in greater depth in chapters 5 and 6.
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5. "Business Expenditure for New Plant and Equipment: 1960 to 1979."
Table 926. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980).
6. "Uses and Sources of Funds: 1960 to 1978." Table 872. Statistical
Abstract. op. cit.
7. Barbe, Nancy, Susan Bartlett, and Steven Klein. Sources of Finance:
A Comparative Analysis of the Footwear, Metalworking Machinery and
Comouter Industries in New England (Cambridge, Mass.: Counsel for
Community Development Inc., 1980; unpublished).
8. Different industries demand different types of financing due to the
nature of the product or the way the tax code treats investors in the
firm. Companion pieces in the study of New England's economy all
addressed the nature of the capital structure of various industries.
See:
Kurtz, Daniel P., The Lodging Business in New England (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1980).
Trainer, Glynnis A., Metalworking Machinery in New England (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1980).
Bluestone, Barry, et. al., The Department Store Industry in New England
(Boston: Auburn Press, 1981).
Bluestone, Barry, et. al., The Aircraft and Parts Industry in New
England (Boston: Auburn Press, 1981).
9. While debt that is issued by federally sponsored credit agencies is
publicly held, it is used mostly in the private sector. The major
corporations that issue this debt are: Federal Home Loan Banks,
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and the Federal Land Banks.
10. The explicit institutional relationships that exist between the
prominent intermediaries and small business is the focus of a forthcoming
paper: Daniels, Beldon Hull, Nancy Barbe and Alisson Kuznick. "Capital
Markets and Small Enterprise." (Cambridge, Mass.: Counsel for
Community Economic Development Inc., forthcoming).
11. Dougall and Gaumnitz. op. cit. Contains a detailed discussion of
financial intermediaries, concentrating on their sources of funds and
their sources of demand. They also briefly survey the important regulatory
constraints that are placed on these firms. Donald P. Jacobs, Loring C.
Farwell and Edwin Neave. Financial Institutions (Homewood, Ill.:
Richard D. Irwin, 1972) presents a broader view of the money markets,
intermediaries, and demanders of credit. However, this book presents the
financial structure of the institutions in less detail than does
Dougall and Gaumnitz.
12. "Flow of Funds Accounts-Structure of Credit Supply: 1950 to 1977."
Table 854. Statistical Abstract, 1978.
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13. From 1969 to 1975, the average income property loan commitment made
by 15 life insurance companies was $2.25 million. Their average invest-
ment in industrial real estate was $845,000 with a term that was greater
than 18 years. Jones, Lawrence C. "Investment in Income Property
Mortgages" in J. David Cummins, ed., Investment Activities of Life
Insurance Companies. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977.
14. See: "Mutual Savings Banks - Assets and Liabilities: 1960 to
1977." Table 867. Statistical Abstract.
15. This is approximately 20 percent of total assets. Dougall and
Gaumnitz op. cit. p. 61.
16. The difference between states is slight. An example of a state with
a different set of regulations is Maine. Savings banks in Maine are
allowed to hold up to 10 percent of their assets in commercial and in-
dustrial loans. The data are from Dougall and Gaumnitz og. cit. p. 63.
17. Thrift institutions receive substantial tax advantages from invest-
ing in mortgages and they are restricted by law from entering most other
asset markets. Commercial banks have alternative areas of investment
available to them. They tend to avoid mortgages due to the very long
term nature of the asset; it does not hedge the bank's liability
structure. There is also the danger that the fixed interest rate will
fall below competing rates in the money markets.
18. See: "Savings and Loan Associations - Financial Items 1950 to
1977." Table 869. Statistical Abstract of the United States.
19. Donoghue, William E. "Banking's Time Bomb: Six Month Money."
New York Times, Sunday, May 11,1980. Business and Finance, p. 16.
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Chapter 3
THE ROLE OF REGULATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON COMMERCIAL BANK BEHAVIOR
While commercial banks face fewer regulatory restrictions on the
composition of their asset portfolios than do thrift institutions they
still confront a wide array of regulations, which are presumed to have
an impact on firm behavior. Industry performance is not simple to
model or diagnose. Performance is a function of the demand character-
istics which face the firm, the competitive structure of the industry,
and regulatory constraints (if they are binding).1 Regulation directly
influences firm behavior by placing limits on the configuration of
assets and liabilities. It also has an indirect influence on perfor-
mance by altering the competitive structure of the industry and shaping
the rules for what is considered to be proper business conduct. Earlier
we have seen that a combination of regulation and economics has re-
sulted in the commercial banking industry being the institution that
caters to smaller businesses.
Commercial and industrial loans are the largest investments in
capital formation that commercial banks make. They absorb about 19% of
the assets of all commercial banks (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). There are
two types of commercial loans made, short and long term, with the total
being fairly evenly split between the two. Traditionally commercial
banks only made short-term secured loans. These are used to finance
inventory and to meet demands for seasonal credit. The other type of
commercial loan is the term loan; this is a loan that is for a time
period that is greater than a year. These loans are made to finance
expansion plans and other longer term activities of the firm.2 There
Table 3.1. Portion of Total Bank Assets Invested in Commercial
and Industrial Loans: 1965 to 1978
Commercial & Total
Year Industrial Loans Assets Percentage
1978 236.9 1329.0 17.8
1977 207.3 1176.6 17.6
1976 185.1 1040.1 17.8
1975 181.0 974.1 18.6
1974 188.6 927.5 20.3
1973 160.8 842.9 19.1
1972 134.1 746.1 18.0
1971 119.6 646.3 18.5
1970 113.4 581.5 19.5
1969 109.4 535.7 20.4
1968 99.0 509.9 19.4
1967 89.0 459.3 19.4
1966 81.1 406.5 20.0
1965 71.9 382.9 18.8
Mean 18.9
SOURCE: "Commercial Banks - Assets and Liabilities 1965 to 1978."
Table 864. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979.
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Table 3.2. Distribution of Assets of Commercial Banks


















































$974.7 $1040.1 $1176.6 $1329.0
23.7% 24.3% 22.2% 20.5%
8.4 9.4 8.2 6.8
10.4 9.9 9.7 9.4
52.6 53.1 53.7 55.5
18.6 17.8 17.6 17.8
14.0 14.5 15.2 16.1
11.0 11.5 12.0 12.6
SOURCE: Table 864. "Commercial Banks - Assets and Liabilities: 1965
of the United States: 1979.
1. Not a complete breakdown, some smaller categories omitted.
to 1978." Statistical Abstract
1978
are few alternatives to term loans. As we have seen, large firms can
float bonds but this is an expensive enterprise that is only justifiable
for the largest debt issues. The firm can also sell equities or take
advantage of a capital subsidy program that is run by a state agency
(such as an industrial revenue bond).
Commercial banks can invest in mortgages of all types, but they
do not participate as heavily as do thrifts. They originate a large
volume of mortgages but they sell them on the secondary markets. Mort-
gages consistently form a smaller share of total assets than do com-
mercial and industrial loans, even though the share has been increasing
slightly over time. A more detailed description of the asset portfolios
of banks is presented in the fourth chapter.
Frank E. Morris, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
has described the range of non-economic regulation that exists in the
banking field today.3 He notes that the spatial restraints that are
built into the banking system began in the earliest days of the
republic and they have led to an unusual pattern of banking, when
compared to that of other industrialized nations. In most of these
nations ten or fewer commercial banks control at least 90 percent of
commercial bank deposits. In the United States the ten largest banks
control only 17 percent of total commercial bank deposits. However, as
Sheppard points out, it is concentration on the local level that is
most important and in the United States the three-firm concentration
ratio is often greater than 80 percent in local banking markets.
According to one study the average level of concentration in local bank-
ing markets is 67 percent.4 In New England the state-wide three-firm
concentration ratio hovers near 50% and in most banking markets in the
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region it is above 70% (see Table 3.3). These figures understate the
amount of state-wide concentration because it is measured as the share
of deposits held by the three largest banks, not banking organizations.
It does not include all of the members of a multi-bank holding company.
This is part of the reason for Scherer describing the banking industry
as being a loose oligopoly at the national level connected to a series
of local oligopolies. In fact, the top ten banking organizations in
the U.S. control the majority of all of the funds which are deposited
in the 50 largest banking organizations.
The same set of laws that prohibited concentration in the commer-
cial banking system has also spawned a very complex array of institutions
and regulators. Before 1863 all commercial banks operated under state
charters and were regulated, with varying degrees of success, by state
banking commissions. In 1863 the National Banking Act was passed which
allowed commercial banks to apply for national charters; thereby cre-
ating a dual commercial banking system, one under.control of a national
body and one operated by the various states.5 In 1927 the McFadden Act
was enacted, allowing national banks the same branching privileges as
state-chartered banks. This means that some states allow state-wide
branching and others impose varying restrictions on branching. The
impact of the McFadden Act and the Douglas Act of 1956 was to outlaw inter-
state branching. The Comptroller of the Currency chartersexamines and
supervises national banks, therefore it must approve a national bank's
application to branch or merge. The Comptroller is analogous to a state
banking commission in these activities.6
The next layer of regulation came with the Great Depression and
the resulting wave of bank closings. Several important pieces of leg-
islation passed as a result of the closings of 11,491 commercial banks
Table 3.3. Three Firm Concentration Ratios for the Banking















































































SOURCE: Katherine Gibson (ed.). Changing Commercial Bank Structure in
New England: 1975-1976.(Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1978).
from 1930 to 1933. The Banking Act of 1933 established the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This act also amended the
McFadden Act and allowed any national bank to merge with another bank
outside of its headquarters city. The Banking Act of 1935 ended much
of the rivalry between the Comptroller of the Currency and the state
chartering agencies by allowing state chartered banks to receive FDIC
insurance. The purpose of these two pieces of legislation was to make
the safety of the banks' deposits the primary regulatory goal -- the
regulators were to enforce the fiduciary responsibility of commercial
banks.
A. Types of Commercial Banks
As a result of the evolution of legislation there are now four
classes of commercial banks in existence: national banks, state banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System, non-member state-
chartered banks who are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) and non-member non-insured state-chartered banks (see
Table 3.4).
All national banks, those with charters from the Comptroller of Cur-
rency, are members of the Federal Reserve System and FDIC. These banks
are therefore governed by four different regulatory agencies; three of
them are doing what is essentially the same job. The Comptroller performs
the tasks which were assigned in 1863; issuing bank charters, examining
banks for financial soundness, and passes on branch banking proposals. The
Comptroller has added regulatory responsibility under the Bank Merger
Acts of 1960 and the amendments of 1966, which will be discussed below.
The FDIC also inspects these banks for financial soundness. This agency
Table 3.4. Commercial Banks by Class of Bank
in 1970 and 1977
Number of Banks Percent of all Assets
1970 1977 1970 1977
All Banks 13,686 14,707
National 4,621 4,654 59.1 55.9
State, Member Fed 1,147 1,014 21.7 18.0
State, non-member 7,735 8,729 18.5 23.0
Noninsured 184 310 0.8 3.1
SOURCE: Table 863: "Commercial Banks - Summary, by Class of Bank:
1970 and 1977." Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1978.
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passes judgment on the financial soundness of the bank, the adequiacy-of
its capital, bad debt reserves and most importantly of all, it examines
the composition of the bank's assets portfolio and passes judgment on
the soundness of its loans (it places all a banks' loans in one of four categories
according to the risk of the loan). All the agency is concerned with is the proba-
bility that the loan will default. The Federal Interagency Examination Council
has recently standardized bank examination procedures so that the
various Federal agencies now accept a common report. The FDIC bears
the primary burden of examination, and each bank is only visited once
a year by a Federal agency, but the agency can vary.8
The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) also regulates national banks.
The Board of Governors examines and supervises member banks and it is
responsible for enforcing the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, with
the 1970 amendments. The Fed sets the maximum interest rates that may
be paid on savings and time deposits (this is Regulation Q). It also
establishes the minimum investment amounts for certificates of deposit.
The FDIC passed these rules on to national banks that are not members
of the system and to federally insured mutual savings banks. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and its insuring agency passes these rules
to the savings and loan system. The Fed also establishes reserve
requirements for member banks. Their requirements are a percentage of
the deposits, but they are not fixed. The requirement increases with
bank size and it is larger for reserve city banks.9
The second group of banks is much like the first; these are state-
chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System. They
are supervised by the Fed and FDIC, but not by the comptroller. State
banking commissions fulfill the role of the comptroller in this case.
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The third set of banks is growing the fastest; these are insured
state-chartered banks who are not membersof the Fed. They are regulated
only by their state banking commission and FDIC. This means that they
can escape the Fed's reserve requirements and reporting laws but they
can offer their depositors the same security as member banks. The dis-
advantage is that the Fed's discount window is closed to them. These
banks tend to substitute interbank loans and purchases on the Federal
Funds markets from these loans from the Fed. This group should disappear
once the full effects of the Bank Deregulation Act of 1980 are felt. 1 0
The smallest set of commercial banks is composed of the 300 banks
that are state-chartered but not members of FDIC. These escape federal
regulation altogether.
One hundred banks have dropped their membership in the Federal
Reserve System over a seven-year period; this is a net figure from 1970
to 1977. Over this same time period the share of assets which the Fed
supervises has decreased by 6.9 percent, from 80.8% of all commercial
bank assets to 73.9%. Over half of this decline has been made up by
insured, nonmember, state banks. The rest, 3%, has been in the unsuper-
vised sector. The major reason for this shift appears to be an attempt
by banks to escape the reserve requirements that the Fed imposes. In
all probability it has contributed to the diminution of the Fed's control
over the money supply.1 1
B. The impact of Insurance Legislation
Morris and Phillips trace the developments that led to the establish-
ment of Regulation Q, interest rate restrictions on deposit accounts.
The public demanded some form of insurance for their time deposits in
1933. This was necessary to restore the nation's faith in the banking
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industry. However, bankers resisted.this scheme to establish deposit
insurance. They would have had to pay for the insurance out of their
pool of earnings, which was severely depressed. The original deposit
insurance plan enacted in 1933 was expensive; it called for a charge
of one-half cent per dollar of deposits. This is at a time when 90-
day Treasury notes were yielding 0.52 percent.12 Bankers felt that a
quid-pro-quo was called for; they proposed that they would pay for the
insurance as long as the other major cost of doing business was con-
trolled -- that a ceiling be placed on the interest rates paid on time
deposits. The banking industry felt that this would aid firm stability.
It was believed at that time that price competition for deposits in the
late 1920s was directly responsible for the string of post-crash bank
failures. The accepted conventional wisdom of the time was that com-
mercial banks were engaged in a struggle for deposits. To
pay for these deposits they had to approve risky loans with high yields.
This was assumed to be the major element of instability that sent the
industry to its knees from 1930 to 1933..
There have been several important impacts of the regulations that
developed in the 1930s. Until recently small savers were forced to
accept low rates of interest for their savings. The banking industry
was able to achieve oligopsonistic coordination from a governmental
body. It also exposed banks to disintermediation in periods of infla-
tion. The oligopsonistic nature of the market has been eroded by the
explosion of short-term investment vehicles. First, $10,000 minimum
certificates of deposit were allowed into the market in the early 1970s.
Later the Fed quietly allowed groups of investors to pool their money
to purchase these certificates, as long as the service was not advertised
by the bank. Then a number of highly liquid money market mutual funds
began to appear with $1,000 minimum balances. These funds operated in
the markets for government paper, and short-term commercial paper, and
offered rates that hastened disintermediation. Several bond issues
were floated in small denominations from 1977 to 1979 to attract the
small savers. Sears and Roebuck floated small denomination corporate
paper to its customers, avoiding traditional institutional sources of
credit. The State of Vermont issued small denomination tax-free util-
ity bonds and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts floated tax-free general
obligation bonds in small denominations. On June 1, 1978, the Fed
responded to this movement by allowing banks to issue 30-month certifi-
cates of deposit, with no minimum amounts being specified by the regu-
lator, offering a return that is tied to government obligations.
Commercial banks still have a monopsony on short term corporate
demand accounts. In many parts of the country they were the only
sources of personal demand accounts (though this too has eroded due to
the presence of NOW accounts in savings banks, the national reach of
money market funds and draft shares from credit unions). The presence
of Regulation Q has had two distinct effects. The direct price that
banks have had to pay for deposits had been reduced.and savers had to
engage in fairly expensive search to find alternative investment vehi-
cles. They are often excluded due to regulatory minimums, or the
amounts they had to invest in alternative vehicles were too small to
justify the transactions costs that were involved. Bankers dichotomize
their liability base, dividing their liabilities into a group that is
called "purchased funds" and another called "core deposits." Core
deposits are the traditional sources of liabilities and they tend to
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have a low variance. They are also the liabilities which Regulation Q
has influenced the most, e.g., they are the cheapest to purchase.
These deposits are composed of all demand deposits and consumer time
and savings deposits. Purchased funds are made up of certificates of
deposits, federal funds, Eurodollars and commercial paper. Money mar-
ket certificates are usually classified as consumer time deposits.
There has not been enough experience with these issues to tell if they
are truly core -- in that they have a low variance.
The second impact of Regulation Q is on interbank nonprice compe-
tition for liabilities. Banks have substituted convenience and "free"
services for interest payments. Banks are overcapitalized, in that
they have a tendency to build too many branch banks for retail banking
convenience to attract core deposits. They have also bundled services,
such as free checking or deposit premiums, to attract or retain
depositors.
All banks offer the same price on the supply side of the market.
Some of the market power that has been awarded to the industry by law
and regulation has eroded over time but the control over the price paid
to savers is a source of profit to the bank. This offers the bank in-
centives to attract more deposits by opening branch banks. However,
this route is partially blocked by laws which prohibit interstate branch
banking and in some states intrastate branching. The situation was more
restrictive before the passage of the McFadden Act, when national banks
were restricted to one location. To expand their business national
banks in national and regional money centers undertook correspondent
relationships with smaller banks. In effect they represented these
client banks and charged them for services rendered.
C. Correspondent Banks and Participation Networks
At the regional level, there are a few banks (sometimes called
lead banks), usually located in the regional money centers, which head
a chain of smaller banks, forming a system of correspondent banks.
The lead banks perform two major services for their correspondents.
They tie the smaller banks into national money markets by marketing
large blocks of securities to the smaller bank. Lead banks also sell
portions of loans to the smaller banks, thereby allowing the smaller
bank a chance to participate in the loan. This spreads the risk of
the loan among a larger pool of investors and it improves the liquidity
position of the lead bank.1 3
Small banks often have more than one larger correspondent bank.
The correspondents provide a range of services for the smaller banks,
such as check clearing, bookkeeping and management advice, in return
for non-interest bearing deposits or fees. The correspondent can also
become a lead bank in a participation network, where it offers assets
to smaller banks in exchange for a finders fee, syndication fee or
management fee. The two networks are often one and the same, except that on
the supply (or liability) side of the market they are called corre-
spondent banking systems, and on the demand (or asset) side they are
called participation networks.
The correspondent banking network serves as a conduit for taking
surplus funds from the smaller banks and placing them to work in national'
markets. The largest involvement appears to be in the marketing of
primary corporate bond issues and in participating commercial loans.
The lead bank can also act as the trading agent for smaller banks in the
federal funds market, stock market, and other investment markets.
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This network is an important transmitter of national money market
conditions to local credit markets. It provides access to secondary
mortgage markets, which give local banks a source of liquidity for their
assets; and the national paper markets, especially for government secu-
rities, establish the opportunity cost for local funds. Regional de-
lineations are further blurred by the opportunities for smaller banks
to participate in large loans to firms which are headquartered outside
of the bank's market area.
The correspondent banking network is an important way in which the
opportunity cost for funds is adjusted for banks which are located out-
side of national or regional money centers. Loans in the smaller banks'
community must provide a return that is equal to that from a loan in
which the bank can participate, less the lead bank's management fee.
This network has also served as a market for interbank loans, with the
lead bank borrowing from its correspondents for short periods of time.
D. Bank Holding Companies: A Response to Regulation
During the 1920s a second reaction to the limitation on branch
banking took place, the great growth in holding companies. The early
holding companies held stock in commercial banks, investment banks (or
companies that made equity investments), and securities firms. The
entrepreneurs who controlled these financial companies at times added
a life insurance company or two to their personal holdings. The
Depression hit these firms very hard and after 1930 the humber of hold-
ing companies fell. The Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933) forced
the separation of commercial and investment banking activities, either
directly or through a securities affiliate.14 By 1950 there were only
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28 multi-bank holding (MBHC) companies in existence. Later on one-
bank holding companies were formed. Their numbers began to grow again
in the early 1960s.
A bank holding company is a firm that owns a commercial bank, or
banks, as a subsidiary. There are one-bank holding companies (OBHC)
and multibank holding companies (MBHC). Each is restricted in the forms
of nonbanking activities that they may enter. They may expand into
closely related areas but they may not engage in commerce.
Holding companies now engage in business and personal lending
(mortgage, finance, credit card, and factoring companies), investment
or financial advising, leasing services, bookkeeping and financially
related data processing, insurance services especially when related to
credit, and limited courier services. These activities are conducted
as corporate entities that are usually separate from the bank which the
holding company owns.
Holding companies are regulated under two acts of Congress: The
McFadden Act of 1927 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, later
amended in 1966 and 1970. The 1956 Act (sometimes called the Douglas
Act) regulated MBHCs with an eye toward limiting their expansion.
Holding companies cannot acquire a bank in another state unless it is
authorized to do so by the legislature of the state in which the bank
is to be acquired. Inter-state acquisitions are limited to nonbanking
subsidiaries. One-bank holding companies were not regulated until 1970,
and from 1966 until the 1970 amendments were passed, there was an explo-
sion in this activity led by some of the nation's largest banks.15 In
1960 there were only 47 OBHCs and MBHCs; twenty-seven years later there
were 2,027.
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MBCHs are not merged banks. The holding company owns a majority
interest in the acquired bank. But the acquired bank exists as a legal
entity, complete with its own officers and board of directors. This
form of bank expansion is governed by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System under the Douglas Act. The Fed must approve all
take-overs and expansions into nonbank businesses. This form of expan-
sion also distorts traditional measures of concentration, such as the
three firm concentration ratio. These statistics are usually calculated
for the three largest banks, not banking organizations.
Banking regulation is a continual balance between the post-depres-
sion concern for deposit safety and the economic concern for promoting
competition within the industry. The basic conflict between these
goals is evident in the way in which the Bank Regulatory Act has been
administered. An amendment that was made in 1966 charged the Board of
Governors with disapproving any merger by a bank holding company "Whose
effect in any section of the country may be to substantially lessen
competition, or to tend to create monopoly, or which in any manner could
be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive
effects are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and need of the
community." The last clause is what is commonly called a loophole.
Reid presents data that show that after the 1966 amendments were
passed there was a sharp increase in the number of merger requests made
to the Board of Governors. The median approval rate also increased in
1966 from 77.4 to 89.6 percent.16 These mergers have had an effect on
the structure of banking in the United States. MBHCs held 16.2 percent
of total commercial bank deposits in 1970. This is an increase of 8
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percent in 5 years. In 1972 their share jumped to 61 percent. Holding
companies, multibank and singlebank, have controlled a majority of com-
mercial bank deposits since 1970. In 1978 they controlled 68.2 percent
of all bank assets. The specific consequences of this shift are examined
below. At this point, we are interested in the reasons that have been
given for this expansion, an examination of the literature on the conse-
quences of this expansion of holding companies, and in tracing the possible
consequences of this expansion on economic development.
A clear definition as to what the public interest is in merger or
acquisition applications does not exist. Concern over the safety of
deposits is paramount; after that other interests can sway regulators
as to how the industry should be structured and what are the standards
of acceptable performance. Concern about the influence of bank struc-
ture and performance on pricing and lending patterns appears to be given
secondary weight to the influence of the size of lending limits, the
provision of data-processing services, and management services to the
member of the holding company, provision of trust and credit card
services to the banking public, and a spread in the number of branch
banks.
What is clear from the way in which MBHCs are organized is that it
costs more to operate a MBHC than it does to operate a branch banking
system of equal size.17 In fact this expansion causes increases in cost
that often offset any scale economies that can be realized. When a MBHC
acquires a bank, the acquisition maintains its legal identity. The MBHC
then imposes another layer of management on top of the existing layers.
The only economic advantages that can be realized are through better
management of the assets and liabilities of the acquired bank. But as
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was pointed out above, small banks have access to these services through
their correspondent banks, in which case they are charged a competitive
service fee rather than a centrally determined overhead charge. The
holding company can derive two legal benefits. The first is that the
acquired banks will often have lower reserve requirements than the
acquiring bank, so that the average reserve requirement for the holding
company will be lower than for a branch banking system of equal size.
Secondly, the acquired banks will often withdraw from the Federal Reserve
system, if they were members. In some states this will reduce the amount
of required reserves still further.
Merger has an advantage for states with smaller banks, such as in
rural New England. This is a special case where the size of the bank is
so small that medium- to large-sized loans cannot be made, as they will
require the commitment of more than 10 percent of the bank's loanable
assets. This should only deter the bank if the loan is so marginal that
it does not pay to offer the loan for participation. Acquisition in the
form of a holding company offers the bank the opportunity to participate
the loan internally.
18Reid reviews the empirical work on the economic impact of mergers.
The literature itself is marred because there is almost no data on the
cost of the loan (the real price term) and absolutely no data on re-
jected loans so that the sample of loans is biased. Thus qualified, the
literature itself is virtually unanimous in concluding:
...The behavior of bank regulators indicates that they are
concerned with so-called banking factors and that they
generally tend to fall back on so-called convenience and
need factors rather than cope with price competition and
concentration levels. Economists associate competitive mar-
kets with the satisfaction of convenience and needs, while
the regulators appear to have separated these functions....
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It is important to realize that no one has yet produced
any substantial empirical evidence that the public
benefits in a significant manner from a concentrated
banking structure for the appropriate services... .In
summary, a substantial body of research findings indi-
cates that concentrated markets do not serve the public
interest on the services which are most widely utilized
by individuals, households, and small businesses.. 19
Professor Benston looks at the same set of studies and emerges
with very different policy conclusions.20 He notes that methodologi-
cally most of the studies of the impact of concentration on the price
of loans are weak. He correctly notes that existing studies do not
contain sufficient data on either the type of loan that is made, the
risk that is involved in the loan, the cost of handling the loan or
compensating balance requirements. Benston feels that a clear state-
ment cannot be made on the impact of concentration due to these meth-
odological weaknesses. He also states that as no evidence exists to
indicate that more than a few institutions are needed in a banking
market for workable competition to exist, authorities need not be con-
cerned that mergers will reduce competition. He feels that concerns
about mergers blocking potential competition are groundless in any but
the smallest states, and that mergers that are made to stimulate the
growth of a bank's assets are good. He states that "...There is reason
to believe that the desire of bank management for growth as such is a
motivating factor for many mergers. Nevertheless top management's
desire for growth need not be contrary to the stockholders' interest.
For one thing, growth may be a good proxy for expected profits...." 2 1
This is a curious statement for a market that is spatially limited and
where it may be safely assumed that the total pool of liabilities is
fixed (due to price ceilings on deposits that were enforced during the
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time of Benston's review). Real growth at one institution is done at
the expense of another. Benston's arguments then shift to the supply
side, concentrating on the ability of larger, merged banks, to offer
convenience and services to customers. These are the arguments found
under the regulatory loophole mentioned above and are essentially non-
economic arguments for expansion. Benston's reasoning encourages the
formation of what are essentially merged banks without calculating the
economic costs of such mergers.
In addition some more recent studies have been completed on the
impact of concentration on bank behavior and they reinforce Reid's
observations. Increases in concentration are costly to the public.
Edward's study of 34 metropolitan areas found that banks which operate
in more concentrated markets maintain larger staffs and incur higher
labor costs. There is no positive relationship between net profits and
concentration, but there is between operating expenses and concentration.2 2
Graddy and Kyle discovered that when simultaneity in the input and out-
put decisions of the banking firm are accounted for, total loan output
is restrained in concentrated markets. This is consistent with oligop-
olistic behavior. 23
E. Reaction to Regulation
Regulations have provided the commercial banking industry with a
unique position on the supply side of the finance capital markets. In
this submarket the intermediary acts as the demander of surplus funds
from two groups. Small savers, who use the commercial banks' savings
and checking accounts, are the first set of customers. The second set
is composed of corporate clients who use the banks' checking accounts
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and leave compensating balances for loans. The major restriction that
is placed on this side of the market is a price ceiling on deposits,
Regulation Q.
This will result in several actions being taken by the intermediary
to raise the real interest rate that is paid, while keeping the nominal
rate at the legal maximum. Banks will begin to offer premiums for new
deposits. They will also open more retail banking outlets to make it
more convenient to bank, reducing travel and waiting time thereby en-
couraging more deposits. As a result of regulation, banks engage in
stronger non-price competition to lower the interest elasticity of the
supply curve.
Bankers also attempt to make the supply curve less interest-elas-
tic by limiting the number of close substitutes that are available.
Historically in the case of the banking market the Federal Reserve
Board has attempted to limit the range of substitutes that are available,
especially to small savers.
The effects of the Great Depression are still being felt in the
commercial banking industry, especially in the way in which the industry
is being regulated. The dominant regulatory goal appears to be one of
maintaining the fiduciary responsibility of the industry and the profit-
ability of firms in the industry, regardless of the economic cost. The
cold fact is that for this important intermediary to be a 100 percent
reliable fiduciary, more than the "prudent man" rule of investment must
be observed by firms in the industry. All of the firms in the industry
must be profitable; banks cannot be allowed to go broke. This emphasis
pleases the public, a public that is still nervous about banks that can
fold up in the night, and it clearly pleases the members of the industry.
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Unfortunately, there is very little price data on the supply and demand
sides of the market or on the criteria used to reject commercial loans;
therefore we do not really know how much all of this pleasure is costing
us.
There has recently been a great deal of movement on the supply side
of the market. Before a bank is granted a charter, or is allowed to
open up a branch bank, the impact of the development on existing compe-
tition is judged. The preservation of spatial oligopoly has been an
important factor in granting permission by the relevant chartering
agency, either federal or state. The state banking commission has
the final say on expansion, even for national banks. The impact
of this practice will be examined below. But two immediate observations
can be recorded. First, it limits the number of alternative sources of
funding for firms that are too small to approach national money capital
markets. There is a strong suspicion that this can be translated into
oligopolistic power and profits. As it is an implicit goal of bank reg-
ulation that the profit structure of the industry should be supported,
it is assumed that this is an intended result of regulation. This is
especially true if local banks do not actively compete with each other
for business on the asset side of the ledger and are vigilant in containing
their own costs of doing business.
The second major impact of regulation comes from the insuring body.
The regulatory goal of this agency is that banks in the industry be-
have in a risk-averse manner. The regulator will encourage the
intermediary to invest in risk-free paper over'loans, to seek
guarantees for lower risk loans, and to ignore riskier ventures. This
is not to say whether this regulation is correct or not; but it is
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potentially expensive and we should be aware of the costs imposed by
regulation and de facto industry collusion. This is an example of the
conflict between the fiduciary responsibility of the bank and a goal
of encouraging the development of the local economy.
However, competition has entered on the liability side of the market.
The real return to depositors has been eroding at more than 5% a year
due to inflation. Large savers have found alternative vehicles that
will preserve their capital and there has been an explosion of near
money instruments that are beyond the control of the Fed. This has
had two sets of impacts. Consumer advocates and small savers recognized
the unfairness of Regulation Q and have been lobbying to circumvent the
regulation. As the opportunity cost of placing money in deposit accounts
has risen, small savers have begun to bear expensive transactions costs
to circumvent the rules and have found alternative vehicles (including
purchases of durable goods). The intermediaries have also been attempt-
ing to circumvent the rules as they face mounting pressure from dis-
intermediation.
The increased competitive pressure on the liability side of the bank-
ing market has raised the cost of doing business for banks and this cost
pressure should increase as more time deposits become due. This is
going to put added pressure on profits in the industry which will result
in changes in the way in which the industry is organized. On the liability
side firms should engage in a greater array of noneconomic competition
for deposits, primarily through increased advertising services. Branch
banks will be consolidated and electronic funds transfer machines will
be used to a greater extent. As savers invest in new forms of time
depos4ts, service charges will begin to be unbundled, and free
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checking accounts will become more scarce. On the whole these develop-
ments will be visible, controversial and relatively unimportant.
The structure of the industry will change. The introduction of
computers and electronic banking has already influenced the industry;
it has increased the minimum efficient scale of operations from the
level observed in the 1950s and 1960s. There is increased pressure for
banks to expand to cover these overhead charges (this pressure has been
mitigated to an extent by the development of smaller computers). This
can result in a wave of intrastate mergers. The larger impact will
probably be felt by holding companies. If the merger route is blocked,
the larger banks, either MBHCs or OBHCs, will attempt to market their
new electronic services to their correspondent banks.
Still greater changes should take place on the asset side of the
ledger. The profit erosion due to the loss of oligopsony power of banks
will cause structural changes on the asset side. Large MBHCs will continue to op
loan offices outside of their home states to service large corporate
accounts. Attempts will be made to expand MBHCs within states. While
they may not expand in markets they dominate, they will try to expand
in other markets. Small banks will argue politically that they must be
preserved to maintain a competitive banking climate. However, regulators and
the public must not equate the preservation of a large number of small
banks, each with a sheltered market, to the preservation of competition.
There is a fair amount of confusion involved in discussing the
impact that regulation and the way in which the banking industry is
organized have had on the economy in general and, more specifically, on
business finance. At the aggregate level the industry is typified as
being a loose oligopoly and fairly competitive. But this description
is almost meaningless unless one considers the supply and demand sides
of the market for funds. For large demanders of funds, who operate in
the national credit markets, there is competition among and between
spatially disparate commercial banks and between these banks and the
commercial paper market. But this level of competition is applicable
to the 900 to 1000 largest financial and nonfinancial corporations.
The influence of regulators and concentration on demanders of capital
is primarily felt on the local level.
June 1, 1978 was indeed Savers' Liberation Day. This was the first
day money-market certificates were made available. However, even before
this day constraints on the liability side of the bank's ledger books
became less binding. From the mid-1970s on, commercial bankers placed more
emphasis on liability management and began to compete more aggressively
for purchased funds as a significant portion of their liability base.
This has tended to make a greater share of the aggregate liability base
of the banking sector more unstable.
For the purpose of economic development the area of greatest in-
terest lies in the way in which changes on the liability side and
industry structure have influenced the composition of assets of the banking
industry. The next three chapters attempt to provide an answer.
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Chapter 4
THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ENGLAND
It is difficult to obtain information about the structure of the
commercial banking industry in concise form -- particularly at the sub-
national level.1 The information that is available from government and
private sources is rarely available in disaggregated form, that is for
individual banks.. The data that are available have been generated by
security analysts. However, the bank operating ratios that they provide
are analogous to reduced form equations, where the supply and demand sides
are mixed together. It is difficult to use these indicators for anything
but rule-of-thumb investment analysis. They are not designed to be used in a
study of the efficiency of a particular market. Private vendors generally
restrict their studies to banking organization with a minimum asset size of
$300 to $500 million and they are not concerned about local banking markets
per se.
Most banking studies conducted by economists are similarly limited in
scope. In most of these studies there is a loose association between
theory and the description of patterns of bank behavior. However, most of
the work is aggregate in nature and the behavior which is described is usually
that of the industry taken as a whole. In studies of the commercial banking
industry this description has been largely missing at the level of the firm
and for local banking markets, which is a necessary adjunct to theory.
This chapter provides the description with three specific purposes
in mind. First, summary data for the entire U.S. are presented which
depict the aggregate structure of the industry, its size and the way in
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which assets and liabilities are distributed. The second purpose is to
examine much of the same material for banks in the New England states. This
will allow us to see if the banking industry in New England is representative of
the industry nationally. Finally, an examination of the influence of struc-
tural variables on the investment policies of commercial banks in New
England will be begun. This examination is undertaken to determine if
industry structure is related to differences in behavior on the asset and
liability sides of the market. These are not fully developed models of
economic behavior. Instead, the results are used to inform the theory in
the chapter that follows. Theory and description will then be used to-
gether to develop the statistical model in the sixth chapter.
Three types of data are used in this chapter. Extensive use is made
of secondary data which are published by the FDIC. These data are
aggregate asset and liability data for states and the nation as a whole.
The second data source was provided by the security analysis and bank
consulting firm of Keefe, Bruyette and Woods. These data are from the
consolidated statements of banking organizations with assets greater than
$300 million and were collected by private survey and compared against the
reports of condition and income filed with FDIC. The most disaggregated
data set is one that has been generated for all commercial banks in the
First Federal Reserve District, which is composed of all of New England
except for Fairfield County in Connecticut.2 The data are cross-sectional
and have been taken from the December 31, 1977 reports on.condition and
income (the "call" report). The year-end reports for 1977 were chosen so
that the data are directly comparable- with others presented in this work.
It is also the author's contention that the cross-sectional results of
local banking market behavior must be understood before more complicated
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time series analysis is undertaken. This is especially true in a research
scheme which focuses on a financial intermediary during a turbulent in-
flationary period of history.
A. Aggregate Industry Structure
In 1977 there were 14,707 commercial banks in the United States, of
which 10,804 tor 73%) were independent banking organizations. The remain-
ing 3,903 banks were owned by 1,913 one-bank or multi-bank holding companies.
The independent banks are mostly smaller in terms of asset size; banks
owned by holding companies control 73% of bank assets and 72% of all depos-
its. Table 4.1 displays the size distribution of all insured commercial
banks in the United States in 1977. The bulk of the banks (70.1%) are
smaller, with less than $50 million in assets. There are only 119 banks
with assets of more than $1 billion and another 143 banks with assets that
were greater than $500 million and less then $1 billion. 3
New England is similar to the nation in terms of the distribution of
banking organizations by the size of their asset base (see Table 4.2).
The region has fewer industry giants -- banking organizations with more
than $5 billion in assets -- than the nation as a whole, and more banks of the
second rank, $2 to $5 billion in assets. These figures are somewhat limited,
as they report on the consolidated assets (foreign and domestic) of banking
organizations, not just banks. The figures therefore include the assets
of non-banking subsidiaries and for MBHCs they include the assets for
more than one bank. Table 4.2 is also restricted by the lower bound which
is placed on the asset size of the banking organization, $300 million.
These data are restricted to the 31 largest commercial banking organiza-
tions in New England.
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Table 4.1. Distribution of Insured U.S. Commercial Banks
by Assets: 1977
Asset Range Number of
Class (Millions) Banks Percent
1 Under $10 3,787 26.3
2 $10 to $25 4,911 34.1
3 $25 to $50 2,982 20.7
4 $50 to $100 1,483 10.3
5 $100 to $500 976 6.8
6 Over $500 262 1.8
TOTAL 14,401 100.0
SOURCE: Bank Administration Institute. The 1977 BAI Index of Bank
Performance. Park Ridge, Ill.: The Bank ADministration
Institute, 1978.
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Table 4.2. Distribution of U.S. and New England Banking
Organizations with Assets Greater than
$300 Million. December 1979
Asset Range United States New England
($ Millions) Number Percent Number Percent
Over $5,000 41 10.2 1 3.2
$2,000-$5,000 69 17.2 7 22.6
$1,000-$2,000 87 21.6 4 12.9
$750-$1,000 37 9.2 3 9.7
$500-$750 82 20.4 9 29.0
$400-$500 53 13.8 3 9.7
$300-$400 33 8.2 4 12.9
TOTAL 402 100.0 31 100.0
SOURCE: Keefe, Bruyette and Woods, Inc. Keefe Bankbook: 1980
There were 360 commercial banks operating in the First Federal Re-
serve District in 1977 and their distribution by asset size was similar to
that of the industry nationally, with a few exceptions (see Table 4.3).
Proportionately the New England region has fewer small banks and more large
banks than does the nation on average. Nearly one-third of New England's
banks had assets valued between $10 and $25 million and 68.6% of the
region's banks had less than $50 million in assets compared to 70% for the
nation. Proportionately New England had nearly 8% more banks in the $50
to $100 million asset class and 16% more banks with assets greater than
$100 million. This information must be coupled with that from Table 4.2
to derive an accurate picture of the distribution of banks by asset size
in %dw England relative to that in the nation.
New England has fewer giant banking organizations but it does have
more banks with more than $100 million in assets than the nation as a
whole. There are 58 such banks in the First Federal Reserve District and
another 5 in Fairfield County, Connecticut. One guess as to the reason
for the smaller number of large organizations in the face of the large
number of good sized banks is that they are not members of MBHCs. This,
however, is not true. Nearly three-quarters of these banks, 71%, were
members of MBHCs or had a state-wide branching system in 1977. The true
reason is probably due to the fact that the New England states are small
and that restrictions on inter-state ownership have increased the relative
number of intermediate-to-large sized banks in the district by preventing
the inter-state merger of these chains. The New England states are
also close to New York City and large corporations which are located in
southern New England tend to keep their financial offices in New York.
There were another 55 banks in the next size bracket ($50-$100
Table 4.3. Distribution of New England Banks
By Asset Size. December 1977
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SOURCE: Reports on Condition, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. unpublished.
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million). A majority, 60%, of them were independently owned in 1977. But
it appears to have been the size range in which MBHCs were the most active
in making purchases over the next two years. The last group of banks where
ownership was closely examined were the 88 banks with assets which ranged
from $25 to $50 million. Nearly 25% of the district's banks are of this
size, and only 31% of these banks are owned by MBHCs.
There are also distinct differences in the pattern of bank ownership
in New England, which reflects variations in local regulations which mirror
the structure of regulation in the nation. In 1977 22 states allowed state-
wide branching, 16 limited branching and only 12 allowed unit banking. Rhode
Island does not have any MBHCs reflecting that state's long history of state-
wide branching. Maine now allows state-wide branching but the extensive
spread of MBHCs demonstrates the influence of earlier laws. Formerly, Maine
restricted branching to the counties in which the bank was headquartered and
to the adjacent counties. Massachusetts restricts branching to the home
county of the bank and it has experienced extensive growth of MBHCs.
Connecticut allows state-wide branching but prohibits branching into a
town where another commercial bank has its home office. The existence
of this law reflects the political power of the Suburban Bankers Assoc-
iation and has resulted in the co-existence of both forms of expansion,
state-wide branching combined with bank mergers and the formation of
MBHCs. In Connecticut, banks organize as MHBCs for two reasons: to
avoid the home office rule and to retain the good will an acquired bank
has established over time. New Hamphsire has a limited branching law. 4
Vermont has a state-wide branching law.
The banking industry in New England (or more accurely the First
Federal Reserve District) is thus an imperfect but acceptable reflection
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of the industry nationally from the perspective of the distribution of
banks by asset size and local regulation.
At the same time, however, the region is also heterogeneous econom-
ically; New England contains at least three distinct spatial economies.5
There is stagnant older New England: the rural areas, older mill towns, and
the peripheral vacation areas. This is joined by areas of vibrant economic
activity based on high technology, sophisticated manufacturing, and services.
The third part of New England is really suburban New York, the city's com-
muter suburbs and the land of Fortune 500 headquarters and is located in Fair-
field County in Connecticut. This range of activity is very desirable for
several reasons. First there is spatial variation in the demand for loans
in general, depending on the industrial composition of the local market.
Second the long term economic prospects in various markets are different
depending on the secular strength of the local economies. Third the com-
position of loan demand depends on the strength and composition of the
economy. For example, it could be reasonably expected that demand for
commercial and industrial loans will be unusually strong along the Route
128 high-tech corridor around Boston and in southern New Hampshire's
golden triangle, while the demand for mortgages and personal credit maybe
relatively stronger in Connecticut.
The distribution of bank assets by state should complete the intro-
duction to the banking industry in New England. The picture is somewhat
muddy because the assets held by banks in Fairfield County can only be
estimated from the FDIC data file. Historically banks in this county have
held nearly 25% of Connecticut's deposits. Assuming that bank assets are
perfectly correlated with deposits it can be assumed that these banks hold
25% of the state's banking assets. If this is so 23.8% of New England's
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bank assets are held in Connecticut, 16.7% are held in the region's
northern tier (4.3% in Vermont, 6.3% in Maine and 6.5% in New Hampshire), 11% are
in Rhode Island and 48.1% in Massachusetts. Calculating the same dis-
tribution for only the First District leads to some differences: 19% in
Connecticut, 4.5% in Vermont, 6.7% in Maine, 6.9% in New Hampshire, 11.7%
in Rhode Island and 51.1% in Massachusetts.
B. Concentration and Competition
There are a large number of banking organizations operating in the
nation, and most banking markets have more than four banking organizations
open for business. Yet the question remains: do these firms provide
services that are close substitutes for each other? After all, money and
credit are the same ro matter which firm is providing the credit. Sensible
as this statement appears to be, it is not quite accurate. Banking firms
appear to have developed specialized lending functions in areas where they
have a comparative advantage. As was discussed in the preceding chapter,
it is often asserted that the advantage is a function of size and the
liability structure of the bank; this has never been proven, but it is a
widely accepted conventional wisdom. Bank analysts have implicitly used
6
the notion of specialized function to place banks into "peer groups."
In so doing, a number of classification schemes have emerged.
The crudest method is to divide all banks into two major categories,
wholesale and retail banking firms. Wholesale banks are large institu-
tions, in terms of their asset base, but they do not have an extensive net-
work of branch banks. They are called wholesale banks for two reasons.
Their average transaction on the demand and supply sides tends to be large.
The profit strategy of these banks is based on high volume transactions with a low
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markup; it is the same as that of any other wholesaler. Their customers
are large corporations and institutions, and as such they do not have ex-
tensive contacts with small businesses or consumers. Retail banks receive
the majority of their funds from their branch banks and place a large
volume of relatively small-sized loans.
A recent extension of this scheme has been proposed by Light and
7
White. They divided the two broad classes of banks into four groups.
The smallest group of banks in number, but not in size or importance,
is made up of the very large money-center banks. There are approximately
10 banks which fall into this category.8 The majority are headquartered
in New York; two are located in Chicago. These firms are wholesale banks,
serving large multi-national and domestic customers. They operate on the
international money markets and they derive a substantial fraction of
their deposits, loans and incomes from their off-shore operations (see
Table 4.4). This table shows the contribution of international income to
total operating income of the 35 largest banks, ranked by assets. The
international orientation of the 10 largest banks on this list disting-
uishes them from most of the rest. Offshore earnings dominated six of
the eight largest banks and the fifteenth bank. The contribution to earn-
ings is minimal for the smaller banks on the list. The absolute size of
bank assets and liabilities from foreign sources for the 100 largest bank-
ing organizations was examined, these banks are essentially the universe
of American banks which are involved in offshore transactions. Only 50
banks receive more than 10% of their deposits from foreign sources and
only 9 of these banks have more overseas assets than liabilities.
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($ Million) Total Income
(Percent)
1. Bank of America NT & SA 173 35
2. Citibank, N.A. 346 71
3. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 103 47
4. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 95 56
5. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 130 52
6. Chemical Bank 52 46
7. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust 31 20
8. Bankers Trust Co. 54 70
9. First National Bank of Chicago 30 27
10. Security Pacific National Bank 19 14
11. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 17 16
12. Marine Midland Bank 6 20
13. Crocker National Bank 10 12
14. United California Bank 6 9
15. Irving Trust Co. 28 57
16. Mellon Bank, N.A. 19 20
17. First National Bank of Boston 19 35
18. National Bank of Detroit 5 7
19. Bank of New York 4 9
20. Republic National Bank of Dallas 8 16
21. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. 5 21
22. Seattle-First National Bank 7 13
23. First National Bank in Dallas 8 16
24. Harris Trust & Savings Bank 3 11
25. Union Bank, Los Angeles 4 15
26. First City National Bank of Houston 3 8
27. European American Bank & Trust Co. 7 23
28. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. 3 9
29. Valley National Bank of Arizona 3 9
30. Northern Trust Co. 3 10
31. Philadelphia National Bank 8 26
32. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. 3 7
33. North Carolina National Bank 3 10
34. Cleveland Trust Co. 3 7
35. First National Bank of Oregon 1 4
SOURCE: A.G. Becker. Bank: Data
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In short, international banking activity is an important source of
business only to the money center banks and a few large regional banks.
Business Week states that money center banks typically earn more than 50%
of their profits overseas.9
The next group of banks is the dominant regional banks. These banks
are smaller, but still sizeable. As a rule of thumb they had at least
$2 billion in assets in 1979, and often more than $5 billion. These banks
tend to have branching networks and a more substantial retail function than
the money-center banks. However, they act as the region's wholesale
bankers. As such they have specific functions which lead them to downplay
retail activities on the asset side of the ledger. These banks are the
heads of correspondent banking systems and as such they perform clearinghouse
functions (processing checks for smaller banks), loan funds to smaller
banks and break up large loans for sale to its smaller correspondents.
These banks also tend to specialize in serving high volume accounts and
their customers tend to be the large and medium-sized institutions which
operate in the region. In fact the largest domestic bank, the Bank of
America, is often called a regional bank due to these characteristics.
Light and White feel that these banks are important in that they often
dominate financial flows within a region. But they are of much less im-
portance on the national and international markets.10
First National Bank of Boston is the largest bank in the New England
region with $13.7 billion in assets in 1979. It shares the characteris-
tics of both types of banks, important regional and money center. It is
primarily a wholesale bank, which obtAined 53% of its nearly $9 billion
in deposits from foreign sources. It is reported to have developed a
dominant role as the American bank to finance credits to Australia and
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South America. But on the other hand the firm owned 5 other banks with
combined assets of $1.5 billion in 1977 and they have continued to try to
expand their network of subsidiaries. The bank is clearly dominant in
the region, as it has nearly four times the assets of its nearest New
England rival (see Appendix 1). In 1977 the First National Bank of Boston
controlled 13.4% of the total commercial bank assets in the First District.
Other banks which are large enough to be influential in the regional credit
market are Industrial National (Providence); Shawmut and Bay Banks (Boston);
CBT and Hartford National (Hartford). Each of these firms has more than
$2 billion in assets; and they essentially round out the list of New
England banks with foreign deposits. 1 1
The larger banks also have a liability base that is substantially
different from that of the rest of the industry, as these banks manage
their liabilities as a source of liquidity. To do this they actively pur-
chase liabilities on the open market, obtaining large certificates of
deposit, Eurodollars, and making substantial inter-bank purchases of
funds (the inter-bank market for funds is the same as the federal funds
market). These banks tend to have a larger ratio of purchased liabilities
to core deposits.
Light and White call the third group of banks important local
banks. These are medium-sized banks, with assets of $300 million to $2
billion (this rule of thumb is somewhat arbitrary).12 They often have
state-wide branching networks, either wholly-owned or as a multi-bank
holding company.
Large local banks are not active on nation-wide markets. They serve
the needs of local businesses and households; they are predominantly retail
banks, operating extensive networks of branch banks in order to collect deposits.
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They also tie the local credit market to the national markets by providing
funds to the inter-bank market and through their purchases of nationally
traded securities. These banks do not compete on the national markets for
loans or for the direct placement of securities. Instead they purchase low-
risk securities on the national markets. These are risky assets that have
well developed secondary markets, such as local government issues and low-risk
porate bonds. It is important to note that these nationally traded assets
are equally available to all banks due tc zhe quality of information that is
available on the issue and the minimal transactions costs that are involved
in the purchase or sale of the securities. At the grave risk of adding
to the (already) formidable amount of jargon in this field, the two types
of risky assets should be distinguished. Those assets with well developed
secondary markets, easily obtained information and low transactions costs
will be referred to as ubiquitous risky assets. Those assets which do
not have well developed secondary markets will be referred to as local
risky assets.
The 29 largest banking organizations in the First Federal Reserve
District own 72.3% of the assets of all commercial banks in the district.
The 6 regional banks control 40.9% and the 23 largest local banks control
31.4% of the assets. Two of the banking organizations which were mechani-
cally classified as large local banks due to their size in 1977 are almost
large enough to be called regional banks. These are State Street Finan-
cial Corporation, with $1.92 billion in assets, and New England Merchants,
with $1.69 billion.
The smallest banks are numerically the most prevalent. These are
independent banks which operate very small branching networks and have
limited asset bases. Table 4.1 overstates the number of small banking
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organizations nationally. The figures in that table are for the number
of banks, not banking organizations. A significant number of these banks.
are members of multi-bank holding companies. These small banks have a pure
retail function and they tend to specialize in meeting the needs of house-
holds and small businesses. These banks are constrained in their pursuit
of large commercial business by regulations that limit each loan to a maxi-
mum of 10% of a bank's equity.
The vast majority of banks in New England have less than $300 mil-
-lion in assets. In fact, 84% of the banks have assets under $100 million.
But many of these firms are not independent banking organizations. The
bulk of bank acquisitions in the district have been of banks with more than
$50 million in assets, 53% of the banks with more than $98 million in
assets and 42% of those with between $50 and $98 million are owned by
MBHCs or have a state-wide system of branch banks. In Maine almost
a third of all banks are integrated in some fashion and this is true for
25% of the banks in Connecticut and Massachusetts. The bulk of the truly
local banks are small independents with assets of less than $50 million.
These four types of banks do not directly compete with each other.
The large money-center banks face more competition from the commercial
paper market than from the two smallest classes of banks. Regional banks
compete with the money-center banks for the business of larger loan cus-
tomers. But they and the important local banks compete for the commercial
loans of middle-sized U.S. companies. Business Week has called the loan
demand that is generated by firms with sales between $5 and $100 million
the "bread-and-butter customers" of the regional banks. 1 3
The reasons for the specialization of function among types of com-
mercial banks have not been empirically documented. They may be due to
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differentials in transactions costs or to comparative advantage. But
the result is clear. The industry is organized as a loosely knit oligopoly
on the national level, with varying degrees of concentration in local
banking markets. From 1960 to 1978 the largest commercial banks have main-
tained their share of total commercial bank assets (see Table 4.5).
Though there has been some deterioration over the 18-year period it has
not been significant. The ten largest commercial banking organizations
(essentially the money-center banks) control over half of the deposits of
the top 50 banks and 20% of the deposits of all commercial banks. If
these banks essentially compete among themselves and the commercial paper
market, the meaning of traditional measures of concentration quickly be-
comes blurred. In 1977 the ten largest banks controlled 19.4% of all
domestic commercial banking assets and it is estimated that the three
largest banking organizations controlled between 9.3% and 8.1% of bank
14
assets. However, if the relevant market is defined as the 10 largest
banks, acting as a proxy for the "money-center banking market," the
three-firm ratio of total assets is 48.3%.
Three-firm concentration ratios of deposits for New England's local
banking markets in December 1976 were presented in Table 3.3. The same
information for SMSAs in New England in 1979 is presented in Table 4.6.
The three-firm concentration ratio in these markets is usually above 70%
and often much higher. The measure of concentration used in Table 3.3
and 4.6 is the three-firm share of deposits, not of assets. A perfect
correlation does not exist between the two concepts, as banks can pur-
chase non-deposit liabilities to support these assets. It will be shown
below that banks with larger assets are more dependent on non-deposit
liabilities than are smaller banks. Due to this fact it is expected
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Table 4.5. Assets of Largest Commercial Banks, Financial Data,
by Rank of Assets: 1960 to 1978.
(in $ Billion)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1977 1978
Total 50 Largest 98.6 146.7 220.0 348.0 413.1 467.4
% of all Commercial
Banks 39.1 39.4 34.3 35.7 35.2 35.2
% Held by Ten Largest
of all Commercial Banks 21.5 21.9 18.3 20.0 19.4 19.2
of Top 50 55.0 55.7 53.4 56.1 55.2 54.7
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of The United
States. 1979. Table 863. "Largest Commercial Banks -
Financial Data, by Rank of Assets: 1960 to 1978."
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Number Total Percent Percent Percent
of Deposits Bank 3-Firm 5-Firm
State SMSA Banks Bank Name (000) Share Share Share
CONNECTICUT (cont'd.)
New Britan 5 243,650 76.3 100.0
New Britan Nat'l 37.5
New Britan Bank & Trust 26.4
Southington Bank & Trust 12.4




New London 15 503,964 72.4 83.9
Hartford Nat'l 33.0
Washington Trust 21.8
Connecticut Bank & Trust 17.6
Norwalk 8 394,143 59.9 86.7
Westport Bank & Trust 23.6
Union Trust 18.4
Merchants Bank & Trust 17.9
Stamford 10 1,328,740 75.2 88.2
Union Trust 37.0
State Nat'l Bank 29.0
Putnam Trust 9.2
Waterbury 8 706,937 84.8 95.8
Colonial Bank 60.7
Citytrust 13.8
Mattatuck Bank & Trust 10.3
Table 4.6 (cont'd.)
Number Total Percent Percent Percent
of Deposits Bank 3-Firm 5-Firm
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Number Total Percent Percent Percent
of Deposits Bank 3-Firm 5-Firm
State SMSA Banks Bank Name (000) Share Share Share
MASSACHUSETTS (Cont'd.)
Lawrence 12 709,089 80.5 89.4
Arlington Trust 54.1
Bay State Nat'l 13.7
Baybank Merrimack 12.7
Lowell 9 342,902 84.9 97.4
Union Nat'l 51.0
Baybank MIddlesex 20.7
First Bank & Trust 13.2
New Bedford 9 240,425 86.6 98.5
First Nat'l of N.B. 39.0
Baybank Merchants 28.6
First Bank & Trust 19.0
Pittsfield 5 198,401 92.2 100.0
First Agricultural 45.5
Berkshire Bank & Trust 37.6
Pittsfield Nat'l 9.1
Springfield 13 1,068,855 78.8 88.9
Third Nat'l Bank 37.0
Baybank Valley Trust 26.9
Shawmut First Bank & Trust 14.9
Worcester 8 807,151 88.4 97.3
Worcester Cnty Nat'l 47.7
Guarantee Bank & Trust 26.3
Mechanics Bank 14.4
Table 4.6 (Cont'd.)
Number Total Percent Percent Percent
of Deposits Bank 3-Firm 5-Firm










































SOURCE: Table 4 "Percentage of Total Deposits, by Type of Deposit, in the Five Largest Commercial Banks
in Each Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, Grouped by State, June 30, 1979." Summary of Deposits
in All Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1980.
That a concentration ratio which is based on bank deposits will be lower
than one based on bank assets.
The lowest of all the three-firm local market concentration ratios
exists in the Boston SMSA, 52.1%. This number must be taken with a
grain of salt for three reasons. First, the three leading firms in the
Boston market are members of the first, second and eighth largest bank-
ing organizations in New England. There is a major difference in the
liability structure of these banks and 73 of the other 79 banks in the
Boston market. The six largest banks in this market purchase a large share
of their liabilities. This will introduce a downward bias to concentration
ratios whichare based on deposits. Second, the Boston SMSA and Massachusetts
banking regulations combine to artificially hold down the ratio. The ratio
is calculated for banks, not banking organizations, and in Massachusetts
banks can only open up branches in their home counties. This restri.cts the
largest three banks in the Boston market to branching in Suffolk County,
leaving out the other counties in the SMSAs. If the ratio were calculated
for banking organizations Bay Banks would replace New England Merchants as
the third largest bank and the ratio would increase. Unfortunately it is
impossible to compute the magnitude of the change. First National owns two
subsidiary banks in the SMSA; Shawmut owns three additional banks and Bay
Banks owns a total of five banks in the Boston SMSA. The third problem
with the concentration ratio is shared with the other SMSAs which contain
regional banks within their borders: these are Hartford and Providence
(in New England). The question is one of the relevant market for the bank.
Is the market area of the three largest banks restricted to the SMSA? Does
the bank operate on a more highly aggregated spatial dimension, be it the
state, region or nation?
In fact, measuring the three-firm deposit concentration ratio is not a
relevant measure of concentration on the asset side of the market. It is
an acceptable measure on the liability side, where the bank may be an
oligopsonist and depositors would then be restricted in their search for
a higher real return from their savings. These questions will be addressed
later. The concentration ratios for the other SMSAs in Massachusetts are
all greater than 78%. The three-firm share of assets in the state is 50.6%
and the top six banking organizations control 70% of total assets.
Another conceptual difficulty crops up when examining the ratios
for Connecticut, Fairfield County is not in the First District. However,
these data do cover three SMSAs in that county: Bridgeport, Stamford and
Norwalk. Approximately 30% of the state's deposits are banked in these
SMSAs. As part of Bridgeport's SMSA lies in the district and some of the
banks which operate branches in the county are headquartered in the dis-
trict the earlier estimate that 25% of the state's banking assets are
located there is given added credence. Concentration in individual mar-
kets is lower than it is in Massachusetts. But it should be noted that
there are eleven SMSAs in the state and the Fed only recognizes 5 banking
markets in the state. The level of concentration using Table 3.4 is
lower than in Massachusetts but it is still above 70% in the local markets.
The three-firm share of state assets (assuming that 25% are located in
the Second Federal Reserve District) is 48%, which is close to the figure
in Massachusetts.
The pattern of concentration in the other states is more clear cut.
Rhode Island is essentially one banking market and it is dominated by its
three leading banks. The northern tier of New England has few SMSAs so
that Table 3.4 must be relied upon. The states have low ratios overall
but the ratios are high in the individual banking markets indicating that
banks concentrate on one market or a few locations. The exception is in
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Maine which has a three-firm ratio on a par with the more southern
states. It is unique in that there is so little difference in the market
shares of the five leading holding companies. As most of these firms are
present throughout the state there is a chance for vigorous competition
as, and if, each tries to expand its market share.
The data show that individual SMSAs and local banking markets are
highly concentrated and that the three-firm concentration ratio of bank
assets is near 50% in all of the New England states, except Rhode Island.
These figures are, by themselves, just cautionary. They do not prove the
existence of economic harm; they just warn us that there is potential for
collusion. It was also recognized that these data may be misleading be-
cause larger banks may not consider the local market area to be relevant;
they may operate on a higher spatial level. The definition of the rele-
vant market segments has been largely absent from the literature on
bank organization and this has hindered analysis of the impact of bank or-
ganization on the demand side of the market. Most bank studies have
focused on the impact of oligopoly on savers, not on the bank's debtors.
Light and White concluded their examination of the structure of the
banking industry by commenting on the causes of the distribution of banks
by asset size and the role that regulation played in the development of
that distribution:
..Thus, from a largely fractured very local banking industry,
a small number of large national and multinational banks have
developed. The share of all banking services provided by those
large banks has grown in recent years, as our national banking
system has consolidated and developed within ts still pre-
dominantly local regulatory restrictions....
The last portion of their statement is not evident from the data presented
here or in their text. In fact, it appears that consolidation is occur-
ring most quickly among the second and third tiers of banking firms. A
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crude way of determining if banks differ, and if so, how, is to inspect
the asset and liability statements of the various peer groups.
C. The Asset Structure of the Industry Nationally
Commercial banks hold portfolios of both assets and liabilities,
which they allocate according to relative rates of return, taste for risk
and other considerations (which are the concern of the next chapter). They
do have a degree of discretion in the composition of their portfolios;
and there are apparent differences according to the size of the bank. One
example was presented earlier in the chapter, where it was demonstrated
that there were wide variations in the holdings of foreign assets and
liabilities among domestic banking institutions. These were closely as-
sociated with the size of the bank. Only a few dominant regional banks
received more than 25% of their deposits from foreign sources (dominant
regional banks are those with more than $2 billion in assets but with less
than $35 billion). More detailed data on the asset portfolio of commercial
banks are presented in Table 4.7. It should be noted that total bank assets
are more than the sum of the usual investment items (cash, investment, lease
financing, and loans); the remainder being the value of fixed assets, invest-
ments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and other items.
The money-center banks are represented by 21 large banks which are
members of the Fed system and located in New York or Chicago. The category
"other large member banks" is composed of the 153 banks which are members
of the Fed with consolidated assets of at least $1 billion.16 The other
large member bank category is dominated by the group of institutions that
were called important local banks by Light and White. "All other member"
banks are the smaller members of the Federal Reserve System.
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Table 4.-7. Percent Distribution of Funds Among Domestic Earning
Assets of Member Commercial Banks in the U.S.
December, 1977
Large Other All




and Leasesi 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Risk Free Assets 15.7 19.8 21.0
U.S. Treasury 10.4 9.2 11.4
U.S. Govt. Agencies 1.9 2.6 4.8
Federal Funds Sold 3.4 8.0 4.8
Ubiquitous Risky Assets 37.8 36.8 39.1
State/Local Bonds 9.2 10.7 14.4
Other Securities 0.5 0.5 0.8
Real Estate 8.6 17.9 22.5
Financial Institutions2 12.0 6.0 1.0
Security Loans 3  7.5 1.7 0.4
Local Risky Assets 46.6 43.3 39.8
Loans to Farmers 0.2 1.3 3.6
Commercial &
Industrial 36.5 24.5 16.2
Loans to Individuals 6.3 13.8 18.5
Other Loans 2.8 2.4 1.2
Lease Financing 0.8 1.3 0.3
Number of Banks 21 153 5,494
SOURCE: "Commercial Bank Assets and Liabilities: Detailed Balance
Sheet, December 31, 1927." Federal Reserve Bulletin. June, 1978.
1. Total loans and securities, net (includes federal funds sold) plus
unearned income on loans and reserves for loan loss, less federal
reserve stock and corporate stock plus direct lease financing.
2. Loans to financial institutions both depository and nondepository.
3. Loans to security brokers and dealers and other loans to purchase
or carry securities.
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Money-center banks clearly had the largest share of assets placed
in cash balances - this is vault cash, due from other banks and required
reserves. These banks face the highest reserve requirements due to their
size and the share of their liabilities which are demand deposits. How-
ever, over half of the cash assets are attributable to cash items in the
process of collection from other banks. Other large banks had 54% of their
cash in this category also, reflecting the role these banks play in the
international system of finance and as correspondent banks. Cash balances
used to be of primary concern to bankers and regulators as it formed the
primary reserves of the banking system.
The major areas of bank investments are displayed in Table 4.7. The
distribution of the earning portfolio is displayed in this table and some
distinct differences between the three classes of banks become evident.
First the share of earning assets placed in securities is inversely re-
lated to bank size and the share in loans is positively related. Second,
the inadequacy of a commonly used indicator of a bank's role in private
capital formation -- namely, the ratio of loans to total assets -- becomes
quite evident. While the share of invested assets varies by 10%, the
composition shows much wider fluctuations. Larger banks invest a larger
share of their funds in commercial loans while the smaller banks are more
heavily involved in loans to individuals. This is in accord with the dis-
tinction between wholesale and retail banks that was made above.
Earlier, two categories of assets were introduced: ubiquitous risky
assets and local risky assets. There is also a third asset category - the
risk-free asset. It is composed of federal funds and U.S.
government securities. Ubiquitous risky assets are those loans and invest-
ments made in issues which have well developed secondary markets. These
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assets are securities which are issued by institutions other than the
federal government: real estate, loans to financial institutions and
loans to brokers and individuals for the purchase of securities. The re-
maining category is made up of local risky assets: those assets which are
troublesome to liquidate and where information about the issue is not well
known. The largest area of investment is in commercial and industrial
loans, followed by loans to individuals. The other categories are direct
lease financing by the bank, working capital loans. to farmers and miscel-
laneous loans.
There are ccmpelling differences in the investment patterns of the
banks. Generally the largest banks are more heavily invested in local
risky assets, while those with smaller asset bases are more evenly di-
versified.
The money center banks have a smaller share of their funds invested
in risk-free assets. -This is especially true of issues of federal govern-
ment insured debt. One surprising discovery is that it is the important
regional banks, not the smallest group, that invest the largest share of
their assets in federal funds. This may be a reflection of their role as
interregional conduits of funds. It could also be partially due to the
fact that in 1977 there were no reserve requirements on the sale of federal
funds which were made with repurchase agreements.
Each class of banks has invested about the same share of its assets
in the portfolio of ubiquitous risky assets. However, the distribution
within the portfolio is very different, probably reflecting differences in
the opportunity frontier which each group faces. The smaller the bank's asset base,
the more heavily involved the bank is in real estate investments. The oppo-
site is true in regard to loans to financial institutions and securities
loans. The largest banks appear to be the bankers' banks. But this is some-
what inaccurate,as the largest :ategories of loans made by money-center
.a.)
banks to other financial institutions are (in descending order): loans
to non-depository financial institutions, loans to banks in foreign
countries, and loans to real estate investment trusts (REITs) and mort-
gage companies. For the non-money-center banks the order is reversed with
REITs directly following non-depository financial institutions.
The largest differences in the composition of the asset portfolios of banks
lie in their holdings of local risky assets. The largest banks invest
greater shares of their asset base in this area. The money center banks
place over one-third of their earning assets in commercial and industrial
loans. The smaller banks put lesser amounts to work in these assets and
emphasize consumer loans more heavily.
This pattern suggests several hypotheses of investment behavior which
will be discussed theoretically in the next chapter and empirically in the
sixth chapter. The first concerns the degree of "localness" in the
local risky asset. The relevant pool of demand is that for which the bank
has a comparative advantage. Larger banks have a more ex-
tensive market area and their customers are ordinarily the best credit
risks in the economy.17 They then have a larger pool of loans, or wider
opportunity set, with, presumably, better risk characteristics from which
to draw. If the degree of risk from their loan pool is lower than that
of other banks, then it needs to compensate less by purchasing fewer of
the lower risk assets, either the risk-free or ubiquitous risky assets.
However, this does not mean that the larger banks are necessarily in-
vesting in their local (e.g., spatial) market areas. Indeed, the location
of where the capital is physically placed is not revealed to us through
these data, and may be national--or international--in scope.
The second hypothesis is related to the first. Larger banks may be
operating in more competitive markets than do smaller banks. They will,
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therefore, have less discretion in their pricing decisions than will banks
in less competitive markets. If smaller banks have some degree of dis-
cretion in their pricing policies, there will be a reduction in the quanti-
ty of local loans made to support the price the bank receives.
The third hypothesis of bank behavior is one involving nonaggressive asset man-
agement and it has two components. Only banking oragnizations with more than
$300 million in assets are followed by investment analysts but they are not
all closely followed. For example, the stocks of only 23 New England
banking organizations are traded on any organized market. Only 2 of the
23 are traded on the New York exchange and 2 on the American. The rest
are traded over the counter. This implies that the majority of the banks
are fairly closely held corporations which may not have short-term profit
maximization as their primary goal. They may be more interested in long-
term capital preservation. This goal will lead them to risk-averse in-
vestment strategies, which banks that are more widely held may reject be-
cause of pressure to maximize their immediate earnings per share.
The related hypothesis is that smaller banks are operating in
spatially restricted markets, which are protected by regulatory barriers
to entry. The firms are then in a position to adopt the quiet life and
not aggresively seek local risky investments. The firms may also realize
that the major barrier to entry is regulatory and scaling that barrier is
a political process, not a purely economic process. If the bank's
profits are deemed to be too high, new entry may be permitted by regula-
tors. They would then shift their assets into less risky but lower earning
issues to enjoy the quiet life and to stymie new entry. There is a formal
behavioral theory that describes this: it is the theory of"limit pricing."1 8
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D. The Liability Structure of the Industry Nationally
A decade or so ago there was some concern expressed over the stability
of the deposit base of commercial banking institutions. This was when
introductory economics texts instructed students about the implication of
the volatility of demand deposits relative to time deposits. Today con-
cerns over the liability base of the banking industry have changed. Now
the current focus is on liability management and its impacts on the cost
structure of banks and managerial practices. In this section we will
describe the liability structure of the banking industry as of December
1977. It should be kept in mind that this was a relatively calm period
for bank managers when compared to the period from June 1978 (Savers' Lib-
eration Day) to the present.19
Before Savers' Liberation Day, certificates of deposit (CDs) could
only be purchased in very large denominations. This was the only way for
savers to obtain market rates of return on their liquid capital. This
predated the advent of money market mutual funds and was before the Fed
publicized the fact that savers could pool their funds to purchase
Treasury bills.
The way in which large banks managed their liabilities began to
change radically in the mid to late 1960s. The credit crunch of 1966
started the trend toward liability management and the tight money market
condition in 1969-1970 and then in 1974 solidified it.20 Interest
rates hit historical highs in nominal and real terms in February of 1980.
The full impact of sustained inflation on the way in which'banks manage
their liabilities is not yet known. 2 1
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Before the inflationary shocks began to hit the banking system in 1966, the
liability base of a banking institution was considered to be a given and the
bank manipulated its asset portfolio to obtain the level of liquidity
that it desired. The primary resources of the bank were its cash balances,
including mandatory reserves. Secondary resources were the assets which
we called risk-free assets. Most commercial banks received their deposits
from relatively stable, and low cost, demand deposits. Their liability
management job was fairly clear; they invested in longer term assets at
fixed rates. This would provide a matched, or well-hedged, mix of assets
and liabilities.
The change began to be felt when the banks' liability base became
not only more unstable but much more expensive. Banks had to purchase
interest-sensitive liabilities from a number of different channels. This
was especially true for wholesale banks whose main customers were large
firms and institutions which had both sufficient assets to purchase large
CDs, and professional money managers who were knowledgeable about this
new use of corporate funds.
As a result of this learning process it is no longer meaningful to
examine the liability base of banks strictly in terms of time and demand
deposits. Liabilities are more usefully bisected into core deposits
and purchased liabilities. Core deposits are demand and consumer time
and savings deposits. In the 1977 call reports this amounts to all de-
posits except those time deposits above $100,000. Purchased liabilities
are all those funds with market determined interest rates: certificates
of deposit, federal funds, Eurodollars, and commercial paper.22 These
funds are not only more expensive but also more volatile. They pose a
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greater risk of flight from the banking industry.
The rate that is paid for purchased funds is the bank's marginal
cost of money. The interest costs that are associated with such purchases
are also variable. Banks have had to make several adjustments in the way
in which they manage their asset and liability portfolios to stabilize
their earnings.
Bank managers usually solicit and maintain their core deposits from their
existing customer base. This is easiest for a retail banking organization. The
core is then supplemented by shorter term purchased liabilities. It is
hypothesized that the composition of liabilities will have a direct im-
pact on a bank's asset portfolio. The term structure of the portfolio
should shrink to match the new term structure of the liability base and
more of the assets will have to be indexed to match general money-market
conditions and fluctuations in the bank's marginal cost for funds. This is a
reaction to the increased risk of the bank being caught in a liquidity squeeze.
The change in liability structure should also influence the relative
earnings of banking firms. Traditionally retail banking systems have been
more expensive to maintain and their cost of obtaining funds has been
higher than that of wholesale banking systems. This is mostly due to the
added capital and wage costs involved in maintaining an extensive branch-
ing system. However, a retail bank has access to a larger potential pool
of core deposits than does a wholesale bank. This means that as the
relative cost of attracting funds changes the interest expenses of pur-
chased funds will exceed the capital and wage costs of attracting core
deposits. Retail banks are in a position of increasing their profit-
ability relative to wholesale banks. This scenario can be explored by
looking at the liability portfolios of groups of banks and their net
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interest margins. The net interest margin is the difference between total
interest earned and interest paid by a bank divided by total earning assets.
The boom in the creation of large certificates of deposit began in
earnest during the first quarter of 1970. This coincided with the decline
in bank borrowing from their overseas branches.23 Since the first quarter
of 1970 CDs have played a pivotal role in the liability structure of large
commercial banks. Banks purchase liabilities in several related markets.
Their purchases on the overnight interbank market, or the federal funds
market, are made to meet very short run credit demands. Banks purchase
longer term funds by soliciting certificates of deposit or for the largest
financial institutions,by floating bond issues.
The liability portfolios of insured commercial banks are shown in
Table 4.8. The first thing to note is that the money-center banks have
the lowest ratio of deposits to liabilities and that this ratio increases
with decreases in bank size. The remainder is made up of purchased li-
abilities, less certificates of deposit. The same relationship held when
a more accurate measure of volatile liabilities was used, the share of
purchased liabilities to total liabilities (see Table 4.9). This ratio
is a minimum estimate because borrowings from foreign branches are ex-
cluded, which should not have an appreciable effect on the smaller banks
but will on the money-center banks and the dominant regionals. The smallest
banks only purchased 14.6% of their liabilities on the open market, with
most of this amount coming from CDs. The larger banks relied much more
heavily on the federal funds market. It is clear when the data in Table
4.9 are compared with those in Table 4.7 that the money-center banks and
dominant regionals are on net large users of federal funds. The money-center
banks are essentially the only users of the commercial paper market as a
I




Total To Total To Total
Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities
Percent Percent Percent
Large Money Center Banks 100.0 75.7 39.1
Other Large Member Banks 100.0 82.4 32.3
All Other Member Banks 100.0 94.8 14.6
SOURCE: "Commercial Bank Assets and Liabilities: Detailed Balance
Sheet, December 31, 1977." Table 1.26. Federal Reserve Bulletin.
June, 1978.
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Table 4.9. Composition of Domestic Purchased Liabilities
For All Federal Reserve System Banks
(December, 1977).
Large Other All
Money Center Large Member Other Member
Banks Banks Banks
Total Liabilities 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Domestic Purchased
Deposits 39.1 32.3 14.6
Federal Funds 15.6 12.8 3.6
Other Borrowed Money 1.4 0.9 0.3
Time Deposits > $100,000 22.1 18.6 10.7
SOURCE: Same as Table 4.8.
source of borrowed funds, although this is relatively small when compared
to their borrowings from other sources.
The increase in the cost of purchased liabilities may have had an
effect on the net interest margin of banking organizations (see Table 4.10).
Unfortunately, there is no historical series at our disposal to indicate
if the changing prices of liabilities have resulted in a dramatic differ-
ence in net interest margin; however, there is a distinct pattern in the
data. Banks with assets which are larger than $1 billion have much lower
interest profits on their average earning assets.24 The lowest earners of
all are the money-center banks and large regional banks. The difference
may be due to either the nature of their liability base or their profits
on the average loan (the larger banks are mainly wholesale operations and
they may be geared for lower average profits and greater volume in their
loan portfolios).
We have seen that the size of total bank assets appears to be an
important way of categorizing banks. Banks of different sizes have markedly
different asset and liability portfolios. It also appears that they have
radically different customers on both the liability and asset sides of the
ledger book, and as such the peer groups are poor substitutes for each other.
Every member of the industry who was interviewed as part of the early
work on the thesis stated that New England is a capital surplus region
and as such was shipping capital out onto the national, and, in a limited
number of cases, the international capital markets. The region's banks
were exporting funds in several ways. The largest banks were lending
monies directly to firms and governments for investments in plant and
equipment to be built outside of the region. Some of the middle-sized
banks were participating in loans and investments that were generated by
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Table 4.10. Average Net Interest Margin for U.S. Commercial
Banking Or anizations by Peer Group:
1978, 1979'
Number Average Net
of Banks Year Interest Margin2
$5B 41 1979 3.91%
1978 3.90
$2-5B 69 1979 4.88
1978 4.80
$1-2B 87 1979 4.95
1978 4.83
$750mm-1B 37 1979 5.35
1978 5.14
$500mm-750mm 82 1979 5.31
1978 5.20
$400mm-500mm 53 1979 4.99
1978 4.91
$300mm-400mm 33 1979 5.05
1978 4.91
SOURCE: Keefe Bankbook 1980 (New York: Keefe, Bruyette
Inc. p. VII).
and Woods,
1. Net interest margin: net interest (full taxable equivilant)
divided by average earning assets.
2. For commercial banking organizations based on fully consolidated




their correspondent banks. A limited share of local funds was indirectly
invested outside of the region through purchases on the secondary markets.
In the following section we will see if New England's banks invest in a
qualitatively different fashion than do banks in the nation as a whole.
E. Asset and Liability Holdings in New England
There are 381 insured commercial banks in New England, of which
nearly half are members of the Federal Reserve system. Slightly over half
of New England's banks are independent, that is, they are not affiliated
with a one-bank or multi-bank holding company. These independent banks
control about one-quarter of the deposits in the region.25 Most of the
independent banks are located in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont;
they control a majority of the deposits in the latter two states. The
assets and liabilities of the independent banks are the same as those of
the banking organization.
The balance sheets of holding companies are a bit different as they
can acquire assets and liabilities through their non-bank subsidiaries.
As of December 1976 the impact of the subsidiaries on the asset structure
of New England's banking organizations has not been overwhelming. Only
half of the region's 32 bank holding companies engaged in non-bank activi-
ties. These activities contributed from less than one to approximately 10
percent of total holding company assets for the ten largest organizations.
This is in keeping with national averages, where it has been estimated that
non-bank subsidiaries contribute less then 5% of consolidated assets.26
The aggregate asset and liability schedules that FDIC publishes are
an accurate representation of the portfolios of banks in the entire region.
But they do not contain data on the consolidated position of banking organi-
zations as the assets and liabilities of foreign affiliates are omitted as
well as those of.non-bank subsidiaries. The secondary data from FDIC will
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be used to compare the asset and liability portfolios and selected financial
ratios of New England banks with the national averages. Unfortunately, the
data do not control for the size of the bank (which, as we have just seen,
appears to be an extremely important variable). The FDIC data are spatially
aggregated for each of the New England states.
Assets
The average distribution of the earning assets of New England banks
resembles an average of the distributions of the larger regional banks
and the smaller banks which are members of the Federal Reserve system
(dompare Tables 4.7 and 4.11). The state-wide distributions are disag-
gregated by membership status, which by itself is not a good proxy for the
average asset size of the banks. It is true that New England's largest
banks are members of the system and are located in Connecticut, Massachu-
setts and Rhode Island. This fact can be used in guiding the discussion,
as it will influence the resulting average distributions.
New England's commercial banks invest more heavily in the ubiquitous
risky asset than do the two national comparison groups: "other large mem-
ber banks" and "all other member banks." They compensated by investing
less heavily in the risk-free asset, particularly federal funds sold.
There also appears to be an intra-regional difference in the way in which
banks allocate their assets between these two classes of assets. Member
banks invest more heavily in the risk-free asset than do non-members.
There is almost a 5% difference. Almost all of the difference is centered
around the purchase of U.S. Treasury bills; almost 12% of the member
banks' portfolios are invested in this issue and only 8% of the non-member
banks' portfolio. Upon further investigation the difference appears to
be centered in banks in Rhode Island (10.4%), New Hampshire (4.1%) and
Table 4.11. Percent Distribution of Funds Among Earning Assets
Commercial Banks by State (December, 1977)
for New England
Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hanpahire Rhode Island























































































































































































































































































































SOtORCE: Various tables. Assets and Liabilities. Commercial Banks and Mutual
I.embert3__1977. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. nd.
I numbers do not exactly add to 100% due to rounding error.
* nauber is less than 0.05%
Savings Banks:
Massachusetts (2.1%). Banks in the first two states appear to be taking
these funds and investing them in real estate loans. Over half of the
assets of non-member banks in Rhode Island were invested in real estate.
This is compared to the regional average for non-members of 31% and 18% for
members.
The portfolio of ubiquitous risky assets had two main components,
real estate and state and local bonds. New England banks invested, on
average, 11.2% of their portfolios in this asset. Banks in the northern
tier invested about 2% more than the average. The major difference in
the particular composition of ubiquitous risky assets purchased by banks in
New England when compared to the national average lies in their purchases
of real estate mortgages and loans to financial institutions. Banks in
New England purchase more real estate loans and make fewer loans to finan-
cial institutions.
The position of the regional industry's investments in the portfolio
of local risky assets lies between those of the comparison groups. The
group which is made up of regional banks and important local banks invests
43.3% of their assets in the portfolio of local risky assets. Smaller banks
which are members of the Federal Reserve system invest 39.8%. Member banks
in New England invested 43.7% and non-members invested 38.7%, for a regional
average of 42.9%. Banks in Connecticut, Maine and Massachusetts invested
from 40% to 47% of their assetsin this category. The two dominant areas of
investment in the local risky portfolio are commercial and industrial
loans and loans to individuals.
The original reason for the existence of commercial banks was to
make commercial and industrial loans. Nationally there is a wide variation
in the amount of assets invested in these assets. The money center banks
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devote over one-third (36.5%) of their assets to this class. It is
their single largest investment category. "Other large banks" invest
24.5% of their assets in commercial loans. However, the group of banks
which is dominated by smaller institutions only 16.2% of their assets in
commercial loans, which is less than is invested in real estate and loans
to individuals.
Two hypotheses are offered as to the reason for the negative cor-
relation between bank size and the share of assets invested in the port-
folio of local risky assets in general and commercial and industrial loans
in. particular. The first has been discussed in an unsystematic manner-
earlier; this is a hypothesis about the role of the size of the bank.
Large banks invest a larger proportion of assets in the local risky port-
folio, especially commercial and industrial loans, because they specialize
in serving a stratum of the market that has lower risk than do other
market segments. This specialization is said to exist for several reasons.
First the customers of the money center banks are very large institutions
and they must deal with banks with large equity bases, which are capable
of making large loans. Second, these banks are wholesale banks. Their
customers on the liability side areon average, large institutions and they
require sophisticated financial services that only a bank with a large
asset base could support. This breeds a special dependency between the
bank and customer that gives the bank preferential access to making loans
to these customers. Third, larger banks have a comparative advantage in
servicing large loans because they have an asset base which is large enough
to absorb the high fixed costs which are involved in investigating these
loans.
The second hypothesis focuses on the structure of the local banking
market. Crudely stated it is: the higher the degree of concentration
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in the bank's relevant market area the less will be invested in that mar-
ket. This is a theory of spatial monopoly which relies on the fact that
the banks do not face the same inventory problem as industrial firms, due
to the presence of the unlimited demand for their funds in the form of the
risk-free asset. This hypothesis is developed from a series of observa-
tions about the banking market. The first is that the size of the spatial
market in which the bank operates is positively correlated with the size
of the bank's assets. Secondly, two sets of local demanders for the bank's
funds have alternative sources of finance available to them. Thrift insti-
tutions and mortgage brokers compete for real estate loans and finance
companies and retail merchants compete for consumer loans. The area of
demand where a bank's local monopoly power will be most felt is in the
area of commercial and industrial loans.
Both of these hypotheses are loosely based on some notion of port-
folio theory but a model of portfolio selection in an oligopolistic market
has never been developed in the literature. However, it should be empha-
sized that at this point we can only speculate about what has motivated
the bank behavior which has produced these results. Developing a theo-
retical explanation is the task of the next chapter.
In New England banks invest nearly 43% of their assets in the port-
folio of local risky assets but they place more emphasis on consumer loans,
or loans to individuals, than did the comparison groups depicted in Table
4.7. In general, banks in Connecticut, Massachusetts and Maine invested
more heavily in the portfolio of local risky assets and they placed
more emphasis on commercial and industrial loans. Member banks in Massa-
ahusetts and Rhode Island invested most heavily in commercial loans, but
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they are also the states which contain all but two of New England's re-
gional banks. Most of the New England banks invest about 16% of their
assets in consumer loans, with the exception of member banks in Massa-
chusetts.
New England's banks invest heavily (60%) in the asset categories
which contain less risk, which is in accordance with the average for
smaller banks that are members of the Fed system. There appears to be a
systematic difference in the way member banks and non-member banks allo-
cate these funds. Member banks are more likely to place their funds in
the risk-free asset; this is especially true with respect to sales on
the federal funds market. Non-member banks invest more heavily in the
ubiquitous risky asset. This result is due to the large investments that
are made in real estate by non-member banks in New Hampshire, Rhode Island
and Vermont.
On average nearly 43% of earning assets of New England banks are
invested in the local risky assets. This figure ranges between 40% and
47%, except for those groups of banks which are heavily invested in real
estate. The regional average for investments in commercial and industrial
loans is 25%, which reflects the influence of member banks in Massachu-
setts. The bulk of the classes of banks invested about 20% in this asset
category, compensating with higher investments in loans to consumers.
There are several differences that appear to exist among banks in
New England, but no major differences between the regional averages and
the national averages. This is not a major surprise. New England's
banking industry has a diversity of banks, lacking only the money-center
giants; and the region is heterogeneous economically so that there will
be diversity in local demand conditions.
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Liabilities
The differences between New England's banking industry and the
nation as a whole are most evident on the liability side of the ledger.
These differences may be due to some sort of "capital surplus," a slower
adoption of aggressive liability management, or the absence of very large
money-center banks. The cause is not clear from the data but the effect
is: The region has a much lower share of purchased funds in its liability
portfolio than do large regional banks and the share is not much larger
than the share of smaller member banks (see Table 4.12).
Banks in the region purchased 20% of their liabilities on the open
market in 1977, member banks purchased 25%. Purchases of large certifi-
cates of deposit were not terribly low, but purchases on the interbank
market were well below national averages. Intra-regionally there were
differences as well. States in the northern tier purchased the smallest
portion of their liabilities, ranging from a high of 13% in Maine to a
low of 5.7% in New Hampshire. These purchases were also largely restricted
to large CDs. Massachusetts and Rhode Island banks purchased nearly 25%
of their liabilities. They also purchased the largest shares in CDs, over
15%. Member banks in Massachusetts purchased nearly 14% of their liabili-
ties on the federal funds market.
These purchases of liabilities have had an effect on the net inter-
est margin of New England's banks. The net interest margin is the differ-
ence between total interest earned and interest paid by a bank divided
by total earning assets. The higher this number, the larger the
net interest earnings of the bank per dollar of earning assets. This is
the bank's interest profit, or margin. The data in Table 4.13 are for
1977, a year earlier than those presented in Table 4.10. But the pattern
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Table 4.12. Purchased Liabilities as a Percentage of
Total Liabilities for New England's
Commercial Banks by State and Membership
Status. December 31, 1977.
Other Large
Total Federal Borrowed Certificates
State Share Funds Money of Deposit
New England 20.0 7.6 0.8 11.6
Member 25.4 10.2 1.1 14.1
Nonmember 10.2 2.7 0.3 7.2
Connecticut 15.5 3.8 1.7 10.0
Member 18.7 4.8 3.0 10.9
Nonmenber 11.0 2.4 * 8.6
Maine 13.0 4.1 * 8.9
Member 14.2 4.6 0.1 9.5
Nonmember 11.9 3.6 * 8.3
Massachusetts 24.9 11.0 0.4 13.5
Member 30.1 13.7 0.6 15.8
Nonmember 11.4 3.9 * 7.5
New Hampshire 5.7 2.4 0.1 3.2
Member 8.0 2.8 0.1 5.1
Nonmenber 2.1 1.7 0.1 0.3
Rhode Island 25.0 8.3 1.5 15.2
Member 31.7 11.5 1.2 19.0
Nonmember 8.2 0.5 2.3 5.4
Vermont 6.0 0.8 0.2 5.0
Member 5.5 0.2 0.3 5.0
Nonmember 8.2 1.1 0.2 6.0
SOURCE: Various tables. Assets and Liabilities, Commercial Banks and
Mutual Savings Banks: December 31, 1977. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, n.d.
* Percentage is less than 0.05 percent.
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Table 4.13. Average Financial Ratios for New England's Banking Organizations
with Total Assets Greater than $262 Million: December, 1977
Asset Class Number Net Overhead Return Equity as
($ Millions) of Banking Interest Ratio on Earning a % of
Organizations Margins Loans
262-450 11 5.22 62.79 0.84 10.51
451-1,125 11 4.73 63.52 0.64 7.79
1,687-10,302 8 4.10 58.47 0.52 8.89
1,687-2,485 7 4.23 59.85 0.51 8.47
10,302 1 3.17 48.87 0.57 11.86
SOURCE: Keefe Bankbook, 1980 (New York: Keefe, Brayette and Woods, Inc., 1980).
is the same. Smaller banks have the greatest net interest margin and are
the most profitable per dollar of earning assets. These smaller banks
obtained their core deposits through branch banks, as indicated by their
higher overhead ratios. It was less expensive to attract liabilities by
spending overhead costs than it was to purchase liabilities on the open
market. This is reflected in the superior return on earning assets of the
smaller banks. These banks were substituting overhead cost for interest
expense. The overhead ratio is defined as the non-interest expense of
banks less non-interest income divided by net interest income. This is
the overhead expense of generating bank earnings. It appears to have
been a more profitable strategy, as reflected in the higher return on
earnings of the smaller banks.2 7
F. Summary
Studying the impact of industrial structure on the asset behavior of
New England's banking industry will yield insights which are applicable to
the industry nationally. It has been shown that the banking industry in
New England is similar to national aggregates in terms of the structure of
its assets, liabilities, distribution of firms, as well as the way in which
it is regulated by state agencies. There are three ways in which banks in
New England differ from the national aggregates. There are fewer money
center banks in the region and more important local banks. New England's
large banks do not purchase funds on the inter-bank market with the same
frequency as do large banks in other regions of the country. This may
indicate that New England is in some sense a capital surplus region.
The data which were presented in this chapter indicate that the way
in which a bank is organized may also influence its behavior. These
structural attributes of a bank must be incorporated in either the development
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of the theoretical model or in the statistical work which is to follow.
The size of the bank or, more properly, of the banking organization,
appears to determine the market in which the bank operates. There are
four distinct levels in which a bank can compete, and they are not
necessarily mutually exclusive: purely local, regional, national or
international. However, it was noted that banks in one peer group are
poor substitutes for those in other peer groups. Money center banks
operate on the national and international markets. Dominant regional
banks have less to do with international credit transactions and compete
for the debts of national corporations and service the needs of large
institutions in its region. These banks also tend to be the banks of
smaller banks in its regions. Important local banks will be in a
position to compete for the business of large corporations which are
located in its market area and it will tend to serve the needs of the
best commercial credit risks in that market. Small banks appear to
specialize in local consumer finance and in the rural areas of New
England they are important issuers of mortgage debt.
Another important determinant of bank behavior, which complements
asset size, is the form of ownership. The data which were presented
in this chapter indicate that the size of the bank is not as important
as the size of the banking organization. Banks which are members of
multi-bank holding companies and those which are independent but have
branches throughout the state should behave similarly. The legal inde-
pendence of the subsidiary of a holding company is an economic fiction.
The legal fiction of independence has influenced the measure of
concentration which is commonly used by regulators and the courts. The
three, or four, firm concentration ratio of deposits is the measure of
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concentration which is commonly employed. This ratio is calculated for
banks, not banking organizations. If a MBHC owns several banks in a
market area the true level of concentration will be understated. There
is also another problem with this measure. Large banking institutions
purchase an important fraction of their liabilities and they are not recorded
as deposits. This will tend to understate the influence of large banks on
the asset side of the local banking market.
A theoretical model of the way in which banks form their asset port-
folios will be developed in the next chapter. This model incorporates
some of the findings of this chapter. The econometric model, which is
developed in the sixth chapter, uses the theory and the behavioral findings
of this chapter and the previous chapter.
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1. The best published sources for descriptive information on the American
commercial banking system are found in Light, J.O. and William L. White,
The Financial System, (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1979) esp.
Chapter 13: "Commercial Banks" and Chapter 15: "The Market for Short-
Term Corporate Debt."
Dougall, Herbert E. and Jack E..Gaumnitz, Capital Markets and Insti-
tutions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1975).
Jacobs, Donald P., Loring C. Farwell and Edwin Neave, Financial Insti-
tutions, fifth edition (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972).
Also see the annual Business Week issue that rates the 200 largest commer-
cial banks. The issue is usually released in mid-April. Each issue pro-
vides a topical article as well as financial data on the banks.
2. The data were obtained from Data Resources Inc. They are from the
Reports on Income and Condition which are filed by all insured commercial
banks at.year's end with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The data are available to the public from FDIC. However, the computational
soft-ware used in this work is the property of Data Resources Inc. A com-
plete explanation of the reports and the accounting definitions used is con-
tained in: Garcia, F.L. How to Analyze a Bank Statement, sixth edition,
(Boston, Mass.: Bankers Publishing Co.: 1978).
3. "Banking Offices, Assets and Deposits of Banks in Holding Company
Groups, December 31, 1977 Including Foreign Data," Table 76. Annual
Statistical Digest, 1973-1977, (Washington, D.C. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, December, 1978) and "Foreign Lending by Large U.
S. Banks, by Type of Borrower, Maturity and Country: 1977" Table 880.
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1978, (Washington, D.C.: U. S.
Bureau of the Census, 1978).
4. Gibson, Katherine et al., Changing Commercial Bank Structure in New
England, (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Report No. 64,
1978), pp. 14-16.
5. There is no recent work which completely updates the economic geography
of New England. The most recent body of work on the New England economy
consists of several industry studies (Wf which this is one) which were
conducted at the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies:
Kurtz, Daniel P., The Lodging Business in New England (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1980).
Trainer, Glynnis A., Metalworking Machinery in New England (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1980).
Bluestone, Barry, et al., The Department Store Industry in New
England (Boston: Auburn Press, .1981).
Bluestone, Barry, et al., The Aircraft and Parts Industry in New
England (Boston: Auburn Press, 1981).
Barocci, Thomas A., New England's Non-Profit Hospital Industry
(Boston: Auburn Press, 1981).
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A separate study which was conducted concurrently at the MIT-Harvard
Joint Center for Urban Studies:
Dewar, Margaret E., Industry in Trouble: Economics and Politics
of the New England Fishing Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, Department
of Urban Studies and Planning, Ph.D. thesis, 1979).
A geography of employment in New England was written by a group of
students at Harvard's Department of City and Regional Planning: Brown,
Jeffery, et al., "The Distribution of Employment in New England: Trends,
Changes and Prospects, 1962 to 1977," (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity, Department of City and Regional Planning, mimeo, May 1980).
6. Most bank security analysts feel that comparisons of the performance
of banks can only be made within groups of similar banks, that is, banks
of roughly equal size and located in the same area of the country. This
is in fact allowing space to act as a proxy variable which controls for
the demand for credit which the bank is facing, see: "Bank Beauty: More
than Nice Assets," New England Business, March 16, 1980, pp. 12-15.
Keefe Bankbook: 1980 (New York: Keefe, Bruyette and Woods, 1980). Bank
Data (New York: A.G. Becker, Inc.).
7. Light and White, op. cit., p. 208.
8. There is no definitive list of banks which are members of this group.
A common reference is Business Week's annual banking issue (see "How the
Top 200 Banks Performed in 1979," Business Week, April 21, 1980, pp. 105-
118). The domestic giants are clearly Bankamerica and Citicorp. The
money-center banks are most often listed as Citicorp, Chase Manhattan,
Manufacturer's Hanover, Morgan, Chemical, Bankers Trust, Continental
Illinois, and First National of Chicago. "The Fancy Dans at the Regional
Banks," Business Week, April 17, 1978, p. 67.
9. "The Fancy Dans at the Regional Banks," Business Week, April 17, 1978,
pp. 66-72. The regional banks are First National Bank of Boston, Mellon
Bank of Pittsburgh, First National and Republic National in Dallas and
First Pennsylvania, Philadelphia National and Fidelity Bank in Philadel-
phia.
10. Light and White, op. cit., p. 209.
11. We noted earlier that foreign deposits are fairly well correlated
with loans made in foreign countries and if anything domestic banks tend
to have larger foreign liabilities than assets. The clearest indicators
of offshore activity are the share of total deposits which are located
in foreign offices and loans to foreign banks (which were discussed earlier).
In the U.S. as a whole only 0.13% of consolidated deposits were held in
foreign offices of U.S. banks. The percentages for the New England states
in December 1977 were: 0.28% in Connecticut, 0.52% in Massachusetts, and
0.64% in Rhode Island. The other states had no foreign deposits. These
deposits were all concentrated in banks with more than $100 million (the
largest reporting category); the percentages for the three states were:
1.64% in Connecticut, 2.42% in Massachusetts, and 1.79% in Rhode Island.
See: Bank Operating Statistics, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, n.d.). Of the list given in the text Bay Banks
had no foreign deposits and State Street and New England Merchants (Boston),
Hospital Trust (Providence) and Colonial Bancorp (Waterbury) generated
6.1%, 4.5%, 5% and 3% of their deposits from foreign sources.
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12. The criterion that "important local banks" have assets from $300
million to $2 billion is somewhat arbitrary. Light and White avoid de-
fining bounds within which banks must fall but this becomes necessary in
order to make the delineation useful. The first point is that by banks I
mean banking organizations, which will include a number of $100 million
banks. Secondly a measure of the importance of a bank is the degree to
which it is followed by securities analysts and they cut off banks
below $300 million. The third point is that the importance of these cate-
gories and their exact specification will be examined econometrically in
the sixth chapter.
13. "Here Come the Foreign Banks Again," Business Week, June 26, 1978,
pp. 77-86.
14. This figure is a rough approximation. The 9.3% figure is most cer-
tainly on the high side. It was calculated in the following manner: the
share of foreign deposits in each bank was multiplied by total deposits
and called foreign assets. This was then subtracted from total banking
organization assets. The figure for the ten largest banking organizations
was $261.2 billion. The figure derived from the FDIC statements was
$228.2 billion. My estimate is high by 12.6%. Using this method it was
determined that the three-firm concentration ratio, for domestic assets,
is 9.3%. Using the 12.6% error leaves a range from 9.3% to 8.1%.
15. Light and White, op. cit., p. 210.
16. The exact cutoff is not provided in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
However, the 174th largest banking organization had $970 million in as-
sets in 1977. The cutoff used probably was between $900 million and
$1 billion.
17. Sullivan, Timothy G., "The Cost of Capital and the Market Power of
Firms," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1978, pp. 209-217.
Judd, J. P., "Competition Between the Commercial Paper Markets and
Commercial Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review,
Winter, 1979, pp. 39-53;
Light and White, op. cit., pp. 262-288.
18. Hannan, Timothy H. "Limit Pricing and the Banking Industry."
The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, November 1979, pp. 436-446.
Scherer, F.M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980), pp. 232-252.
19. See Chapter 3.
20. Light and White op. cit., pp. 265-277, have an excellent summary of
recent events over the credit cycle covering the period from 1966 to
1976 and the impacts of the cycle on the liability structure of commercial
banks.
21. One possible change from the latest peak in the credit cycle is for
banks to shorten the maturities on their holdings of secondary reserves,
which we called risk-free assets.
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22. Eurodollar purchases are actually liabilities of domestic banks of
funds borrowed from their foreign affiliates. Regulation Q does not exist
in Europe. American banks compete for these European dollars, pay the
going rate and then transfer these funds to the U.S. to invest as the bank
sees fit(as we said earlier, most of these funds are then invested abroad).
23. See Tables 15-4 and 15-5 in Light and White, op. cit., pp. 271-272.
24. The indicator controls for non-earning assets so that differences in
reserve requirements is not a factor.
25. Gibson, Katharine, et al., op. cit., pp. 271-272.
26. Ecker, Deborah, "New England Bank Holding Companies" in Gibson, op.
cit., p. 269, p. 280.
27. More financial data on the 31 largest banking organizations in New
England are presented in Appendix 1.
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Chapter 5
A THEORY OF OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR IN LOCAL BANKING MARKETS
The previous chapters have provided a broad description of the institu-
tional and competitive factors that influence decision making in the commer-
cial banking industry. The purpose of this material was to describe the role
commercial banks have as an intermediary, the structure of the industry and
its importance to the economy. These insights will be used to develop a
structural model of the factors that influence the distribution of bank assets
among various investment vehicles, giving particular attention to local risky
assets. The model will then be used in the following chapter to analyze
data on banking activity in New England.
The chapter has two major sections. The second section presents a well
known model of investor behavior, the capital asset pricing model and a dis-
cussion of the separation theorem that was developed by Tobin.1 This section
may be omitted by those who are familiar with the model. This is followed by
a presentation of two models of investment in the commercial banking industry.
The first is a model of bank investment in a monopolized local market. The
second is an investment model in a perfectly competitive local market.
A. The Demand for Bank Assets: The Opportunity Set
The spectrum of available investment opportunities varies within the commer-
cial banking industry. Banks vary by size, location and organization. Each
of these characteristics will place the bank in a different market, changing
the composition of the demand for its assets. Variations in the composition
of demand will result in a bank having a different mix of assets in its port-
folio regardless of risk preferences and the structure of the local banking
market.
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Most commercial banks are largely restricted to their own local banking mar-
kets for loan application of all sorts. However, a hypothesis which is often
presented is that money center banks and large regional banks have a broader
pool of customers. They have access to a loan market that is denied to smaller
banks due to the transactions costs that are involved. The bank must possess
detailed information about the firm, its products, finances and competition. The
costs that are involved in examining the loan are large in absolute terms
but small as a share of the total loan. The loan itself is profitable
but the transactions costs that are involved limit the initiating role of
smaller banks. Large banks, or banks that have had a history of dealing
with the firm, have an added advantage. Most of this information is al-
ready at their disposal from previous contacts; this is an economic sav-
ings that is derived from the banking relationship. Larger banks also
deal directly in a range of securities that are denied to smaller banks
due to the quasi-fixed cost nature of the transaction. This is most true
in the commercial paper and stock markets. 2
There are three broad classes of assets that a bank can hold. But access
to these markets is not equal, resulting in different realized rates of
return from the asset classes. Therefore banks with different character-
istics have different opportunity sets. There is little difference in
access to widely held, riskless securities. All banks are price-takers
in this asset category. They are also price-takers in the second class
of assets: ubiquitous risky assets. No single bank, or group of banks,
can act in an oligopolistic fashion due to the presence of close substi-
tutes from other intermediaries and the aspatial nature of the market.
The third set of assets is quite different. These are locally generated
risky assets. There is rarely a secondary market for these issues and
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substitutes from other intermediaries are rarely available. It is here
that oligopolistic pricing behavior can become evident (in fact it ap-
pears that banks in different peer groups do not act as close substitutes
for each other).
In developing the theoretical model it is assumed that banking firms
face an absolute liability constraint, their total assets are fixed and
they cannot contract to purchase any additional liabilities. The bank's
problem is to purchase assets which provide the best mix of risk and re-
turn possible; i.e. to assemble the optimal portfolio of assets. The
model used is sometimes called the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which is
derived from portfolio theory. It is a positive model of investor behavior where
the investor is a price-taker. In this way it is applicable to banks for
two of the three asset classes. (In the next chapter the statistical model will
build on the theory and include the third asset and the liability constraint
will be relaxed. Portfolio theory must be the foundation of a model of
the investment behavior of a bank due to the fact that the return from any
single asset is -uncertain; there is an element of risk involved in its
acquisition. The risk is that the actual rate of return from the asset will
be less than its expected yield.
B. A Review of Portfolio Theory
Sharpe has codified most of the derivations that are needed to use
portfolio theory as an analytical tool; the notation that is used has been
loosely adapted from his text. Sharpe models the behavior of a prototyp-
ical investor. In our case we are specifically concerned with the invest-
ment behavior of commercial banks. This introduces unique constraints
and opportunities which will be incorporated into the analysis.
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The bank selects its portfolio by choosing from a vector containing
a number of classes of potential assets. Each asset has an expected value
that is calculated by multiplying a possible outcome (return from the as-
set) by the chance, or expectation, that the outcome will occur. The ex-
pected value of the asset (its mean return) is derived by adding together
the weighted possible outcomes. This can be summarized in the following
formula:
J
(1) E. =.L P. .0..
i J-1 iJiJ
where: i is the i asset (i=1...,I)
th th0. . is the J.. possible outcome, or return, from the i asset
1)
(j-=1, ... ,J)
.th thP.. is the chance that the j outcome from the i asset will
occur. 0 < P. .<l and.P .=1
- 1- J=1 ij
.th
E. is the expected value, or mean, of the i asset.
The expected value of an asset is one way in which to measure its value
But it does not yield any information about the distribution, or
spread, of the possible outcomes. A measure of risk is needed to judge
how-good a "bet" the asset is. The variance of the expected return is
the measure of risk that is involved in the purchase of an individual
th
asset. In the following equation V. is the variance of the i asset:
J1
2(2) V. = P..[(0. .-E.) ]i J= 13 1) 1
The square root of the variance, the standard deviation, is a more con-
venient way to express the spread, or risk, and will be used extensively




where a. is the standard deviation of the ith asset. The standard devi-
ation of the return measures the likely divergence of the actual outcome
from the expected value.
Banks must allocate their total investments among the range of as-
sets that are available to them. The allocation is exhaustive and mutually
exclusive, with the shares of the portfolio going to each type of asset
summing to 1, as is shown below:
I
(4) Z X.=1 and o<X.<l,
. i -i=1 ~
where X. is the decimal fraction of the total asset portfolio that is in-
1
vested in the ith asset. When a portfolio of assets is being considered,
it also has an expected return, just as an individual asset has an ex-
pected return. Now, however, the expectation of the portfolio is the
weighted average of the expectations of the individual assets, the
weights being provided by their share in the total portfolio. The statis-
tical characteristics of the portfolio can be viewed as being the result
of a joint probability distribution, as the probability distributions of
the individual assets are being combined. The expected return, or the
value, of the portfolio is defined as:
I
(5) E = X.E.
p 1 1i=1
where: E is the expected value of the portfolio. The expected value of
the portfolio is the weighted average of the expected returns from each
of the assets (the variance is a bit more complicated). The advantage
of investing in a portfolio over a single asset is that the patterns of
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risk of individual assets may offset each other. The covariances between
assets then become an important concern to the investor in selecting as-
sets to form a portfolio which displays a level of risk which the investor
finds desirable.
The variance of a sum of random variables is equal to the variance of
each variable plus twice their covariance. In the case of an asset port-
folio, where more than two assets or random variables are being combined,
each asset does not necessarily have equal weight. It must be assumed that
each asset carries with it some degree of risk. Later the influence of a
risk free asset on the portfolio will be examined. The variance of the
portfolio is the weighted variance of each asset plus twice the multiplica-
tive weight of the covariance. Using C.. to indicate the covariance ofiJ
realized returns of two assets and a2 as the variance of the portfolio:
p
(6) a 2  X .c..
p i=1 j=1 i j ij
The expression for the variance of the portfolio can be expanded by us-
ing the fact that the covariance is equal to the correlation of the re-
turn from the assets multiplied by their standard deviations:
C..=p. .a.a.ij1 1 J
where: p.. is the correlation between the i and j assets.
13
Substituting this expression into (6) results in:
MN
(7) a = .E X p..a.a.
p i=1 j=l i 3 1] . J
In the two asset case (7) becomes:
2 22 2 2(7a) a = X a +X a +[2x X a a Ip
p 11 2 2 1 2 1 2
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This shows the value of diversification in forming the asset portfolio:
the variance of a diversified portfolio is less than the weighted average
of the variances of the individual assets. The first two terms on the
right hand side are the variances of the two assets. The bracketed por-
tion of the third term is positive as long as both assets are present in
the portfolio:
(7b) 2X1X2 a1 2>0 if: X X2>0
If (7b) is binding then the variance of the portfolio will decrease with
decreases in the correlation between the two assets, the correlation co-
efficient ranging between -1 and 1. Of course if the two assets are per-
fectly correlated the variance of the joint distribution is at a maximum. 3
The aspects of the portfolio which are of concern to the investor are
its risk and return. In effect a bank is faced with a wide variety of
possible portfolios from which to choose, each with different risk and
return parameters. And each portfolio is composed of different combina-
tions of assets. The bank must choose a subset of all the possible investment
portfolios for consideration. These portfolios are those which yield the
maximum expected return for a given level of risk; or have the minimum risk
for a given expected return. These portfolios compose the set of efficient
portfolios, which is also called the efficiency frontier of the opportunity
set (see Figure 5.1).
The boundary of the opportunity set is determined by the aggregation
of the demand curves for the various assets. The opportunity set will
shift in expected value-risk space according to some of the attributes
of the bank. By this it is meant that banks face different aggregations
of demand curves due to exogenous attributes of the bank's location or
organization. Each point on the boundary and in the interior of the
opportunity set is a 2ortfzlio consisting of combinations of individual
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E = f(a )
assets yielding an overall expected return, E , and standard deviation, ,
. P.
Again, the boundary of the opportunity set is called the efficient frontier
and it is the locus of all of the most efficient of the feasible portfolios.
The expected return from the portfolio is a function of the risk of the port-
folio. The efficiency frontier is defined by this relationship:
(8) E =f(o ).
The slope of the efficiency frontier can be thought of as the mar-
ginal rate of transformation between the expected return from the port-
folio and the degree of risk that is embodied in the portfolio. The eff-
ficiency frontier of the opportunity set is convex. This is true because
any portfolio along the frontier can be thought of as linear combinations
of the same set of assets. If changes in the expected returns from assets
are perfectly correlated the variance of the portfolio will be a weighted
average of the variances of the assets. If they are less than perfectly
correlated the variance of the portfolio will decrease linearly and the
standard deviation will decrease by the square root, yielding the convexity
that is shown in Figure 5.1.
Therefore, the curvature of the efficiency frontier is derived from the
covariance between the assets. As the investor moves up along the return
axis the portfolio becomes more specialized, the safety of a well-diversified
portfolio with off-setting risks is traded for a risky portfolio that has
the potential of extremely high returns (the crapshooter's portfolio).
There are limits to the number of assets that can be held in the portfolio
and this yields the two inflection points in Figure 5.1, a and b. At
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point a, a portfolio cannot be found which will yield a lower level of
risk. This is the minimum variance portfolio; the investor is as widely
diversified as is needed to gain as much safety as the economy can pro-
vide and E1 is the most that can be earned. The converse is true at
p
point b. Here the investor is earning as much return as is possible,
2
E , and any more specialization only earns more risk, without any added
p
return.
All points within the opportunity set describe portfolios, which
are linear combinations of securities as described by equations (5) and
(6). As such, each point describes the assets which make up the portfolio.
The portfolio of a bank is a bit more complicated. Bank portfolios are
made up of classes of assets, which are themselves portfolios composed of
individual loans and issues. For example, banks hold a portfolio of
commercial and industrial loans as part of their asset portfolio. Each
class of assets is composed of individual loans, securities or issues.
Composition of the Optimal Portfolio
Any portfolio on the surface of Figure 5.1 is efficient and it can
be assumed that a bank will try to hold such a portfolio. But two issues
remain to be explored. First, how is the optimal portfolio formed;
second, how does the presence of a riskless asset influence the composi-
tion of the portfolio?
The asset portfolio is a linear combination of the assets that are
available to the bank and the opportunity set is the combination of all
feasible portfolios. The portfolios themselves are the amalgamation of
the demand curves for the various assets. Therefore each feasible point
in expected return - risk space represents the price which demanders for
a bank's assets are willing to pay. Banks are able to earn higher returns,
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at constant levels of risk, as the opportunity sets shift to the left in
Figure 5.1. These are in effect higher production functions. On the
supply side, banks are operating at higher levels of utility, due to the
more palatable trades that can be made between risk and return. The
utility function is represented in (9):
(9) U=u(E ,a
p p
Usually utility functions are used to describe the behavior of in-
dividuals, not of firms or institutions. However, in this case it is
quite appropriate. In standard microeconomics certainty of return is as-
sumed in the profit maximization problem. In portfolio theory this as-
sumption cannot be made due to the nature of the good; the theory is a
response to the uncertainty that is inherent in investing. Secondly the
usual penalty that is placed on firms for not maximizing profits (the
entry of new, more efficient rivals) is not easily imposed in the banking
industry, as potential new entrants must first clear a regulatory hurdle.
The third reason for the profit maximizing hypothesis to be suspect was
raised in the preceding chapter. Not all bank stocks are publicly traded.
There are 14,000 commercial banks in the United States; of these only
430 of the largest banking organizations are easily followed by investors.
And of these organizations only 150 have current market statistics pro-
vided on a regular basis, and most of these shares are traded on the
over-the-counter market. Many banks in this country are closely held
institutions. For all of these reasons, the usual implicit utility function
that underlies the profit-maximization hypothesis, i.e. U=u(E ), is not approp-
riate for the study of bank behavior. Equation (9) constitutes the
simplest of all alternatives.
The utility function and the resulting indifference curves are heu-
ristic constructs and are used to develop a model of asset selection.
The utility function is such that banks get increased utility for increases
in expected return and decreases in risks:
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(10) au >0 ; u <0E_ 30
p p
It seems quite plausible to assume that, for individual investors there is a
decreasing marginal utility for wealth, and that for financial institutions,





On the other hand both individual investors and financial institutions
have a decreasing marginal utility for risk:
2
(llb) 1 2 <0.
aT2
p
The relationship between risk and return in the utility function can (for example) be
expressed linearly, where a represents the intercept on the expected
return (E ) axis and A the degree of risk aversion:
p
(12) a = a+XE
p p
According to (llb) X is either constant or it increases at a decreasing
rate, resulting in the concave indifference curves in Figure 5.2.4 In-
creases in utility are equivalent to leftward shifts in the curves. Max-
imizing utility is then equivalent to maximizing the intercept of the
indifference curve on the E axis. 5
p
Knowing the degree of risk aversion, X, is crucial in determining
the optimal portfolio for a bank. The more risk averse the bank, the
steeper is the slope of the indifference curve. Increases in risk aver-
sion will shift the point of tangency to the left in Figure 5.3.
Selecting an optimal portfolio moves the problem to one of selecting
assets. Each point along the efficiency frontier in Figure 5.3 repre-
sents a portfolio of assets and each portfolio contains a different mix
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Figure 5.2. Utility Functions of Banks
U3
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U 1=f(E ,c )
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E = f (a )
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of these assets It is then possible to plot the different linear combina-
tions of risky assets in another graph which make up the portfolios on the
efficiency frontier (see Figure 5.4). X1 , X2, must add up to 1.0 anywhere
along the risk axis, X in Figure 5.4b. In this case, X is the safer asset
and X2 is the riskier asset. Each portfolio in Figure 5.4b is efficient.
However, its optimality is a function of the investor's taste for risk, k.
The expected return of the portfolio is equal to the weighted average of
the returns from each asset (5). When the portfolio is more heavily
weighted toward the riskier asset the variance of the portfolio is in-
creased. This means that a greater return must be derived from the portfolio
to balance the increased risk. Tangency between the opportunity set and the
indifference curve yields a vector of equilibrium holdings of the assets in
the portfolio. This equilibrium determines the mix of assets in Figure 5.4.
Up to this point portfolios have been composed only of risky assets.
But banks have risk-free assets available to them which will influence
the composition of the bank's holdings. The availability of a risk-free
asset can be treated as a two-asset portfolio problem. One asset is the
risk-free asset and the other is the portfolio of risky assets. The op-
portunity set and efficiency locus remain the same as in earlier diagrams.
The change is that there is a risk-free asset which is labeled R in Figure
5.5. The efficiency frontier now consists of the ray from R tangent to
the efficiency locus, point L . This is called the capital market line
p
(CML). The bank can purchase a portfolio that combines the optimal port-
folio of risky assets, L , with the risk-free asset, R, subject to its
p
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Figure 5.4. From Opportunity Space to Asset Space























utility function. The more risk-averse the bank the more heavily weighted
the portfolio will be with the risk-free asset. The variance of the op-
timal portfolio is:
(13) V = x a + (1-X ) 22 + 2X (1-X )PO a
p R R R 1 R R Rl
where: X is the share of the portfolio that is invested in the risk-
free asset
2.
a is the variance of the risk-free asset, which is equal to zero
R
2.
12 is the variance of the risky portfolio
p is the correlation coefficient between the returns from the
risky portfolio and the risk-free asset.
As the risk-free asset has no variance (13) reduces to:
2 2
(14) V = (1-X ) a1 or a =(1-X )aY=CF-p R 1 p R 11X R1.
The influence of a change in the share of the risk-free asset in the port-





The variance of the portfolio will decrease by the square of the share of
the risk-free asset. The slope of the CML can be thought of as the price
of added risk to the investor; it is equivalent to the ratio of a unit
change in return for a unit change in risk. If the bank is restricted
so that it cannot borrow to finance its portfolio the optimal portfolio
will reside on the CML between R and L . The point is determined by
p
the tangency between the CML and the bank's indifference curve.
Figure 5.5 shows what the impact of a change in the risk-free asset
is on the composition of the risky portfolio, L , and the portfolio that
p
is held by the investor - the optimal portfolio, O. The return~ from
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the risk-free asset is increased from R to R 2 , thereby increasing the
intercept of the CML on the E axis. This results in a decrease in the
price of risk, which is the slope of CML. As risk is now cheaper, the
optimal risky portfolio will contain a higher share of the riskier as-
9
set; therefore X will increase. The risky portfolio will shift from2
L to L . A basic assumption behind Markowitz' portfolio theory is
pl p2
that the optimal risky portfolio can be purchased in any amount by all
investors as they are assumed to be price-takers. The actual share of
the risky portfolio in the optimal portfolio depends on the investor's
taste for risk, the utility function- In the case presented in Figure 5.5
the optimal portfolio that is consumed by the investor shifts from o1 to o2'
This is a simple restatement of Tobin's separation theorem.10 The
theorem was so named because it separates the decisions about risk preference and
asset selection into two separate decisions. The theorem asserts that the
composition of the portfolio of risky assets will be the same for all investors.
What will change is the share of the total portfolio that is composed of the
risky portfolio. This is a function of the bank's degree of risk aversion.
However, as Sharpe has indicated, the separation theorem usually does not
apply if there are additional constraints placed on the investor.11 The sep-
aration theorem is only binding at those times when the risky portfolio (Lp
will be held when the. investor is risk-neutral(X=0). The presence of investment
constraints could force the investor to the interior of the opportunity set.
This problem can be avoided in the development of the theory by redefining
the asset base. The relevant measure of assets is total earning assets,
not total assets.
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A second point to be made is that all components of the risky
portfolio, L , must be available to all potential investors at the same
p
price. If the opportunity set is restricted in any significant way to
specific groups of banks then each group will have a different optimal
portfolio of risky assets.
Despite these problems with a direct application of the separation
theorem an important insight can be derived from it which will be useful
later. As the risk-free rate increases there will be a shift in the
share of the risky portfolio (L ) in the optimal portfolio (0) that the
p
investor will hold.
Portfolio theory serves as the departure point in examining the
way in which banks allocate their portfolios at the local level. The
opportunity set is exogenous to the firm, representing the aggrega-
tion of the demand curves for each asset. ThE risk-free asset competes
against the portfolio of risky assets, not against each individual risky
asset. Utility maximization is in reality the supply side of the three-
way transaction. The bank's decision to supply funds to a specific de-
mander first involves a trade-off between the risk-free asset and the
risky portfolio and then funds are allocated within the risky port-
folio.
We have introduced a model with three assets, two of which may be
collapsed into one asset class, called the portfolio of risky assets.
10
The risky portfolio is a group of assets which are available to all banks
at the same prices. The other asset is the risk-free asset which is com-
bined with the risky portfolio in accordance with the investor's risk
preferences. Together these two assets combine to form a portfolio which
was called the optimal portfolio. These assets are assumed to be ubiq-
uitous and available to all banks at the same price. Now we must depart
from this two-asset world and introduce a third - locally-generated risky
assets. It is contended that these assets are not uniformly available
to all commercial banks and that banks do not necessarily act as price
takers in this asset category.
C. The Demand Side of the Local Credit Market: Departures from Modern
Portfolio Theory
A major problem with applying portfolio theory to a study of local
commercial banking markets is that opportunity sets vary by location and
bank size. This implies that the collection of risky portfolios and the
resulting optimal portfolio will vary for reasons apart from the risk
preferences of the bank. Location plays a major role in shaping the op-
portunity set which the bank faces, as a significant portion of the poten-
tial assets of a bank are generated locally. Locally generated assets
include: commercial and industrial loans, mortgages and consumer debt.
All of these assets, except real estate, were called local risky assets
earlier. The strength of loan demand will vary from market to market
and by bank size. This variation could be due to any of several reasons,
and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the causes. Pres-
ently it is desirable to enumerate these causes as a means of introducing
the two market models which are developed below.
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Demand for credit in the productive sectors of the economy is essen-
tially derived from product demand, or more accurately expected product
demand. The household sector uses credit for two purposes. One is to
satisfy immediate wants; the other is to invest in durable products,
housing, automobiles, etc. This is demand that is induced by spending in
the basic sectors of the local economy. In this way the opportunity set
which exists in a local banking market depends on the industrial compo-
sition of the market area. If the local economy is declining, or is
dominated by very competitive or cyclically sensitive industries, the ex-
pected return from a locally generated loan will be downgraded. This
means that the risk-return characteristics of the same asset may be in-
ferior to that of a bank which is located in another region. Even though
a general change in conditions may not directly influence a particular
loan, or potential loan, the indirect effects will be felt.
Banks which operate in physically isolated regions will also face
a restricted pool of demand. It is costly to investigate potential loans
that are physically distant from the bank's offices. Information that is
needed to process a loan is partly objective and partly idiosyncratic;
this is information on the character and strength of the borrowing firm's
management, the physical design of their plants and distribution systems,
etc. Idiosyncratic data on the firm are expensive to obtain and they do
not travel well. Recognizing the fact that banks have accumulated knowl-
edge about their customers and local market areas and that there are
imperfections in the interregional dissemination of information gives
rise to tie possibility that banks develop comparative advantages in
servicing classes of customers. Purely local banks, that is retail
banks whose customers on the supply and demand sides are restricted to
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their immediate banking markets, may find it relatively cheaper to serv-
ice local demand than larger national accounts. This would be reinforced
by legal lending limitations. On the other hand, banks with large asset
bases, and wholesale banks in general, tend to have a greater share of
larger corporate clients as both borrowers and depositors. These banks
are often forced to engage in a more formal investigation of their loan
applications, raising the fixed cost of processing all applications.
Larger banks would then have a comparative advantage in specializing in and
processing larger loans, thereby amortizing the greater fixed costs over
a larger loan base.
Differentials in the comparative costs of accounts, on the supply
and demand sides ofthe bank's ledger, may be an important force behind
Sheppard's concept of "banking relationship." Another important facet
of a well-developed banking relationship is that it is symbiotic - it
protects both parties in the transaction.12 The bank benefits because
it has the first chance to satisfy the loan demands of its larger cus-
tomers. These customers will often have long credit histories and, for
the largest banks, operate in relatively stable markets. They are the
good commercial credit risks. Commercial customers benefit from the
existence of a banking relationship in several ways. Primarily, they
are assured credit during periods of tight money, when banks are ration-
ing funds.13 They may also receive in-kind services from their bankers,
which range from payroll accounting to financial advising.
An Intuitive Approach to the Problem
Banks form their asset portfolios from three classes of assets: risk-
free assets, ubiquitous risky assets and local risky assets. Standard
portfolio theory is only concerned with the first two classes of assets,
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as their properties conform to the major assumptions of portfolio theory.
Two of the assumptions are particularly problematical in discussing the
portfolio behavior of commercial banks. First, that the investor, in
this case the bank, is a price taker. Second, following from the first,
that the risky portfolio is equally available to all investors. The
problem is that banks are not necessarily price takers in the local market
and that by the act of making loans-they are changing the configuration
of the available risky portfolio. In short, there are quantity effects
that are absent from the Markowitz model. Banks can act as spatial
monopolies. The standard portfolio model posits that the expected return
from a portfolio is a sole function of the variance of the portfolio (see
equation 8).
It is reasonable to assume that all banks have equal access to two
of the asset classes: the risk-free asset and the portfolio of ubiquitous
risky assets. If banks were restricted to holding these two asset classes,
then their capital market lines would be identical, and all banks would be
price takers. The size of their liability base would not influence the
composition of their asset holdings. However, with the introduction of
the third asset class, local risky assets, differences in the opportunity
sets will occur.
The efficiency frontier in standard portfolio theory is determined by
the relationship between risk and expected return given in equation (8).
It is assumed that all investors face the same frontier. However in each
banking market the relationship will vary for risky assets which are gener-
ated locally. Assume, for the moment, that the economy consists of two
local banking markets. Each market generates its own risky assets. They
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also share a group of assets which are equally available to banks in each
market, ubiquitous risky assets. Ubiquitous risky assets link the markets
to each other and form a common basis for their efficiency frontiers. Dis-
tortions in these frontiers will be introduced from the available pool of
local risky assets.
The relationship between risk and return will differ for the local
risky assets in the two markets. In some sense each market contains a distribu-
tion of loans; each of which is distributed along two dimensions, risk and
return. The two markets share a common basis for calculating the opportunity
cost of investing in local risky assets, the ubiquitous risky asset. However
they will differ because of differences in the "thickness" of the local de-
mand curve. The thickness of demand is the density of potential loans
which exists near the risk-return pair which is most desirable to the bank.
Banks which are operating in markets with thin demand will quickly exhaust
14
the supply of desirable applicants. Those which face thick demand curves
will be able to invest more heavily in the local risky asset. It should be
noted that the thickness or thinness of demand depends not only on the dis-
tribution of demand for the bank's assets but also on the size of the bank
relative to the market demand.
The problem which confronts bankers in the two markets is to determine
the quantity of local risky assets which they will purchase. Essentially
the ubiquitous risky asset and local risky assets will be combined to form
portfolios, or risk-return pairs, in accordance with equations (5) and (7).
The general form of the relationship in the two markets is:




The investment decision which banks make in each of the markets is
dependent on both the expected return from the local portfolio and the
risk of holding the portfolio. The bankers' problem is to determine
how much of the local risky asset it should purchase. In functional
form the problem is:
(17) Q = f(E , )
1 1 1
where: Q, is the quantity of assets invested in the local risky
asset;
El is the expected return from the portfolio of local risky
assets;
or is the measure of risk in the portfolio of local risky
assets.
Equation (17) is a local investment function. The banker will increase the
amount invested in the local portfolio with increased expected return and
will invest less with increases in risk. These assumptions yield the partial
derivatives of the investment function:
2Q, 0 ; 9Q1 0
(18) 3E
However, this also assumes that the bank takes the efficiency frontier as
given; that is the bank cannot influence either the rate of return or risk
in the local portfolio. If the actions of the bank can influence either
of the two exogenous variables in the investment function the bank is in
some sense a frontier "maker." This is the same as saying that the bank
faces thin demand.
The influence of the bank in a thin market can be felt for several rea-
sons. The way in which most would expect a bank to exert its influence is on
the expected return from the local portfolio. A naive theory of bank be-
havior would state that banks in a monopolized market area would endogenize
the rate of return from the portfolio. They would realize that their invest-
ment in the local portfolio would serve to drive down their rate of return
from the asset.
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D. Two Models of Bank Portfolios in the Local Loan Market
The investment function (17) contains an implicit relationship between




There is a positive relationship between risk and return, holding the quantity
of assets invested in local assets constant. However, this approach begs
the central questions;' a bank's decision variables are the amount of assets
it will invest in local risky assets and the amount of risk which it will
accept in its optimal portfolio. Banks do not have control over the expected
return from the local portfolio; it is a function of the risk inherent in
the portfolio and the amount of funds the bank will invest in the local
market.
The investment function can be used to find a revenue function. The
following equation implicityly defines the investment function:
(20) Ql-f (El, 1) = 0
(21) G(E1 , l,Ql) = 0
and it also implicitly defines the revenue function:
(22) E1=g (Ql, I)
and its partial derivatives.
The partial derivatives of the revenue function are equal to:
3E aG/SQ1(23) __.. _ 1: >0
3G/3E
1
(24) note: 3G/2Q, = 1
The revenue function is subject to diminishing returns in a spatially re-
stricted market implying that:
(25) '?E 1 G/OJ3
l 0
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The second partial derivatives have an intuitive explanation. The marginal
rate of return from local assets is negatively related to the amount of
assets invested on the local market. This is akin to diminishing marginal
revenue in price theory. The marginal rate of return should deteriorate
at a more rapid rate with additions to the amount of funds already invested
in the market. The second derivative of the revenue function with respect
to risk is well established in Markowitz portfolio theory. It is the pre-
sence of the local quantity variable which differentiates the expected
return function from the function used in Markowitz portfolio models (see
equation 16).
It is assumed that the bank has two broad classes of assets from which
to choose: the risk-free asset and local risky assets. Ubiquitous risky
assets will not be included in the formal models as they would bring an
additional degree of complexity to the problem and the results would not
change in any qualitative way. The two models to be developed are port-
folio models of banks in monopolistic and perfectly competitive local bank-
ing markets. The models will be developed in three steps. First the
efficiency frontiers will be presented. This will be followed by an exam-
-ination of the two capital market lines and then the equilibrium conditions
of each model.
The Efficiency Frontier
The efficiency frontier of the opportunity set in the local banking
market is given by the revenue function, equation (22). The basic differ-
ence between the two models revolves around the way in which the banks
interpret the efficiency frontier.
The banks in competitive markets take the efficiency frontier as given.
In the competitive market the total amount invested in the local risky asset
is Q , which is divided among m identical banks. Each of the m banks invests
q, in the local portfolio:
(26) Ql=m 
.
The assets of any of the m banks are small relative to the total assets in
the local market, and the same is true for its investments in the local asset.
These banks do not perceive that their investment behavior will influence the




In a competitive market the actions of an individual bank will not have an
appreciable impact on the rate of return from the portfolio of local risky
assets. This can be seen by substituting (27) into (23):
3E aQ(28) _1 1" 
- - 01 1
This is not true in a monopolized banking market, where Q, is the amount
of assets which the bank invests in a portfolio of local risky assets. In
a monopolized banking market the demand curve which confronts the bank is
identical to the market's demand curve. Under these conditions (23) is nega-
tive.
The Capital Market Lines
The capital market lines in the two market models are linear combinations
of the rate of return from the risk-free asset and the expected return from
the portfolio of local risky assets. However the two models differ in the
exact form of the revenue function, or the efficiency frontier. This re-
sults in differences in the relevant capital market lines in the two market
models.
The CML for the monopolist is formed by taking a weighted average of the
rates of return from the two asset classes. The weights are formed by the
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amount of local assets the monopolist purchases and the remainder of the bank's
earning assets being invested in the risk-free asset. It should be remem-
bered that the amount of local assets the monopolist purchases is identical
to total effecive demand in the local market. The CML is given by:
Q-Q Q 1, Q1E l E 1 1ER(29) - n+--E R+-(E-R).
where: E is the expected rate of return from the portfolio
p
Q is the total amount of earning assets the bank has at its disposal
Q is the amount of earning assets invested in local risky assets
R is the rate of return from the risk-free asset
E is the expected rate of return from the local risky asset
Substituting the equation for the efficiency frontier (22) into (29)
results in an expression for the CML in terms of the two decision vari-
ables of the bank:
(30) E = R+-[f(Q , ) - R]p Q 1 1
The CML for the monopoly bank is a function of the decision vari-
ables of the bank, quantity of assets invested in the local market
and the level of risk which is contained in the portfolio (a ). The
same is true for the competitive model except that the quantity variable is
not the market's demand curve but q1.
The capital market line for a bank in the competitive market is Simi-
lar to equation (30) except that the weights are expressed differently:
(31) E = R+--[f(Q , a )-R]
p q l 1
where: q1 is the bank's investment in local risky assets
Q1 is the total amount of funds which the bank has available
to invest in earning assets.
The ptimization Problem
The bank in each market model wants to maximize its utility, given
in equation (9), subject to the constraints placed upon it by the relevant
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CML and the amount of risk which is contained in the portfolio. The
two decision variables banks in each type of market have at their disposal are the
quantity of assets invested in local risky assets and the amount of risk
which is embodied in the local risky portfolio.
The risk constraint is similar in each model; it is derived from
equation (14 ). The amount of risk in the total portfolio is the risk in
the local portfolio. multiplied by the share of earning assets which are
invested in the local portfolio. For the monopolist the standard devia-
tion of the two asset portfolio, which contains a risk-free asset is:
(32) =
p Ql1
The total derivative of (32) holding total assets constant is:
1Y 1(33) da da + -- dQp Q 1 Q l
Change in the level of risk in the total portfolio is a linear function
of the degree of risk in the portfolio of local risky assets, where the
share of the portfolio which is invested in locally generated assets (-)
serves as the weight. The expression is the same for the competitive model,
except that q- is substituted forq Q
Monopoly Market Model
The banking monopolist maximizes its utility subject to the three con-
straints. Therefore the monopolist's problem is to:
Q,
(34) Max. U(E ,G ) st: E =R+-±[f(Q ,a )-R]
Qp p p Q 11
' 1Q
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which results in the Lagrangean function:
(35) Z = u(E a ) + A[E - R - Q](f
p p p Q lp 1ap Q l
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It is possible to calculate the bank's marginal rate of substitution







The MRS is negative due to the fact that the marginal utility of risk is
negative.
Solving (39) for yields:
(43) Y af
The analytical goal of the modeling exercise is to establish the
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equilibrium conditions for a bank in monopolized and competitive local
banking markets. The equilibrium in each market is a stable tangency
point between the bank's indifference curve and the CML. Equation (43)
provides the necessary information on the supply side of the monopoly
model, the MRS between risk and return. The slope of the CML must now
be determined. 1 5
The MRT for the monopoly model can be found by solving equation (38)
for and substituting the result from equation (43):
af
-f(Q ,a )+Q aQ-(44) y 1 1 1 1-R
af
f(Q ,a ) + Q aQ(45) af_ 1 1 R
1 1
The right side of this equation can be interpreted in an intuitively
appealing manner. The numerator is the monopolist's opportunity cost of
investing in the local risky asset. The expression (E L-R) is a measure of oppor-
tunity cost, this is the amount of money forgone by the bank if it invests
in the risk free asset. In this case the returns from local assets
af
are discounted by the term Q 9, which is negative and becomes more so as
16QL increases. The negative term in the numerator is equivalent to the
loss in revenue on all loans previously issued when the old rate of return
is set equal to the new rate of return. In this way the right hand side
is the ratio of return to risk, where the rate of return is adjusted to
incorporate quantity effects.
The Competitive Market Model
The banker in a competitive banking market is assumed to have the same
utility function as the monopolist. The difference in their optimization prob-
lems lies in the maximand and the restrictions which are placed on the efficiency
frontier. The first difference is that the bankers in a competitive market
take the market demand for the banks' assets as given. This is the restric-
tion stated in equations (27) and (28). This is true even though equation
(26) is binding when the market is in equilibrium, that is that total
effective demand for loans in the market is equal to the sum of all assets
local banks invest in local risky assets. It should also be noted that
this model assumes that. the number of banks in the competitive market is
fixed at m and the task is to solve for the equilibrium amount of local
loans in which each bank invests. It is possible to hold q constant
and solve for m. However solving for q, is more realistic. This is a
short run model and it is unlikely that the number of banks will adjust
rapidly to fluctuations in demand. Even in competitive markets prospective
bankers must receive charters from regulatory agencies which is a time
consuming process. Portfolio selection of a bank in a competitive market is
(46) Max: u(E a ) St: E = R + fq (a )-R
pPp q 1 ~ 1)-
p q 1
q 1 q
The Lagrangean function and the resulting first order conditions are:
(47) Z = u(E ,a ) + [E - R - [f(Q,a ) -R] + y[a - q a Ip p p q 1 1 p q 1
(48) aZ au
p p
(49) -- - +
p p
(50) =-f(Q+,a ) + - a
(5) -- = - ---(Q
q 11 q q
(51) azX 1 af yq 1
acq a q
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DZ q1(52) Tx= E - R - [f( Q,) 
- RI
(53) Z=a 
- q 15Y p q
The MRS in the competitive market model is identical to that in the
monopoly model, using equations (48), (49) and (51):
MuO
(54) MRS = = = - <0
MuE A If61p 1
The MRT in the competitive market model is found by solving equation (51)
for the ratio of the shadow prices of risk and return; and substituting
(54) into the resulting expression:
(55) _f _ .(. I f(Q 1  -p R
The market equilibrium conditions in the competitive and monopolized
markets are quite different; compare equations (45) and (55). The oppor-
-tunity cost of investing in the local risky asset is greater in the monop-
olized market due to the presence of the additional term in the numerator.
However, these equations are the outline of a solution. It has not been
proven that stable equilibrium exists in each model or that the optimal
risky portfolios, noted by the pair (QC 1 ), are different in the two mar-
ket models. Two proofs will be offered which will demonstrate that the
market equilibria must differ in the two models. The first proof is based
solely on the first order conditions, while the second involves an examina-
tion of the second order conditions of the market equilibria.
The comparative statics analysis of the two models will provide the
results which -are of interest: does a bank in a monopolized local market
change the volume or quality of loans it makes in that market when compared
to banks in a competitive market?
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E. The Comparative Static Results
The static results of h two models will be compared. First the
properties of the equili ria in the monopoly and competitive models will
be presented. Then the second order conditions will be compared graphically.
The method of presentation will be the same in each model. The total differ-
entials of the MRS and MRT will be solved for the two decision variables.
In this way the trade-off between risk and return which are made on the
supply and demand sides of the market can be brought into equilibrium. In
essence the MRT and MRS equations which were developed for the two models
are schedules and they have not yet been equilibrated. The MRS and MRT
equations depict the response of the bank throughout risk-expected return
space.
The difference between the equilibria in a monopolistic and competitive
banking market can be seen most easily by directly examining the first order
conditions in the two models, equations (43), (54), (45), and (55). Equa-
tions (43) and (54) are equivalent expressions, these equations are the MRS
between risk and return in the monopolistic and competitive markets respec-
tively. Equations (45) and (55) are the MRT between risk and return in
monopolized and competitive markets and these expressions are not equal.
The demonimators of (45) and (55) are the same but the numerators
differ. The MRT of the monopolist contains the term Q ?f which is negative
and absent in equation (55). Equation (45) will lie below (55) everywhere in
risk-return space. This means that the equilibrium investment of a bank in
a competitive market will yield higher returns with less risk than will a bank
which is operating in a monopolized market. The exact reasons for this result
will become clearer when the second order conditions are examined.
The decision variables of a bank are the level of risk it is willing to
hold in its portfolio of local risky assets and the quantity of bank assets
which it will invest in that portfoliC. Therefore the second order conditions
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dQ
are found by solving each differential equation for - and seeing whereda
the resulting equations intersect in risk-return space.
Monopoly Model
The first step in graphing the slope of the MRS is to substitute
equation (42) into (43). This results in an equation which will be
called Z :
3u Bu ;f(56) =-/ -- + - =0
p p 1
Taking the derivative of Z with respect to a1 and applying the chain
rule:
dZ 2 p 3-l F -2 2 E 22 u .p u -u a 3 2u p 23f
1a L l p LE l PJ
Substituting for 3c; and :
1 1
-1 -2
32u 31 2 0 2(58) dZ /da - Q9E - 3u .u u f 2 f
30Y p 9G 9E 2 Q 3a 2
tF p E l 3E
dZ
The entire expression ( - ) is negative; this is verified by examining




The second term is the most complicated expression, but the overall sign
is negative as:
a2 Q
- <0 - <0 ; - -- >030y- 2 Q 30P 3E l
p
The third term is also negative.
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The derivative of Z with respect to the bank's other decision vari-
able, Q , is negative:
dZ 2 ao 2 2 3E
(59) a~ U p au -au Iau]Fu p




dZ 2 0 - 1 -2 2 f(Q ,CY)-R Q(60) 1 = u 1u -au au a 1_1 1f <0
1 P p pL-Ep p _QL
The sign of equation (60) can be verified by inspecting the signs of the
two terms; they are all negative. The first term contains:
2
-_<0 and - >0
aca2  3E
p
The second term contains:
au <0 a2 U <0 1  >0 when E -R >0 ; and <0
ap UE2  Q 1 9QE
p
The rate of change in the MRS in risk-return space is given by:
(61) dQ dZ /da1
-1-1<0
da( dZ 1/dQ <1 1 1
and is negative throughout.
An analogous proce.ss is followed to determine the rate of change in the MRT.
Equation Z2 is formed by setting equation (45) equal to zero and differ-
entiating with respect to the decision variables, Q and a.
af
(62) ' 1 1Z2 = a1 ~ a 1
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f ff
dZ 2 1 1' 1 1 Q R 2f
(63) - - 2
1 1 32
From equation (47) it is known that:
af
9f (Q' + Q 1 1 - R
Therefore:
(E4) d2 2 f >0
1 32
af -f
(65) dZ2  2 DQ + Q 3Q 2
dQS CY1
Using the implicit function rule:
a 2f
dQ dZ /da 9_ y_2




Plotting the slope of the MRS and MRT in risk-return space yields a
stable equilibrium (see Figure 5.6). The line labeled dL1 is derived from
equation (61), or the rate of change in the bank's marginal rate of substitu-
tion. The monopoly bank cannot select both the expected return and risk in
its portfolio of local risky assets. This line depicts the desired substitu-
tion between the quantity of the bank's assets which are invested in the port-
folio of local risky assets and the level of risk in that portfolio. The
same relationship holds for banks in competitive markets. The line which is
labeled m is the rate of change in the MRT; this is the trade-off which is
feasible between the quantity of funds invested in the portfolio of local
risky assets and the level of risk in the portfolio. The intersection of
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these two functions, equations (61) and (66), yields the monopolist's
equilibrium amount of risk and investment in local risky assets. This is
* *
the pair (Q, 1 )M
Competitive Model
The equation of the slope of the MRS in the competitive market model
is the same as that of the monopoly market model. The MRS of each bank
in the two models are identical, as can be seen from inspecting equations
(43) and (54). Therefore equation (61) holds for both the competitive
and monopoly market models.
The slope and the interpretation of the MRT differs substantially
in the competitive model. All m banks are assumed to be identical in
this model and individually they cannot influence the characteristics
of the local risky asset. However, collectively they do. Therefore
the competitive solution contains two parts. First the equilibrium risk-
return pair is found for the competitive market. This result is then
divided among the m banks in the market. To model this approach equation
(55) is set to equal zero, and called Z 3. The relevant market
decision variables are Q and CY
l'Q 1a) -R
(67) Z =
3 G 22 1
3f
dZ 3 B~ f(Q ,c )-R 2 2
1 1 1  1 1
(69) dZ 3 af/aQ( 6 1 <0
dQ1  a1
. 2 2
dQ dZ /da 3 f/3
(70) l 3 1._ __ l >0
- dZ /dQ ^
l 3 1 1_
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Equations (66) and (70) are part of the market solutions. It is incor-
rect to say that (70) is the way in which a bank in a perfectly competitive
market views demand: it is the way in which the entire market views demand.
The intersection of the lines drawn from equation (61) and (70) yields
the equilibrium amount of risk and investment in local risky assets by
all banks in a competitive lccal banking market. The schedule of the desired
rates of substitution between the quantity of funds which are invested in the
local risky asset and risk in the competitive market model is labeled dL .
Supply and demand conditions in the market determine the total amount which
*
is invested in the local risky asset, Q . This determines the equilibrium
amount of funds which are invested in local risky assets and the resulting
* *





A bank in the competitive market will only consider the equilibrium
level of risk in allocating a portion of its assets to purchases of the
local portfolio, and this is eatablished by the local market equilibrium.
It is a . Using this piece of data the bank establishes q1 (see Figure
5.7). The relevant comparison between the competitive and monopoly market
models is between the market solutions, equations (61), (66), and (70).
This is done graphically in the next section.
Comparison of the Two Models
The slope of the MRS is the same in both models and it is identical
in Figures 5.6 through 5.8. In fact the difference that clearly exists be-
tween the equilibria of the two models lies in the denominators of the slopes
of the MRT. The numerator in equations (66) and (70) is:
2faa
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Figure 5.'. The Equilibrium Portfolio of a Bank in a






Figure 5.8 . The Equilibrium Portfolios of a Bank in A










This is the change in the slope of the efficiency frontier due to risk at
a given point. The overall term is positive due to the presence of the
negative sign. Changes in the expected returns from the local portfolio
due to risk are the same in both models.
When the numerator of the competitive model is subtracted from that
of the monopoly model the difference is:
2
1
This is the full effect of quantity on the rate of return from the local
portfolio. The first term is the change in the expected return in the
portfolio due to an increase in the amount of funds which the monopolist
invests in the portfolio of local risky assets. The second term is the de-
crease in the amount invested in the local asset due to the rate of change
in the expected return. Both terms of this expression are negative which,
when multiplied by the overall negative sign of the expression, will become
positive. The result is shown in Figure 5.8. The graph of the slope of the
MRT in the monopoly model, m, is lower than that of the competitive model, c.
Banks which operate in a competitive local banking market will in-
vest a greater share of their assets locally than will a bank in a mo-
nopolized market. Compare line c, the slope of-the MRT in the competi-
tive market model, with line m , the slope of the MRT in the monopoly
market model. However, competitive banks will invest in a portfolio of
local assets which contains a lower degree of risk. The monopolist is sub-
stituting risk for quantity in assembling its optimal risky portfolio. The
denominator-of equation (66) clearly shows the role which quantity effects have
in shaping the portfolio and the way in which risk is substituted for
quantity in the monopolist's portfolio.
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The difference which exists between the equilibria will be exaggerated
by two shifts in the graph of the slope of the MRS, holding m and c constant.
The first shift is one in the intercept of dL1 , the slope of the MRS. The
further this line is to the right in risk-return space, or the higher the
intercept on the Q, axis, the larger the difference between the equilibria.
The second concerns the slope of dL1 . The flatter, or more elastic, dL1 is
the larger the difference in equilibria in monopolized and competitive mar-
kets.
The monopolistic and competitive market models are polar cases of the
impact of market structure on the asset holdings of a bank. From these
two cases several points become evident. Monopoly will cause the expected
returns from local risky assets to be discounted. The asset composition
of the risky portfolio will differ for banks facing the same demand condi-
tions; the composition depends on the degree of monopoly power in the mar-
ket.
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F. What Is the Relevant Market?
The two models of banking market behavior depend heavily on the con-
cept of the local market. The demand variables, Q and q1, are the quan-
tity of banks' assets demanded in the local market. The problem
that remains is to determine the relevant defintion of the demand side
of the market. New England's largest banks, the regional money center
banks, such as the First National Bank of Boston, Shawmut, Hartford
National and CBT, do not restrict their search for commercial customers
to the local market. These banks have customers that are national in
scope and not necessarily headquartered in the same state as the bank.
In the fourth chapter these different layers in the banking industry
were mentioned and evidence was provided indicating that there are really
three tiers in New England's banking industry. First, there are the
important regional banks. These banks operate on the national and in
some cases international credit markets (First National is the only New
England bank that has a major involvement in international banking
operations). They are very competitive with the commercial paper market
and other large banks. The second group of banks is composed of those
which operate state-wide banking systems and account for a significant
share of total state deposits, around 20%. The third set is made up of
banks that are purely local. They do the bulk of their business in the
communities in which they have offices.
The banking market models apply to all three types of institutions.
But in the case of the last two the concept of local market coincides
with spatial "locality." For the larger banks it is a limited collec-
tion of large industrial and institutional customers. The smaller banks
operate on the local level, with the overwhelming portion of their assets
I -?
4.- /
being generated locally. The important point is that the relevant demand
term for a bank will vary according to the size of the bank. Due to the
presence of transactions costs differences, and comparative advantages in
specific types of banking activities, these three sets of banking firms
do not necessarily compete with each other directly. Their funds would
then be imperfect substitutes for each other.
The economic factors that influence the demand for bank assets are
fairly straight forward. Demand for capital is derived from expected product de-
mand. Therefore, an instrument for product demand should be introduced
into a statistical model of bank behavior. The bank also considers the
price of the asset and of possible substitutes before expressing its willingness to
supply funds. The second set of factors is locational and in many senses it
interacts with the instruments for product demand in determining how
"thick" the market is for the banks' assets.17
Commercial banks have undertaken two paths to expand their markets.
Some have formed state-wide branching systems, where permitted by state
law, and others have formed MBHCs. These organizations are an attempt
to expand the available banking market from a purely local market to a
state-wide market. A second strategy has been traditionally employed;
banks become a member of a correspondent network. The origins of these
networks were described earlier. They offer an advantage to smaller banks.
Large national, or regional, money-center banks operate at the top of a
participation network. These lead banks will negotiate large commercial
and industrial loans or a direct purchase of commercial paper with a
major borrower. They will then offer smaller banks a chance to parti-
cipate in the loan by selling a share to them. This offers the lead
bank liquidity and added diversity in its portfolio. Smaller banks benefit
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by gaining diversity in their portfolios and a loan with lower risks
than local risky assets. The more important a bank is in the correspond-
ent network, the better the "deals" that are passed down.
Both forms of networks, participation or formal branching networks,
have two influences on the opportunity sets that banks face. First, they
expand the opportunity set, shifting the efficiency frontier to the left,
allowing banks to undertake investments that were previously closed to
them. Banks that are legally integrated could gain some scale economies
from centralized management of their more liquid assets, such as bonds and
stocks. They will also be able to bear the higher quasi-fixed costs that
are involved in investigating larger loans and more distant loans. The
second major impact of these organizations is that they will change the
opportunity cost structure for the local bank. In declining regions the
opportunity cost of making local loans will rise. The local bank will be
in a position to substitute participated loans or purchases of commercial paper
for locally generated loans. The local bank will also have a variety of other
nationally traded assets available to it that will act as investment alterna-
tives. The converse is true for banks in rapidly growing regions. They will be
able to participate loans out to other banks and lower the opportunity cost of
borrowing. However, several bankers have stated in interviews that were con-
ducted as part of this research that the process is asymmetric. Smaller
banks will participate in loans that are generated by lead banks more
readily than will larger banks in loans that are generated by small banks.
This is said to occur because small banks deal with smaller companies
that are not well known and they do not have an extensive credit history.
This makes them riskier to banks that do not have specific information
about the borrower.
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Smaller, localized banks also take part in participated loans be-
cause it gives their portfolios spatial diversity. They are partially
insured against an economic downturn in their banking market that would
affect their assets and earnings by having investment from other markets.
So far this discussion has tended to focus more specifically on the
impact of institutional networks on commercial and industrial loans.
Their influence on the opportunity cost of local investment by making new
categories of assets available cannot be ignored. New categories of as-
sets are also made available to banks through the participation of corre-
spondent banking networks. Commercial paper transactions, government bond
brokerage, and services to trust departments (as well as the issuance of
bank credit cards and discount services to correspondents which are not
members of the Federal Reserve System) are all services offered by lead
banks to their correspondents. This ties the banks, and through them local
capital markets, to the national capital market. It is through these as-
sets that national credit market conditions are tied to local assets and
the nominal cost and opportunity cost of local instruments are adjusted.
In many ways the demand side of a statistical model is a model of
inter-bank demand allocation. Banks are constrained in the amounts they
can lend. They cannot make a loan that is greater than 10% of their total -
equity, they can purchase liabilities but this is limited by their capital
baseand their core deposits are limited by their market area. In this
way it is conceivable that a bank's market share will have a direct in-
fluence on the amount of its assets that it places in locally-generated
assets. Large banking firms will have the most visibility in the com-
munity; they will also have, by definition, the largest set of liabilities.
As the banking relationship is based on a notion of economic symbiosis,
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it is hypothesized the firms with the largest share of the market will
face the thickest demand for its assets. It will pass along demand that
it rejects to other local banks.
Term Structure of Liabilities
Banks are dynamic institutions and our attempts to constrain their
liability problems to a static discussion are somewhat unreasonable. The
largest managerial dilemma banks face is how to hedge their portfolios,
i.e., balance the due dates of their assets and liabilities. This has
been demonstrated by the current concern over disintermediation and its
effects on the entire thrift industry. In this regard the cost and compo-
sition of the liability portfolio is of great concern to a bank. Commer-
cial banks hold four classes of liabilities. The first is demand deposits,
of both individuals and corporations. The savings accounts, time depos-
its, of small savers form the second class of accounts. These two classes
of accounts are fairly predictable, have low variances, and are of low cost to
the intermediary. Usually they are the preferred deposit base. If the
firm is dependent on retail liabilities, it incurs costs in excess of
direct interest costs. They tend to have larger investment in bank
premises, branch banking networks, to attract retail deposits. The third
and fourth forms of deposits, or liabilities, are more expensive and
volatile. They are large negotiated certificates of deposit, in excess
of $100,000, and money market certificates. Bankers tend to consider
these to be wholesale liabilities.
The rates on wholesale liabilities are set in the national market,
with the rate tending to be uniform in all banking markets. Retail lia-
bility costs, interest, "free" services, plus investment by banks in prem-
ises, are a function of the degree of competition in the local banking
market.
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Banks must also tailor their assets to match their liabilities. The
lower the variance of their liability portfolio, the more long-term assets
they can hold. The bank must offset the volatility of its liability base.
If it has purchased a large share of its liability base on the open market,
the bank must hold shorter term assets with floating rates of return.
Core deposits are better suited for investment in the ubiquitous risky
asset. These deposits are lower cost and remarkably stable. They can
therefore be invested in longer term, low-risk assets, which have a rate of
return which is greater than that of the risk-free asset. The degree of
variance in the liability portfolio can be partially mitigated by the strength,
or size, of investors' equity in the bank as a percentage of total assets.
The Market Process
There are two hypotheses as to the way in which banks in a common
market area supply funds to satisfy locally generated demand. There is
competition among banks for customers, but there are institutional and
perceptual barriers at work which act to limit the degree of competi-
tion between banks. Before the hypotheses are presented, the institu-
tional and factual details should be restated.
There are substantial barriers to entry in the industry. New banking
institutions must receive a charter from a public agency, all of which ap-
pear to rank their objectives as: (1) protect the safety of consumers'
deposits (by guaranteeing the profitability of existing institutions),
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(2) aiding the convenience of consumers (ease of access to banking services),
and (3) promote competition in the industry. The banking industry is also
sensitive to public complaints about rates and "excess" profits. In effect it
would be easier for new firms, or potential firms, to vault the regulatory
barrier if existing firms are perceived as making excess profits, or are not
serving the local population. If regulation is successful, it can be
assumed that the economic incentive to enter a banking market is always
present. This is true in the banking industry where the minimum efficient
scale of operations is rather small. 1 8
The first hypothesis is a market share hypothesis: commercial banks
with the largest share of the local market's liabilities are able to
cream locally generated assets. This hypothesis builds indirectly
on the banking relationship mentioned earlier. Banks with the largest
locally generated liability bases are assumed to have the largest pool of
credit-worthy customers. They then are able to pick and choose among
proposals, retaining those with the best risk-return characteristics.
These firms are operating on higher efficiency frontiers than are other
local banks. They are then hypothesized to engage in a greater investment
in non-locally generated assets. The implication is that, considering
the supply side alone, they will have smaller shares of their assets
invested in commercial and industrial loans.
The second hypothesis is more sophisticaed than the first, but the
results are not radically different. This hypothesis invokes a variant
of the limit pricing model.19 The limit pricing model is a model of
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supply side behavior when there is a dominant firm operating in the mar-
ket, surrounded by a fringe of actual or potential competitors. The model
assumes that the product is homogenous, that the competitive fringe (or
potential fringe) is growing, and that each of the fringe firms is too
small to influence the price of the product. The problem that the dom-
inant firm faces is what price to set, coupled with the level of profit
to be reached, to satisfy the dominant firm's profit target and at the
same time to restrain entry.
The dominant firm's ability to extract surplus from the market is a
function of the height of the barrier to entry. In the banking industry
the barrier is partially economic and partially political.
The economic factors, besides routine cost con-
siderations, are the distance from competing markets and an intangible
cost advantage that established banks possess -- the strength of the bank-
ing relationship. The limit pricing model results in a concentrated
industry, but one where excess profits are limited by the threat of entry.
Profits in this case are defined as economic profit, accounting profit,
plus any savings that can be accrued in the way in which the business is
operated.
Edwards has demonstrated that banks in concentrated markets have
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higher operating costs than do those in more competitive markets. This
evidence does not contradict the existence of a limit pricing strategy in
the banking industry; it is evidence that there are significant barriers
to entry and that banks are not punished by the industry for operating in
an inefficient manner. The work of Edwards, and others, does indicate
that the impact of the banking industry on local economic development
cannot be adequately examined by concentrating on the price term.
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The way in which banks allocate their portfolios is of prime concern.
G. Summary
This chapter covered three sets of material as a means of developing
a theoretical framework for analyzing local bank behavior. First, stand-
ard portfolio theory was reviewed as a point of departure. Special at-
tention was devoted to the two asset model. In the review of the theory
it became clear that two assumptions which are central to the Markowitz
model do not apply to local banking markets. These are: that quantity
(the size of the investment) does not matter in the way in which the port-
folio is allocated; and that all investors face identical opportunity
sets. A critical aspect of spatial economics is that opportunity sets
will vary with location.
Two models were then constructed which incorporate aspects of port-
folio theory but are based on the way in which local banking markets are
organized. These models are polar cases, with actual market structure
lying between these models. The first is a model of asset behavior in a
monopolized market. The second is of a perfectly competitive local
banking market. The latter model is the spatial equivalent to the
Markowitz portfolio model. When the models are compared, it is found
that the bank in a monopolized market will invest less of its assets in
the local risky asset than will banks in the competitive markets.
The chapter ended by bringing in a number of concerns about local
banking market behavior which were not easily incorporated into the
models. The models are constructed to proxy the behavior of banks in
local markets. However, the meaning of localness was found not to be
intuitively obvious for all banking organizations.
The majority of banks conduct their business in a spatially
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restricted market, with most of their customers in the demand and supply
side coming from the same area. Other banks operate in a wider spatial
market but their customer base is restricted to firms and institutions
of specific asset sizes. There are two such sets of organizations in
New England, state-wide branch banking systems and regional banks. The
degree of substitutability that exists between the types of banks is an
important empirical question. Two other areas of concern were raised at
the end of the chapter which can only be adequately addressed empirically.
The first is the impact of the bank's liability structure on asset hold-
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and the price of risk. The ratio itself is the difference between the
expected rate of return and the rate of return on the risk-free asset,
which is the opportunity cost. This is weighted by the measure of risk
in the portfolio. The smaller the level of risk in the portfolio the
cheaper is the price of risk.
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from the two asset portfolio is:
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Chapter 6
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF BANK BEHAVIOR IN NEW ENGLAND
Several different aspects of commercial bank behavior in local economies
were discussed in the previous chapters. It was shown that the various finan-
cial intermediaries are not perfect substitutes for each other, as they have
developed specialized roles on both the supply and demand sides of the credit
markets. Commercial banks were found to be the group of institutions which
are the most active, of all of the intermediaries, in the areas of the credit
market which are most likely to influence local economic development. These
banks are especially important to the class of businesses which are commonly
called small- to medium-sized firms. In fact, commercial banks have a near-
monopoly on meeting the short-term financing demands of firms that fall out-
side of the Fortune 1000.
However, the commercial banking industry does not operate in an insti-
tutional vacuum. Once the industry was identified as being an important
intermediary, one that has the potential of influencing the path of develop-
ment of firms in the local economy, its characteristics were defined and
brought into focus. These characteristics can be lumped into three classes:
regulatory restrictions, industry structure, and the nature of inputs and
outputs of the bank. These categories are not mutually exclusive but they
proved to be useful ways of directing the study.
A large part of the literature about bank performance revolves around
the influence of regulation on economic efficiency, the majority focuses on
the relationship between savers and the bank -- the supply side. But there
are important influences on the demand side of the market, the way in which
the bank allocates its assets. This is derived from the fact that regulation
reinforces an important characteristic of banks; they operate in markets which,
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for all but the largest banks (the national money center banks), are spatially
restricted. Secondly, it had been shown that regulation provides an import-
ant barrier to entry which can influence the operational goals of the banking
firm (to simply maximize short-run profit or to pursue some mixture of goals).
The history and impact of regulation were explored in the third chapter.
The fourth chapter of the thesis described the structure of the industry
in the United States as a whole and compared it to the structure of the
industry in New England. Asset and liability portfolios were described, as
was the size distribution of banking firms. The major conclusion, for the
purposes of the statistically based research in this chapter, is that the
commercial banking industry in New England closely mirrors the industry
nationally. There is one exception, the region is underrepresented in terms
of the number of national money center banks; only one bank in New England
can be considered to be a national money center bank. The fifth chapter drew
on these observations to develop a theory of bank behavior in local markets.
The theory was based on portfolio theory, due to the nature of the banks
outputs, or investments. The theoretical model drew on the spatially restricted
nature of the bank's market area to obtain its major result: There will be dif-
ferences in the composition of the asset portfolios of banks in monopolized and
competitive markets, holding all of the other characteristics of the market
constant. Specifically, the monopolist will invest a smaller share of its
earning assets in locally generated risky assets than will a bank in a compet-
itive market. But the monopolist's local investments will be, on average,
riskier.
The formally developed theoretical model cannot test three important
companion hypotheses, for which strong priors exist in the literature. First,
the way in which term structure of the firm's liability portfolio will influ-
ence the structure of the asset portfolio. The liability structure of a
bank determines the liquidity or withdrawal risk; this can be contrasted with
2.L
investment or default risk which is the concern of the portfolio model. Banks
with a higher proportion of core deposits in their liability portfolio will
invest more heavily in long term, less volatile assets. These assets were
called ubiquitous risky assets, of which housing is the largest component.1
Secondly, a hypothesis was advanced about the influence of the absolute
size of the bank. The larger the banking organization, the less involved it
will be in purely local markets. These two hypotheses will be tested below
statistically, along with the theoretical model.
The third hypothesis is related to the second and it appears to be an
important element of the "banking-relationship" theory of bank behavior
which has been advanced by Sheppard. This is that banks which are large,
relative to their local market, have preferential access to loans in that
market. They will have superior risk-return trade-offs in the local risky
asset relative to smaller banks in the same market. This hypothesis escapes
the theoretical model completely and it is difficult to test statistically.
The theoretical model shares a characteristic of all Markowitz models; that
is, all investors have equal access to the efficient portfolio. Preemptive
bidding, or creaming, cannot occur in the competitive model and is irrelevant
to the model of a monopolized investment market. One possible test is to
hypothesize that banks in such situations will have superior rates of return
from their asset portfolios to smaller banks in the same market, ceterus
paribus.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to focus on the narrower question
of the impact of local market structure on the composition of the bank's
asset portfolio. This task is less ambitious than trying to model all aspects
of bank behavior. Three sets of variables which in the short run are exogenous to
bank decision makers, are hypothesized to influence the portfolio of an individ-
ual bank: liability structure, market demand, and the structural characteristics
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of the bank. After the bank model is estimated for all commercial banks in
New England it is run on aggregate data for each of New England's 57 banking
markets. The model is estimated using ordinary least squares estimators as
theory and the spatial restrictions which define the problem do not allow for
a simultaneous determination of the optimal asset and liability portfolios.
The theoretical model, which is the basis of the statistical model,
was developed in isolation from other work on bank decision making in local
markets. Therefore, the existing literature must be reviewed to provide a
context for evaluating the results of the two econometric models which are
pre. ..ted in this chapter. The current literature is largely empirical but
its theoretical foundations are very different from those used to develop
the model which was developed in this work.
A. Recent Literature on Commercial Bank Behavior
The current empirical literature on the behavior of commercial banks
in the United States fits into one of two categories, depending on the theor-
etical underpinnings of the model. The first loosely adopts a traditional
short-run profit maximizing, production function approach, thereby avoiding
a formal treatment of the banks' portfolio problem.2 The second tradition
uses the banking industry as a vehicle for testing hypotheses about imperfect
competition. These hypotheses are generally rooted in theories of managerial
discretion.3 The latter set of writings will be examined first.
Edwards and Heggestad proposed that the commercial banking industry would
provide an ideal vehicle for testing the "Galbraith-Caves" hypothesis. Quot-
ing from their paper:
Galbraith's thesis is that firm performance depends to a
considerable extent upon how firms are organized and how
they interrelate with each other.. .Caves extends this
thesis... '...he (Galbraith) has touched upon an important
oft-ignored aspect of the large firm's behavior: that a
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significant portion of the potential profits latent in
its position of market power is taken in the form of avoid-
ing uncertainty, with important allocative effects on the
economy....'4
Edwards and Heggestad proposed to test the hypothesis in the following form:
Uncertainty avoidance by large firms was hypothesized to vary directly with
the degree of market power which the firm possesses. This was operational-
ized by stating that the degree of risk avoidance by firms could be repre-
sented by their respective ratios of profit variance to profit level. Their
sample was composed of 47 of the largest 100 banks in 1960. These banks
were located in 33 SMSAs across the country; the majority of the banks must
be located in New York, Chicago or California. Their model postulated that
risk avoidance was a function of market structure, average deposit size of
the bank, variability of demand (as measured by the variability of retail
sales in the SMSA), and two regulatory dummy variables which indicate the
relevant branching restrictions in the state. Their empirical results are
consistent with the hypothesis and the article provided a strong theoretical
foundation for future work.5 But the empirical work is seriously flawed.
First, as the authors note, it is not clear that monopolistic banks are
more risk averse than banks in competitive markets, or if they face a more
favorable opportunity set. Secondly, the demand variable is not relevant
to this particular set of banks, these are the national money center banks
and dominant regional banks -- those which are least dependent on the volatil-
ity of retail sales in their local banking markets as a source of loan demand.
The third problem is one shared by all of the works which will be reviewed
(with the exception of the paper by Graddy and Kyle). Variability of profit
depends on the stability and cost of the firm's liability base, as well as
the composition of its asset portfolio. The configuration of the banks' in-
puts and outputs jointly determine its profits. Even the result of this
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process, profit, is not determinant in a setting of imperfect competition.
Therefore, any statistical examination of bank profits which does not account
for the simultaneous nature of the problem will introduce bias and inconsis-
tency into the empirical work. The strongest portion of Edwards and Hegges-
tad's paper is the theoretical development of the Galbraith-Caves hypothesis.6
The research which Edwards and Heggestad have introduced has developed
along two tracks. Edwards used data from the commercial banking industry to
test broader hypotheses about firm behavior. Heggestad embarked on a series
of empirical investigations of the commercial banking industry.
Edwards shifted his focus from risk avoidance as a hypothesized cost
of economic concentration to the preference for superfluous expenses by
firms in regulated industries, such as employing more people than a competi-
tive firm would employ (this is called expense preference behavior on the part
of the firm). Again, he chose commercial banking for an econometric case
study. The hypothesis was advanced that regulated firms, or firms in con-
centrated markets, are utility maximizers and not profit maximizers. 7 Spec-
ifically, Edwards develops a test which, under a reasonable set of assumptions,
is capable of differentiating between expense preference and profit maximiz-
ing behavior. His findings indicate that an expense-preference theoretical
framework better explains the behavior of regulated firms than does a profit-
maximization framework. Edwards' findings can be treated as logical exten-
sions of the theoretical model of the previous chapter.
Edwards begins by citing several common findings about the banking
industry which are most often treated as anomalies (some of the data were
8
also presented in Chapter 4 for 1977). Several studies have found small,
but positive, relationships between concentration and bank prices or interest
rates. At the same time no systematic relationship was found between monopoly
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power and profitability. Edwards cites several studies which were conducted
from 1964 to 1973 which indicate that increased competition does not lower
reported bank profits, but it does appear to improve bank efficiency or
lower operating costs.9 The argument was summarized:
...both the institutional characteristics of banking
markets and the above unexplained phenomena of bank
performance imply that expense preference may be a
useful theoretical framework within which to analyze
managerial behavior in banking.... 10
Expense preference behavior can exhibit itself in one of two ways, but
the result is similar: a prediction that the expense-preference firm's
labor expenditures will exceed what they would be if a firm were a pure
profit maximizer. The first case is one where expense-preferences in
factor input decisions are separable from the output decisions. The firm
selects its optimal portfolio and then reallocates profits internally. This
is an example of "pure waste" and if such behavior exists, there should be
no difference in results derived from a simultaneous model of input and output
decisions and a single equation which estimates labor expenses. The alterna-
tive is one where the bank simultaneously chooses its inputs and outputs in
such a way as to expand outputs beyond the profit maximizing level by employ-
ing an excessive ratio of labor to other factor inputs.
In the empirical work Edwards assumes that regulatory efforts which fore-
stall entry are binding and that input and output decisions are.separable.
He does attempt to standardize for output factors but he is too heavily con-
strained by his data set to be totally successful. His control variables are
the average loan to deposit ratio and average demand to savings deposit ratio.
Neither variable captures the level of demand in the local economy nor the
nature of portfolio selection. However, he does engage in a discrete test to
find the level of local market concentration needed for oligopolistic coordin-
ation by local banks to become apparent. The report level for "the switching
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of regimes" to occur is a three-firm concentration ratio of 76%.
Edwards' basic model was confirmed in the recent papers written by Hannan.
Hannan uses a data set with observations for individual banks, not the SMSA
averages which Edwards employs. The banking markets are also more carefully
defined and they include rural areas. Differences in the level of demand
in the regional economy are loosely controlled for as the data are for all
commercial banks in Pennsylvania in 1970. The state contains 49 local banking
markets and 367 individual banks. Still, an explicit demand variable is absent
from the model, as are portfolio composition variables.
Hannan observes a positive correlation between concentration and the
number of employees and total wage and salary expenses. He also agrees with
Edwards in that bank management indulges in its "taste for expense" mostly
by hiring excess staff and not by paying them higher salaries than are found
in the market area. However, he could not find the strong threshold effect
of the concentration variable, which was reported by Edwards. He also found
that the significance of the concentration variable was not diminished by
12
the inclusion of a market share variable. Hannan and Mavinga developed a
more comprehensive test of the expense-preference hypothesis, using the same
basic data set as Hannan.13 They included a variable that identified banks
which were considered to be management controlled (if an individual owned 25%
or more of the bank's stock the bank was considered to be controlled by an
individual, if no individual controlled at least 10% of the stock the bank
was considered to be management controlled, all other banks were eliminated
from the data file). The management control variable had a significantly
positive impact on two of the three expenditure categories which were
examined, expenditures on furniture and equipment and net occupancy expense.
The statistical significance of the concentration variables were not
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diminished. Switching of regimes occurred with a three-firm concentration
ratio of market deposits of 63%. 14
These articles provide several insights which will be applied in build-
ing the statistical model below. The possibility of the existence of threshold
effects in the concentration variable was carefully explored but they could not
be confirmed. And the existence of expense-preference behavior is clearly an
outcome of the way in which banking firms operate. The question of the sep-
arability of factor input and output decisions should also be explored within
a model based on portfolio theory. The expense-preference model and the port-
folio model developed in this paper are essentially complementary models.
Both assume that the bank does not maximize short run profits. The portfolio
model demonstrates that a family of efficient portfolios exists, and that the
bank chooses the one which maximizes the firm's utility. The expense-
preference model is a theory about how the resulting profits are distributed,
they can go to one of three recipients: stockholders, retained earnings or
to management in terms of "excess" expenses. In this way the portfolio
model is more in keeping with the spirit of the original Edwards and Hegges-
tad article.
The original Edwards-Heggestad paper and Gardner's paper employ a dif-
ferent line of reasoning than that used in developing the portfolio model.
Yet they reach the same conclusion: banks in concentrated markets will be
risk averse. Their econometric work provides weak support for the hypothe-
sis, as they do not investigate the way in which concentration or risk aver-
sion will shape the composition of the asset portfolio.
Heggestad embarked on a separate path of research from that of Edwards.1 5
He produced a series of empirical studies on the impact of concentration on
various aspects of commercial bank performance. All of the studies are sub-
ject to two fundamental criticisms. First, Heggestad used ordinary least
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squares to estimate reduced form equations. As we have noted, bank output
and input decisions are inherently simultaneous in nature. Unless the
hypothesis to be tested is the specified outcome of a well defined, and
separable, decision-making process ordinary least squares estimating tech-
niques will result in biased and inconsistent estimators.16 Graddy and
Kyle demonstrate the simultaneous estimators will yield vastly different re-
sults from those derived from ordinary least squares regressions. The sec-
ond criticism of Heggestad's work is that he employs an ad hoc and unspecified
model of bank behavior which is loosely based on production theory. The
thrust of his theory is that concentration will retard firm mobility, as well
as changes in market share. He also hypothesizes that concentration will
improve bank profits, controlling for risk, in some unspecified manner. His
models also tend to include an inappropriate variable for the level of demand
for bank services. There is no indication of the expected relationship be-
tween factor inputs and outputs; there is little concern shown for the rele-
vant market in which the bank is competing and management is seen to be solely
concerned with straightforward profit maximizing.
The most sophisticated statistical model of bank decision making uses a
short run profit maximizing approach. The work is that of Graddy and Kyle.
Their theoretical model simply states that the objective function of a profit
maximizing bank is to maximize profits (P) where:
P=0(L,X) -C (DK,X)+)F (L,S,D,K,X)
where: P is profit
o is the output function.
L is a vector of loans, with their prices.
S is a vector of securities, with their prices.
C is the cost of function.
D is the vector of deposits, with their prices.
K is the vector of capital, with its prices.
X is the vector of labor services and wages.
F is an unspecified production function
A is the Lagrangian.
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Even if it is assumed that the marginal returns could be calculated, this
approach has several shortcomings which are not easily resolved.1 7  The
most serious shortcomings are that there are no a priori hypotheses as to
how the bank will fashion its portfolio and there is no recognition of
the fact that the demand for capital is largely derived from product demand
in the local economy. It is also impossible to predict what the relation-
ships are between the independent variables and those in the production func-
tion. The largest problem with a pure production function approach to model-
ing managerial decision making when there is uncertainty of return and more
than one output is that the production function is a black box. Specifically
assets are not selected solely on a basis of marginal revenue and marginal
cost, but on the basis of the rate of return and the covariation of those
returns. The production function approach also falls down in the area where
one would expect it to offer greater insights; hypotheses about the influence
of the relative price of factor inputs on asset selection. Finally, the
theory does not shed any light on the conundrums which were discussed by
Edwards and Heggestad in their 1977 articles. 1 The reliance on this theory
does not detract from the statistical insights of the work of Graddy and Kyle.
However, it does lead to a weakness in the interpretation of their results.
As Edwards and Heggestad have stated:
...any attempt to develop a general theory of the firm
to explain the monopoly-risk relationship must success-
fully blend managerial discretion theory of the firm
with modern finance theory - a task not unlike that of
mixing oil and vinegar. It will take a lot of careful
stirring.... 19
The modeling approach which has been suggested by Baltensperger, Fellows and
Klein suffers from problems in the way in which the banking firm selects
factor inputs and decides on the proper combination of outputs. On the input
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side they assume that all revealed factor costs are efficient for the firm,
that is expense-preference behavior does not occur. Indeed, expense-
preference theory states that the selection of factor inputs, especially
the number of labor hours, is an output. Managers of the firm hire excess
labor as a way of "hiding" or using up excess profits. This theory has
received some empirical support and it is a logical outgrowth of the way
in which banks are regulated.20
On the output side their approach ignores the portfolio problem. In
addition, it does not address the economic problem which is central to
this thesis: how does concentration in a local banking market influence
the share of a bank's portfolio which is invested in the local risky
portfolio. They assume that the local risky asset cannot be exhausted.
A third empirical problem confronts analysts in modeling bank behavior
in local markets. If the local banking market is severely concentrated,
the rate of return from the local risky asset is endogenous, as well as the
share of earning assets which the bank invests in the asset. Furthermore,
theory does not provide explicit guidance on how to identify supply equa-
tions, those which would estimate the rate of return and allocate the bank's
assets into this asset category.
In the following section of the chapter a statistical model is developed
which answers many of these theoretical problems. It is a model of the asset
behavior of commercial banks in New England. The estimating equations are
composed of the same set of exogenous variables for each of the endogenous
variables. The equations resemble reduced form equations but they are slightly
different in derivation. A reduced form can be derived directly from a system
of equations, usually supply and demand equations or cost and revenue equations.
Due to the portfolio and expense-preference problems which were explained
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above, the estimating equations cannot be directly derived. Instead the
estimating equations are deduced from the portfolio model and institutional
observations from earlier chapters. The equations form behavioral models
which determine the way in which banks behave. This approach in effect
says that we know that bank inputs and outputs are determined simultan-
eously but we do not know, in fact or in theory, how they interact. Simul-
taneous estimating techniques assume that we know more than we actually do.
The specific form of the equations are not known, as the basic theory has
not yet been developed. To give one example, we do not know the way in
which the exogenous variables and the instrumental variables should inter-
act. The allocation models which are developed below directly test the
expected relationships which are clearly defined by theory or institutional
analysis.
Two models have been developed. Each model consists of four equations,
one estimating the share of earning assets which are invested in three asset
categories (the risk free asset and two definitions of the local risky asset)
and the rate of return from the local risky asset. The first is a model of
individual bank behavior, the way in which individual banks allocate their
earning assets. The model is estimated for all 360 commercial banks in the
First Federal Reserve District. The second model is a model of aggregate mar-
ket behavior, one which examines the way in which assets are allocated in the
local banking market. The 57 banking markets in the First District are the
units of observation; the data were aggregated from the records of banks
present in each banking market.
B. The Asset Allocation Models
The statistical models which are developed examine the way in which
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individual banks allocate their asset portfolios and the way in which assets
are allocated within the local banking market. These are models of deci-
sions which banks must make in forming their asset portfolios when concen-
tration is present in one of the submarkets for their assets. There are
four endogenous variables in the two models: the average rate of return from
the local risky asset, the share of the portfolio which is invested in the
risk free asset and the share which is invested in two forms of the local
risky asset (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and Appendix 3).21 Each of these vari-
ables is regressed on three sets of exogenous variables. The exact compo-
sition of these three vectors will change in the bank and market models.
The first set of variables was derived from the portfolio model: the
alternative rates of return and the concentration variable. The second set
are variables which proxy loan demand in the local market, employment growth
and total market income. The last set are structural or behavioral variables.
The expected influence of these variables has been derived from the institu-
tional analysis contained in the second and third chapters: the composition
of the portfolio of liabilities, advertising expenditures and other variables
which describe the operating characteristics of the bank. It is expected
that this last vector will be more important in the bank model than.in the
market model.
The models are ordinary least squares estimates of the following general
equation:
(1) Y = f(X., Xk' )
where Y. is the vector of dependent (or decision variables)
X. is the vector of portfolio variables
Xk is the vector of local demand variables
X is the vector of structural variables
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Table 6.1
Variables Included in the Bank Model
Endogenous Variables
RILRA = rate of return on the local risky asset
ARFA% = percentage share of earning assets invested in the risk free asset
ALRAl% = percentage share of earning assets invested in loans and leases
ALRA2% = percentage share of earning assets invested in the local risky assets
Exogenous Variables
LCORE% = core deposits expressed as a percentage of earning assets
RIURA = rate of return on the ubiquitous risky asset
RIRFA = rate of return on the risk free asset
AEM% = the banking firm's share of total earning assets in the local banking
market
EMP5YR% = 5 year percentage change in employment in the banking market area,
from 1973 to 1977
TOTALY = estimated total income in the local banking market
SWB = a dummy variable which indicates if the bank has branches in three-
quarters of the state's banking markets or if it is owned by a multi-
bank holding company
APARENT = total assets of the parent organization of the bank; for holding
companies this is the asset of the entire holding company
IFID% = income from fiduciary activities expressed as a percentage of earning
assets
ACNIB% = percentage share of assets invested in non-interest bearing accounts
in other commercial banks; these are usually called correspondent
accounts
EOOP% = expenditures on other operating expenses expressed as a percentage
of earning assets
Table 6.2
Variables Included in the Market Model
Endogenous Variables
RILRA = rate of return on the local risky asset
ARFA% = percentage share of earning assets invested in the risk free asset
ALRAl% = percentage share of earning assets invested in loans and leases
ALRA2% = percentage share of earning assets invested in the local risky asset
Exogenous Variables
LCORE% = core deposits expressed as a percentage of total earning assets
in the local banking market
RIURA = rate of return on the ubiquitous risky asset
RIRFA = rate of return on the risk free asset
CONENL = the three firm concentration ratio of all commercial bank deposits
in the local banking market
EMP5YR% = 5 year percentage change in employment in the banking market area
from 1973 to 1977
TOTALY = estimated total income in the local banking market
IFID% = income from fiduciary activities expressed as a percentage of earning
assets in the local banking market
ACNIB% = percentage share of local market assets invested in non-interest
bearing accounts in other commercial banks
EOOP% = expenditures on other operation expenses expressed as a percentage
of earning assets.
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These equations differ from those in the current literature in several import-
ant respects. The variables are either scaled to control for bank size or
they are rates of return. This negates any chance of the absolute size of
the bank influencing any of the dependent variables, unless size effects
are expected to play an explicit role in behavior. Secondly, the concentra-
tion variable in the bank model is expressed as the bank's share of earning
assets in the local market. Other models of individual bank behavior use
the three firm concentration ratios of local market deposits. The market
share variable is appropriate for the bank model, while the concentration
ratio is appropriate in the market model. Individual banks are operating in
markets which most closely fit Chamberlin's model of monopolistic competition.2 2
It is hypothesized that each bank perceives that its degree of power in the
market for the local risky asset is positively correlated with its share of
the local market. In other words, the bank's perception of the degree of
inelasticity in the demand curve it faces is based on its share of local
market assets. Concentration in the market model is based on a slightly dif-
ferent concept. It is hypothesized that the deleterious effects of monopoly
in the local market is based on the degree of coordination among potential
competitors. This is best modeled by the three firm concentration ratio.2 3
The third difference between these models and others is the way in
which the liability structure is treated. Baltensperger correctly notes
that in most theoretical models of bank behavior the firm's liability struc-
ture is considered to be exogenously determined.24 The common reason given
for this assumption is that the price of deposits is fixed and that the bank-
ing firm takes its liability portfolio as given. The actual case is somewhat
more complicated. The asset portfolio is supported by three types of funds:
core deposits, bank capital and purchased liabilities. It is this last
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source of funds which determines the marginal cost of liabilities to the bank.
The latter two sources of funding are not regulated or, in the case of demand
deposits, are subject to non-interest costs which lower the real rate of return.
In a partial equilibrium model of asset allocation the share of total earning
assets which are supported by core liabilities is the only portion of the lia-
bility portfolio which can be treated as exogenous in the short run.25
The modeling effort is restricted in one aspect due to the data base.
Information is not available on the true spatial location of an asset. An
asset which is called a local risky asset may actually be an investment in
an economic activity which is located far from the lending bank's office.
The term is applied to assets which are most likely to be generated in the
local banking market and for which well developed secondary markets do not
exist. Two definitions of the local risky asset are used in the statistical
model. The first (ALRAl%) is the broader definition, it is used because it
matches the definition of the rate of return variable (RILRA). RILRA is
the calculated average rate of return from all loans and leases. ALRAl% is
the share of earning assets invested in all loans and leases. This defini-
tion includes some asset categories which should be defined as ubiquitous
risky assets. Specifically these are all mortgage loans, loans to financial
institutions and loans to securities dealers. The stricter definition of
local risky assets, ALRA2%, comes closest to the definition used in develop-
ing the theoretical model. These are assets which are invested in commercial
and industrial loans, leases, consumer loans, and commercial real estate loans.
Banks operate at various spatial levels. The larger the bank is the
more customers it is likely to have outside of its immediate market area.
It is not correct to assume that all of the loans in the portfolios of the
largest banks in the region are made locally. Gardner fell prey to this
problem. He cited a survey, conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, which
found that 90% of all business loans of less than $100,000 were made by
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banks in the same metropolitan area as the firm.26 But it does not follow
that 90% of all bank loans are made locally, as he assumed. Therefore
variables must be introduced into the estimating equations which separate
the investment behavior of national and regional money center banks from
that of smaller banks. These banks are serving vastly different market
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areas.
C. The Bank Model
The bank model consists of four equations. The four dependent vari-
ables are independently regressed, using ordinary least squares, on the
vector of independent variables which was presented in Table 6.1. The easi-
est way of tracing the expected effects of these exogenous variables on bank
behavior is to follow each through the four equations.
The first set of variables are the portfolio variables, the alternative
rates of return (RIURA, RIRFA) and local market concentration (AEM%). It is
expected that concentration will increase the rate of return from the port-
folio of local risky assets and increase investments in the ubiquitous risky
asset, where ubiquitous risky assets are defined as (l00%-ARFA%-ALRA%).
Theory leads us to expect that increased concentration will lead the banking
firm to hold a smaller share of its assets in the portfolio of local risky
assets and that this portfolio will be riskier. However, there are two types
of risk, once of which is revealed in the data and the other which is not.
The first is revealed in the makeup of the portfolio of local risky assets;
a riskier portfolio will contain a greater share of consumer loans and commer-
cial and industrial loans (these are the riskiest of local assets). The sec-
ond type of risk is more in keeping with the theory. Increased risk implies
that the bank is reaching deeper down the queue of loan applicants, while
keeping the composition of the portfolio of local risky assets constant. If
the first interpretation of risk is correct, the sign of AEM% should not be
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significantly different from zero in the third equation (ALRAl%) but positive
in the last (ALRA2%). The expected sign of this variable is fairly clear in
one case, it should be negative in the second equation (ARFA%).
The portfolio effect leads us to expect signs which appear to be counter-
intuitive. The rate of return from the risk free asset will be inversely
related to the share of this asset in the portfolio and positively related
to the share of the local risky asset, using either definition of the variable.
This is known as the portfolio effect. The investor, in this case the bank,
invests in the risk free asset to counterbalance the expected degree of risk
in the risky portfolio. Assuming that all banks have equal taste for risk,
an increase in return from the risk free asset will allow the bank to invest
in a riskier overall portfolio. The other rate of return variable, return
from the ubiquitous risky asset, should show the same signs if it is treated
in the same general way as the risk free asset. If the sign is positive the
ubiquitous risky asset and the portfolio of local risky assets are considered
to be complements. If the sign is negative they are substitutes. In the
first case the complementary would be considered to be portfolio effects,
in the second they are standard price effects. It is an empirical question
as to which effect is in force. The variable does suffer from specification
error in that returns from mortgage loans could not not be included, as was
mentioned above these are part of ALRAl% and RILRA. For this reason, the
usual price effects are not necessarily expected, that is a negative sign for
AEM% in the local risky asset equations. If the return from the ubiquitous
risky asset could be defined in such a way as to serve as a clear alternative
to local investments, negative signs would be expected. The two rate of return
variables are not expected to have a direct effect on the rate of return from
the local risky asset.
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The two demand variables are included to proxy two different aspects of
local loan demand which confront bankers. The first is the rate of employ-
ment growth in the local market over the previous five years, EMP5YR%. On
average employment growth occurred in the New England counties with lower
per capita incomes and lower population levels. It is expected that the
rate of return on local risky assets and the share of assets which are devoted
to local risky assets will be affected by employment growth. Growth in employ-
ment is caused by previous capital investments, so this variable is assumed to
approximate local loan demand. It is also expected that there will be a nega-
tive relationship between employment growth and RILRA. This is because with
growth in employment the queue of local loans will "deepen" and the bank will
have better quality loans from which to choose. This will allow the bank to
charge a smaller risk premium on its portfolio of local risky assets. It is
also expected that the bank will shift more of its assets into the more nar-
rowly defined local asset, ALRA2%. Funds will be shifted in one other way.
Banks should shift funds from the ubiquitous risky asset, especially long
term investments in real estate. In this model this shift would be reflected
in a weak negative response in ALRAl%.
The other demand variable, total market income (TOTALY), was calculated
by multiplying per capita income by population, the two components of this
variable were highly correlated. Higher area income is expected to have an
impact on all of the dependent variables due to consumption effects. The
more populous markets were the wealthiest and it is expected that there
would be a lower propensity to consume locally in these markets. Therefore
it is expected that there will be a negative relationship between TOTALY and
the two local asset variables. This independent variable also serves as a
proxy for urban banking markets and urban banks. These banks are forced
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by regulation to carry slightly higher reserves. These are also the markets
which are most closely tied to the national and international capital mar-
kets, yielding easier access to ubiquitous risky assets. These "urban" effects
lead us to expect that there will be a slightly higher rate of return from
local risky assets due to competitive pressure from non-local sources of de-
mand. It should also add to the negative effect on the shares invested in
the local asset. The reserve city requirements and more active movement of
funds in an urban environment would lead us to expect a positive relationship
between TOTALY and the share of assets which are invested in the risk free
asset.
The third set of variables are those which describe structural charac-
teristics of the banks. The first is the liability variable. While the compo-
sition of the bank's liability portfolio was not introduced into the formal
theory, the existing literature and interviews all indicate that it plays a
very influential role in the asset behavior of banks. There are two reasons
for expecting that the larger the portion of earning assets which are supported
by core deposits (LCORE%), the smaller the share of assets the bank needs to
invest in the risk free asset. Regulatory agencies require a smaller share of
assets be held in reserve for time deposits than for demand deposits. Sec-
ondly, the risk of withdrawal is lower for these liabilities than it is for
purchased liabilities, therefore the bank needs less in liquid investments
to balance this risk. These investments are often called secondary reserves.
The principle of hedging assets and liabilities, attempting to match the vari-
ance of each, has led to a rule of thumb which allows the signs of the two
local risky asset variables to be predicted. A positive relationship is ex-
pected between LCORE% and ALRAl%. A large portion of ALRAl% is composed of
mortgage loans which have low variances. The opposite sign is expected in
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the last equation (ALRA2%). There is a strong a priori expectation about
the influence of the liability variable on the rate of return on local risky
assets.
Three structural variables have been entered to measure the degree to
which the bank is "connected" to a wider capital market, all these variables
are expected to increase the share of assets banks invest in the risk free
asset. The first of these variables is intended to measure the impact of
statewide branch banking arrangements, whether or not the bank is organized
as a holding company. If the bank, or other banks owned by the same firm,
are present in a majority of the banking markets in a state, the dummy var-
iable SWB scores a 1. It is hypothesized that such banks are competitive
in larger capital markets, be it statewide, regional, or national. This own-
ership variable will be positively associated with increases in investment in
the risk free asset. Two reasons exist for expecting this result. As banks
become larger, they must increase their reserves; this is a regulatory require-
ment. Secondly, the major Boston area banks serve as correspondent banks for
smaller banks in the New England region. These banks commonly invest their
correspondent accounts in short term risk free assets. It is also hypothe-
sized that the larger the banking organization, as measured by the consolidated
assets of the parent corporation, the less connected it is with the local cap-
ital market. It is expected that the combination of these influences will
raise the opportunity cost of investing in local risky assets. This is equiva-
lent to increasing the number of loan applicants, which will in turn increase
the local opportunity cost of funds. There is increased demand for loans, this
will increase the potential returns for banks in markets with stagnant or declin-
ing economies. Local loans will be charged a risk premium in this case. The
other reason is that spatial diversity lowers risk for banks, increasing the
length of the queue partially insulates the bank from the effects of a localized
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recession.
If commercial and industrial loans, and other assets which are called
local risky assets, had spatial tags associated with them, a decrease in
the share of local risky assets in the total portfolio would be expected.
This would be accompanied by an increase in the share which is invested in
the ubiquitous risky asset. As the assets are not spatially identified,
the expected signs of the relationship become ambiguous. Loans for secur-
ities purchases and loans to financial institutions should increase with
size, but mortgage loans should decrease. It has been verified empirically,
using this data set, that the share of commercial and industrial loans in-
creases with both bank size and the assets of the parent corporation. But
it is suspected that the type of corporation to whom the loan is made is very
different; that is larger banks make more loans to larger corporations or at
least to corporations which have systematically different characteristics
from the corporations that are the clients of smaller banks.
The correspondent banking variable is ACNIB%. This is the share of
deposits that the bank has invested in non-interest bearing accounts in
other commercial banks; these are often called correspondent accounts. Smaller
banks invest in funds in these accounts in larger banks in return for services;
these services range from management advice to computer operations. Most
banks maintain these accounts to assist them in check clearing operations
as well. One of the benefits of maintaining a close correspondent relation-
ship is that the larger, or lead bank, will sell parts of loans to its corres-
pondents. The larger bank will also serve as a broker for the smaller banks
in national securities markets. These activities should raise the opportunity
cost of local investments and, thereby, the rate of return from the portfolio
of local risky assets. By definition it will also increase the share invested
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in the risk free asset. There should be decreases in the share which is
invested in the local risky asset. The major service of correspondent banks
to smaller banks on the asset side of the ledger is to open the national
securities markets to smaller banks, therefore a larger decrease in ALRA2%
is expected. Again, if loans were spatially identified, larger decreases
in the local risky asset equations would be expected.
The last variable which was included in the four equations is the proxy
for advertising expenditure, EOOP%. This is the residual expenditure cate-
gory in the regulatory report of income; it is called "other operating ex-
penses." This catch-all remains once salaries, benefits, interest, occupancy
expenses and furniture and equipment expenses are deducted from total expenses.28
The bulk of this residual is accounted for by expenditures on advertising. Most
advertising is conducted in the local market and it has both direct and indirect
effects on the four dependent variables. It can directly influence the rate of
return from the local risky asset by promoting a differential image for the
bank and allowing the bank to charge higher prices. This will decrease the
elasticity of the demand curve which the firm faces and add to its monopoly
power. It also adds to its cost of doing business in an indirect way. Ad-
vertising expenditures are most closely associated with the share of the
bank assets which are supported by purchased liabilities, LPUR%. These lia-
bilities establish the bank's marginal cost of liabilities. The average cost
of liabilities will increase with increases in LPUR%, necessitating a higher
average return. The close association between LPUR% and EOOP% may strengthen
the positive relationship between advertising and investments in local risky-
assets.2 9
Table 6.3 lists the results from the bank model regressions. The results
are generally in concurrence with those expected and the results indicate
that the model can differentiate between the impact of the exogenous variables
on the four dependent variables.
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Table 6.3
Bank Model: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results
Explanatory Dependent Variables
Variables RILRA ARFA% ALRAI% ALRA2%
CONSTANT 6.462 38.298 34.370 39.630
(13.03) (11.24) (9.21) (8.71)
LCORE% 0.013 - 0.089 0.270 - 0.181
(2.62) (-2.67)** (7.37)** (-4.05)**
RIURA -0.003 0.043 0.733 0.345
(-0.07) (0.17) (2.71)** (1.05)
RIRFA -0.033 -1.937 1.296 1.227
(-0.94) (-7.95)** (4.86)** (3.77)**
AEM% 0.010 -0.053 0.012 0.017
(2.68)** (-2.02)* (0.43) (0.48)
EMP5YR% -0.024 -0.043 -0.152 -0.155
(-2.06)* (-0.53) (-1.73) (-1.45)
TOTALY 1.96E-11 2.68E-10 -2.44E-10 -1.80E-11
(2.12)* (4.22)** (-3.50)** (-0.21)
SWB*APARENT 1.22E-07 6.42E-07 2.53E-07 4.43E-07
(2.16)* (1.66) (0.69) (0.86)
IFID% -0.363 0.692 -1.463 -1.834
(-3.03)** (0.84) (-1.62) (-1.67)+
ACNIB % 0.006 0.029 -0.075 -0.105
(3.19)** (2.24)* (-5.30)** (-6.12)**
EOOP% 1.092 -2.002 7.147 8.221
(7.95)** (-2.12) (6.92)** (6.53)**
CORRECTED R2 .281 .306 .348 .204
R2 .301 .325 .366 .226
F(10,351) 15.12** 16.94** 20.29** 10.28**
N= 362
Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios
** significant at .01 level, 2-tail test
* significant at .05 level, 2-tail test
+ significant at .10 level, 2-tail test
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Empirical Results
The four estimating equations employ a common set of independent var-
iables to explain four dimensions of the asset allocation decision: how
much to invest in the three asset categories and how much to charge for an
asset where there is room for discretionary pricing. However, the exogenous
variables have differential impacts on the four decision variables, as is
expected. The estimating equations demonstrate that concentration in local
banking markets influences the rate of return from the local risky asset
more than the composition of the portfolio per se. It is also demonstrated
that behavioral variables exert strong influence over the portfolio behavior
of banking firms in New England.
The liability variable (LCORE%) had its strongest influence on the asset
composition variables. The larger the share of assets which are supported by
core liabilities, which lessens the risk of withdrawal, the smaller is the
share of assets which are invested in the risk free asset. The share of earn-
ing assets which are invested in longer term risky assets is also increased,
ALRAl%. This indicates that in 1977 banks were still adhering to traditional
rules of thumb on how to hedge their asset and liability portfolios.
The variables which were derived from portfolio theory, AEM% and RIRFA,
behaved as expected in most respects. The effect on the asset portfolio of
a change in the rate of return from the risk free asset (RIRFA) is very pro-
nounced. This rate of return does not appear to influence the rate from the
local risky portfolio but it does influence the share variables. A one hun-
dred basis point increase in RIRFA will result in a 1.9% decrease in the
share of the portfolio which is invested in the risk free asset, the elas-
ticity at the mean is -0.66.30 The shares invested in the local risky asset
will increase with increases in the rate of return from the risk free asset.
This is in accord with the theory presented earlier.
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The influence of concentration in the local banking market is not as
clear as expected. Concentration in the local banking market increases
the rate of return from the portfolio of local risky assets, a one percent
increase in the share of local market assets held by a bank increases its
rate of return from the local portfolio by one basis point. Concentration
also tends to lower the share of assets invested in the risk free asset;
apparently the bank shifts these funds into ubiquitous risky assets. Theory
predicted that concentration would cause the bank to invest less in the local
risky asset but that the portfolio of local risky assets would be riskier.
It is implied that the share invested in the ubiquitous risky asset would be
increased.
The empirical results indicate that concentration does not influence
the share of earning assets which are invested in the local risky asset,
the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Several points
should be made which help to explain this result. First, a portion of the
variable ALRA1% is composed of assets which would be considered to be
ubiquitous (this definition was used because it corresponded to RILRA).
Secondly, due to the fact that the spatial location of investments are not
identified, non-local loans are included in the two local asset variables.
Combining these facts and the results from the three share equations one
can infer that concentration does cause a shift in the way in which the
asset portfolio is allocated. It appears that the share invested in the
risk free asset decreases and the share invested in the ubiquitous risky
asset increases. It is also true that the specification error in the way
in which assets were classified would mollify any shifts against the local
risky asset. It is very likely that concentration does influence invest-
ment behavior along the lines which were outlined by the theory but the
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data are too crude to fully capture these shifts.
The two demand variables have very different effects on the four depend-
ent variables. The rate of growth in employment, which is a close approxi-
mation to demand for capital, is negatively correlated with the rate of re-
turn from local risky assets.31 A higher rate of employment growth implies
that there is a deeper queue of potential local investments and a lower risk
premium will be charged to reflect the improved risk profile. Employment
growth is weakly associated with decreases in ALRAl% which would indicate
that funds are being shifted from mortgage lending to other activities.
The other demand variable, TOTALY, has a strong influence on the asset shares
and it displays a weaker association with the rate of return from local risky
assets. As was noted above, this may be capturing some "urban" influences.
The share of earning assets invested in the risk free asset increases, while
that invested in ALRA1% decreases.3 2
The state wide branching variable increased the opportunity cost of local
lending and this effect increased with the size of the bank. A $1 million
increase in the earning assets of a state-wide bank is associated with a 1.22
basis point increase in the rate of return from the portfolio of local risky
assets. It is also weakly associated with an increase in the share of assets
invested in the risk free asset. There is no evidence which shows that state-
wide banks shift assets away from the portfolio of local risky assets, as
defined in this data set.
Two variables were introduced to measure the degree to which the bank
is involved, or connected to the local market. The first was the income
which the bank earned from fiduciary activities expressed as a percentage
of earning assets (IFID%). This lowered the rate of return of the local
portfolio, as well as the share which was invested in that portfolio.
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The combination of these effects indicate that the bank is in some sense
disinterested in local lending opportunities. It is either investing its
earning assets in the same types of ubiquitous assets as it invests its
fiduciary accounts, or else the bank is not working the local market as
hard as it could and it is concentrating on managing the fiduciary accounts.
The influence of the correspondent banking variable was as expected. The
yield from the local risky portfolio was increased and funds were shifted
toward ubiquitous risky assets. This implies that the most important role
of the lead bank in a chain of correspondent banks is not in participating
loans down to smaller banks but in opening the national securities markets
to smaller banks.
The advertising variable increased the rate of return from the local
portfolio and was associated with increases in the share of funds which were
invested locally. There are two possible reasons for these shifts. The
first is the standard explanation of the effect of advertising: advertising
in the local market reflects a specialization which the bank has developed
in local lending and it has introduced a degree of inelasticity in the local
demand curve which the bank faces. The second explanation is empirical.
Spending on advertising is closely associated with increases in LPUR%,
the share of earning assets which are supported by purchased liabilities.
This introduces indirect effects which are not captured by the liability
variable which was introduced into the equations, LCORE%. Purchased depos-
its are expensive and increase the average cost of funds which in turn would
increase the return required from the local portfolio. In addition, these
are shorter term funds with higher withdrawal risk. To properly hedge these
funds the bank will have to invest in shorter term, and higher yielding
assets.
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D. The Market Model
The four equations in the market model are very similar to those in
the bank model. These four ordinary least squares equations were esti-
mated for the 57 banking markets in the First Federal Reserve District
in 1977, aggregating over all of the commercial banks in the local mar-
ket. The definitions of the dependent variables remain the same except
that the denominator for the asset share variables is total earning
assets in the banking market area. There are also changes in the defini-
tions of two of the independent variables. The concentration variable is
the three firm percentage share of total market area deposits. The sec-
ond change is that the bank branching and size variable, SWB*APARENT, was
dropped, as an equivalent concept does not exist for the market.
The market model taken as a whole did not perform as well as did the
bank model (see Table 6.4). The only equation which benefited from aggre-
gation was that which explained the rate of return from the local port-
folio. The structural variables were most useful in predicting the be-
havior of individual banks than for markets.34 The most striking differ-
ence between the two sets of equations was the lack of influence of RIRFA,
EMP5YR%, and ACNIB% on all of the dependent variables.
The liability variable, LCORE%, significantly influenced two of the
three share equations. The decreased threat of the risk of deposit with-
drawal is reflected in the smaller share invested in the risk free asset.
The principle of hedging is adhered to in the aggregate as well as by
individual banks. Markets with high portions of their-assets supported
by core deposits invest more heavily in longer term assets, mostly mort-
gage loans, which make up a large portion of ALRAl%. The composition of
liabilities does not influence the average price of the local risky asset.
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Table 6.4
Market Model: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results
Explanatory Dependent Variables
Varibles RILRA ARFA% ALRA1% ALRA2%
CONSTANT 5.990 37.990 41.650 31.16
(7.35) (4.44) (4.41) (2.01)
LCORE% 0.000 -0.211 0.311 -0.134
(-0.02) (-2.32)* (309)** (-0.81)
RIURA 0.174 -1.319 -1.458 -1.778
(2.32)* (-2.43)* (-1.67) (-1.25)
RIRFA 0.057 0.818 0.721 1.519
(1.10) (1.04) (1.202) (1.54)
CONCENL 0.007 -0.044 0.72 0.143
(1.61) (-0.99) (1.47) (1.79)+
EMPSYR% -0.009 -0.012 -0.016 0.122
(-1.48) (-0.19) (-0.23) (1.02)
TOTALY 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 2.36E-05
(4.154)** (1.52) (0.75) (0.05)
IFID% -0.662+ -3.663 -2,380 4.405
(-0.79) (0.941) (-0.55) (0.63)
ACNIB% -0.013 -0.150 0.121 -0.035
(-1.03) (-1.15) (0.84) (-0.15)
EOOP% 0.813 0.149 4.738 8.144
(3.76)** (0.07) (1.886) (1.98)*
CORRECTED R2 .539 .248 .172 .279
R2 .613 .369 .305 .395
F (9,47) 8.27** 3.05** 2.29* 3.41**
N=5 7
Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios
** significant at .01 level, 2-tail
* significant at .05 level, 2-tail





The rate of return from the ubiquitous risky asset (RIURA) plays a
different role in the market model than it did in the bank model. It
appears to determine the opportunity cost of local lending; it is a
substitute for local investing rather than a complement. RIURA is posi-
tively associated with RILRA and it is inversely related to the shares of
the two substitute assets, ARFA% and ALRAl%.
The performance of the two portfolio variables was particularly dis-
appointing. The rate of return from the risk free asset did not display
any of the portfolio effects which were so prominent in the bank model.
The concentration variable was statistically significant in one equation,
ALRA2%, but this was a fairly weak association.
The only demand variable to display any influence in the market model
was total market income.35 This variable is closely associated with the
rate of return from the local risky asset. It is unclear if this is some
form of an urbanization effect or if it is a pure demand effect. This con-
fusion in interpretation was also present in the bank model. The fiduciary
variable (IFID%) also appeared to influence the rate of return from the
portfolio of local risky assets; a statistically significant negative
relationship was present, as was true in the bank model.
In a local market aggregate advertising expenditure is used to direct
the flow of both assets and liabilities toward the commercial banking
industry and away from other intermediaries. The strongest statistical
relationship exists between the rate of return from local assets and rela-
tive advertising expenditure. As in the bank model this is due to both
the impact of advertising on the elasticity of the asset demand curve and
the close association between advertising expenditure and the share of
purchased liabilities in the portfolio of liabilities. There are also
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positive relationships between EOOP% and the two local risky asset share
variables. This indicates that advertising will cause a shift from the
ubiquitous risky asset to the portfolio of local risky assets. The shift
could be due to the influence which advertising has on the elasticity of
the demand curve. Inelasticity of local demand will improve the risk-
return trade-off which faces the bank.
E. Comparing the Estimating Equations Across the Two Models
The two previous sections discussed the impacts which the independent
variables had on the four dependent variables. Bu the equations were not
viewed as a whole. In this section each of the equations is examined and
compared across models.
Rate of Return from the Local Risky Portfolio (RILRA)
The rate of return from the local risky portfolio in the bank model
shows more structural variation than it does in the market model. RILRA
is a function of four significant independent variables in the market
model, while eight variables play a role in the bank model. In the market
model RILRA is significantly associated with total area income and rela-
tive advertising expenditure. These variables indicate that opportunity
cost considerations (TOTALY), and the role of purchased liabilities and
cost of advertising (EOOP%), are reflected in the gross rate of return
from the aggregate local portfolio. This is contrasted with the same
equation in the bank model. In the bank model concentration (AEM%), and
the correspondent banking variable (ACNIB%), combine with advertising
expenditure in decreasing the elasticity of the asset demand curve which
the bank faces. These effects coupled with the urbanization effects of
TOTALY also act to increase the opportunity cost of local investments by
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changing the risk-return opportunity locus which confronts the bank.
Two other differences exist between these two equations. RIURA is
of positive sign and significant in the market equation and it is not
significantly different from zero in the bank equation. Secondly, the
state-wide branching variable is positive in the bank equation. This
indicates that there is a higher opportunity cost for making local loans
for banks which operate in multiple spatial markets.
The Share of Assets Invested in the Risk Free Asset (ARFA%)
In the market model the share of earning assets which is invested in
the risk free asset is found to be a function of two variables, the rate
of return from the ubiquitous risky asset (RIURA) and LCORE%. Portfolio
effects are not displayed, as is also true with.the local demand variables.
This is in sharp contrast with the same equation in the bank model. In
the latter model portfolio and concentration effects are felt and RIURA
does not influence the allocation of assets to the risk free asset. The
bank structure variables are prominent in the bank model and have no
statistical effect in the market model.
The Share of Assets Invested in the Portfolio of Local Pisky Assets
The most important difference between the equations which predict the
share of earning assets which are invested in the local risky portfolio is
that the portfolio and structural effects which are prominent in the bank
model are of negligible importance in the market model. In the first of
the two local asset equations in the market model (ALRAl%) the dependent
variable is a function of three of the independent variables. In the
aggregate the principle of hedging asset and liability portfolios dominates
the allocation process. The only structural variable of importance is
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advertising. The rate of return from ubiquitous risky assets is negatively
correlated with ALRA1%, indicating that the two assets are substitutes for
each other. This result is in sharp contrast with the bank model. In
this model portfolio effects are important as are the bank structure var-
iables. The way in which the industry is organized clearly influences
bank decision making. Local demand variables also influence bank behavior.
Comments
The most important lesson which can be drawn from comparing the two
sets of statistical equations is that spatial aggregation hides much of
interest in bank behavior. The characteristics of bank organization
clearly influence behavior and the degree to which the industry participates
in the local economy. The disaggregated model provides a richer and more
accurate tableau of the economic activities of the commercial banking
industry. Most academic and regulatory analyses of the economic perform-
ance of the banking industry use aggregate banking area statistics which
are provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This work
demonstrates that inferences about bank behavior and the competitive struc-
ture of the banking industry cannot be made from these sources of informa-
tion alone.
The statistical results do not disprove the theoretical developments
of the previous chapter. It was shown in the bank model that banks do
follow the outline of the portfolio model, even though the results are
a bit muddied due to specification error. In fact, while the influence
of the rate of return from the ubiquitous risky asset appears to be a
substitute for the local risky asset in the market model it demonstrates
complementary portfolio effects in the bank model. It was shown that local
246
market concentration, or the prominence of the bank in the local market,
increases the bank's rate of return from the portfolio of local risky
assets. These results are understandable when it is considered that
banks act to avoid default risk by diversifying their investments. But
these activities are tempered by their actions to guard against withdrawal
risk.
Two related measurement problems remain with the bank model; together
they are the specification problem which has been mentioned. Investments
do not carry spatial tags; they are called local risky, ubiquitous, or
risk free assets according to the secondary market characteristics of
the asset. Therefore the true size of the local risky portfolio is over-
stated and that of the ubiquitous risky portfolio is understated in these
models. This means that the influence of the exogenous variables on the
local risky variables are minimums; that is the impacts of these variables
on the local risky asset variables are biased downwards. This is com-
pounded by the fact that income from all loans is aggregated in the FDIC
reports, making it impossible to disaggregate bank income to match the
more narrow definition of local risky assets (ALRA2%).
A second statistical problem grew out of the inability to spatially
identify bank investments. It was impossible to directly test the hypothe-
sis that a bank's involvement in the local market deteriorates with increases
in asset size. All that can be said is that the opportunity cost of invest-
ing in local risky assets increases with the size of the earning assets of
banks which are members of state-wide organizations. This is consistent
with the hypothesis. The logical argument behind the hypothesis consists
of two parts. The first is that larger banks have a more extensive customer
base; retail banks would have more extensive network of branch banks and
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wholesale banks would have larger institutions as customers. This spatial
diversity gives the bank a larger pool of loan customers and in turn a
superior risk-return profile. However, it is not clear if the pool of
potential debtors improves more than proportionately with the increase in
the bank's asset size. The second portion of the argument does infer that
larger banks will have a superior risk-return profile. It is hypothesized
that larger banks can take advantage of scale economies and specialize in
serving the expressed needs of large debtors, both firms and institutions.
The largest banks are seen to be competing with the commercial paper mar-
ket for their customers, not with other banks. Loans to the largest firms
in the economy will be nearly as risky as ubiquitous risky assets. These
banks would then be expected to invest their assets in portfolios of local
risky assets in very risky debts with high rates of return, such as consumer
loans made with bank credit cards.
These conclusions have been reached by examining the statistical re-
sults alone. They are statements about the economic behavior of the commer-
cial banking industry in New England during 1977. And as such these results
need to be placed in a broader context to allow us to reach any reasonable
conclusions about the future of this industry in the economy. This is the
task of the next, and final, chapter. It is also necessary to see how
the statistical results compare with similar studies. This comparison
will be presented along with a summary of the theoretical model in the
concluding section of this chapter.
F. Conclusion
The theoretical model was constructed to determine how spatial mon-
opoly will influence the composition of a bank's asset portfolio. There
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does not appear to be a similar model in the current literature. Several
statistical efforts at modeling the impact of local market concentration
do exist but they are not based on a well developed ex ante theory.
Other theoretical models of bank behavior assume that all banks have
equal access to all assets, and most are optimizing models based on pro-
duction theory. This particular model is unique in that it is a model of
bank behavior in a concentrated market area which is based on modern port-
folio theory. As such, it is a partial equilibrium model; concerns over
the impact of the structure of the bank's assets on its liability port-
folio are ignored. Essentially, the model holds the composition of the
liability portfolio constant.
The theoretical model is a two asset portfolio model. The bank has
to select the optimal combination of the two assets; trading off risk for
expected return, to maximize its utility function. The risk free asset
is available to all banks in unlimited quantitites. The model departs
from the usual Markowitz assumptions in that the supply of the risky asset
is restricted in the monopolized market. The restricted asset is called
the local risky asset. The model is initially solved for a monopolized
banking market, then for the competitive market and finally the static
results are compared across the models.
The marginal rate of substitution is the same in both models. It
takes increasing amounts of expected return to compensate the banks for
accepting the added risk of purchasing greater shares of the risky asset.
A schedule or loci of marginal rates of substitution can be plotted;
these depend on the slope of the efficiency frontier in the particular
market.
The difference between the two models exists in the way in which
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banks view the efficiency frontier, or more accurately, the way in which
they can convert risk to return. A bank which has monopolized the local
banking market realizes that by investing more heavily in the local risky
asset it will drive down the rate of return from that asset. This is a
quantity effect which is missing in the model of a competitive banking
market. In a competitive market a bank cannot influence the rate of
return from the local risky asset by its investment policies.
The existence of the quantity effect means that a bank which has
monopolized a banking market will transform risk into expected return more
slowly than will banks in competitive markets. Therefore, a line showing
the rate at which risk is converted into expected return in the competi-
tive market will be above the same line drawn for a monopolized market.
The loci of the marginal rates of substitution are the same in both
models. The loci of the marginal rates of transformation (MRT) for banks
in monopolized markets lie everywhere below the MRT of banks in competi-
tive markets. This implies that banks which operate in competitive local
banking markets will invest a greater share of their assets locally than
will banks in monopolized markets. However, their portfolio of local
assets will contain less risk than will the portfolio of local assets
of a bank in a monopolized market. The monopolist is substituting risk
for quantity in assembling its optimal risky portfolio.
The monopolistic and competitive market models are polar cases of
the impact of market structure on the asset holdings of a bank. Monopoly
will cause the expected returns from local risky assets to be discounted.
The asset composition of the risky portfolio will differ for banks facing
the same demand conditions and holding identical liability portfolios;
the composition of the asset portfolio will depend on the degree of monopoly
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power in the local banking market. The theoretical models are in effect
market equilibria, as well as equilibria for individual banks. There will
be more funds invested in local risky assets in competitive markets than
in monopolized markets. These models indicate that local economic develop-
ment will be retarded in monopolized local banking markets. This may be
manifest in two ways. The monopolized banking market may have a lower over-
all growth rate. Or the market may be more dependent on branch plants,
and other forms of development which are not generated locally, for their
growth.
The statistical models which were developed in this chapter were
based on modern portfolio theory, other theoretical work on the economics
of the banking industry and the recent empirical literature. There are a
number of articles in the literature which examine bank behavior but none
operate from the same theoretical background. In fact, recent articles
test a number of related topics but they tend to focus on either the level
and variation in bank profits or the prices banks charge for specific pro-
ducts. A major point which distinguishes this work is its emphasis on the
distribution of assets in the portfolio of a bank. The decision on asset
pricing is seen as being part of the general portfolio problem, but the
bank only has discretion on the pricing of local risky assets. The prices
of ubiquitous risky assets and the risk free asset are seen as being deter-
mined in the broader financial markets.
The statistical models do not test the relationship between concentra-
tion and bank profit levels for two reasons. The work of Edwards and
Hannan indicates that banks which operate in concentrated markets engage
in expense-preference spending behavior. This would dilute the level of
reported profits. Banks have an additional incentive to restrict their
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profit levels, especially those which are closely held. Regulation will
grant new bank charters.in markets where above normal bank profits are
consistently reported.
The results of the statistical models are of interest to regulators
for what they do not reveal, as well as for what they do show. If regu-
lators or public policy makers agree that the structure of the banking
industry may be influencing the prices banks charge for their assets
and the allocation of those assets, they must insist that the spatial loca-
tions of banks investments be known in aggregate form in the bank's income
statement. This is also true of the prices which are charged for those
loans. This could be done by adopting some of the categories which are
used in this thesis. At a minimum regulators should insist on an account-
ing of bank income which matches the reported distribution of assets.
Most studies of bank market structure indicate that concentration
has its strongest influence on the price of bank assets.36 The results
from the bank model are no exception. The model also demonstrates that
affiliation with a large parent organization will tend to channel bank
assets toward ubiquitous risky assets and raise the cost of local risky
assets. The other area where the results from the bank model, in partic-
ular, are in agreement with other articles is that the composition of the
liability portfolio influences the distribution of the asset portfolio.
The statistical work did demonstrate that the major effect of member-
ship in a correspondent banking network is to give smaller banks access
to the national securities market, and not to allow them to purchase por-
tions of larger loans from their correspondents. The portfolio effects
which were expected were evident in both models, but they were more pro-
nounced in the bank model.
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The results of this study can be viewed in two ways. The narrow results
of the fifth and sixth chapters are of interest by and of themselves. They
reveal, in theory, what the impact of concentration will be on a monopolized
banking market. It also contains an empirical investigation about the
competitive condition of the commercial banking industry in the First Federal
Reserve District. Broader conclusions are drawn in the next chapter. There
have been increasing demands for government and regulators to change the
legal framework under which the industry operates. The final chapter tries
to evaluate some of these proposals in the light of what has been put forth
in these earlier chapters.
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NOTES
1. Baltensperger, Ernst. "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of the
Banking Firm." Journal of Monetary Economics, January 1980, pp. 1-37.
This article reviews the major developments which concern the theory of
the banking firm. The article divides theoretical models into several
groups: models of reserve and liquidity management, models of liability
structure and capital accounts, monopoly models of bank behavior, risk
aversion or portfolio models of bank behavior, and real resource or
production function models of bank behavior. The first two sets of models
are partial models of portfolio management, while the last three groups
attempt to theoretically model the asset and liability structure of a
bank. The liability models are reviewed on pages 17-19.
2. Two articles summarize and review the literature on the production
function approach:
Graddy, Duane B. and Reuben Kyle III. "The Simultaneity of Bank
Decision-making, Market Structure and Bank Performance." The Journal of
Finance, March 1979, pp. 1-18.
Fellows, James, A. "A Theory of the Banking Firm." American Economist,
Spring 1978, pp. 22-25.
3. The best articles using this approach are both by Edwards:
Edwards, Franklin R. and Arnold A. Heggestad. "Uncertainty, Market
Structure and Performance: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis and Managerial
Motives in Banking." Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1973, pp. 445-473.
Edwards, Franklin R. "Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries:
Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking." Journal of Political Economy,
February 1977, pp. 147-162.
4. Edwards and Heggestad. op cit., p. 455. The works to which they are
referring are:
Galbraith, John K. The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1967), Chs. 3,7.
Caves, Richard E. "Uncertainty, Market Structure and Performance:
Galbraith as Conventional Wisdom" in J. Markham and G. Papanek, eds.
Industrial Organization and Economic Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1970), p. 284.
5. Some dispute has arisen about the theoretical development of models
which address the Galbraith-Caves hypothesis. Edwards and Heggestad note
that differences between the firm's opportunity set and preferences cannot
be identified. Christofides and Tapon (1979a) formally developed another
model of the hypothesis which does not address this problem. They con-
clude that monopoly firms will adjust per unit discretionary expenditures
upwards to minimize profit uncertainty. In a later paper (1979b) they pro-
vide an elaborated discussion of the problem of differentiating between a
firm's taste and opportunities. They claim that a model which ignores the
impact of market power on efficiency frontiers, thereby avoiding confusion
between preferences and opportunities, is preferable to one which lumps them
together (as Edwards and Heggestad do). Ignoring this problem will yield
a more elaborate theoretical model but clarity of the results and interpre-
tation are sacrificed. See:
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Christofides, Louis N. and Francis Tapon. "Discretionary Expendi-
tures and Profit-Risk Management: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis." The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1979, pp. 303-319.
Christofides, Louis N. and Francis Tapon. "Uncertainty, Market Structure
and Performance: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis Revisited." The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, November 1979, pp. 719-726.
Edwards, Franklin R. and Arnold A. Heggestad. "Comment on 'Uncertainty,
Market Structure and Performance: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis Revisited.'"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1979, pp. 727-729.
6. A paper by Gardner is similar in spirit and methodology to that of Edwards
and Heggestad and it was developed separately. Gardner's hypothesis was that
the banking industry in a particular city may, over time, become relatively
conservative with regard to their lending policies. He hypothesized that
regulation prevented firm entry and therefore denied potential risk takers
from receiving their appropriate rewards. This will result in a form of
market disequilibrium which cannot be easily remedied. His data are from
Saint Louis for three ten-year periods. His data indicate that the four
largest banks in the SMSA are more conservative than the average for all
big city banks in the U.S.; they also tended to become more conservative
over time, thereby inferring that the supply of high-risk loans is drying
up in St. Louis. He states that this may be part of the reason for the city's
failure to generate significant new regional investment from 1950 to 1970.
His measure of volatility is the Beta coefficient of the banks' stock price
regressed on a few variables which control for regional economic fluctuation
in Saint Louis. This is a clever application of the CAPM, but there is one
major problem. The average size of the banks in his universe may be much
smaller than that of his Saint Louis sample, especially since his stock
price index for the nation excludes New York City banks. Gardner may be
using the wrong peer group, plus he is assuming that banks restrict their
lending to the locality. For large commercial banks this is not so. In
sum, his methodology is sound, his results are highly plausible, but his
data are much less robust than he purports them to be.
Gardner, Cyrus J. "Banking Regulations and Urban Growth." Rand Paper
Series, No. P-5057. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, July 1973.
7. This assumption is also critical to the development of the theory in
Chapter 5. However, there is a fundamental difference. In the model which
was presented in that chapter there is no single profit maximizing portfolio
due to the presence of risk. Certainty of return is assumed to exist in the
Edwards model.
8. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 147-148.
9. Edwards, op. cit.
These observations are repeated in:
Heggestad, Arnold A. "Market Structure, Risk and Profitability in Com-
mercial Banking." The Journal of Finance, September 1977, pp. 1207-1211.
10. Edwards, op. cit., p. 149.
11. Hannan, Timothy H. "Expense-Pref erence Behavior in Banking: A
Reexamination." Journal of Political Economy, August 1979, pp. 891-895.
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Hannan, Timothy H. and Ferdinand Mavinga. "Expense Preference and
Management Control: The Case of the Banking Firm." The Bell Journal of
Economics, Autumn 1980, pp. 671-682.
12. Hannan, op. cit.
13. Hannan and Mavinga, op. cit.
14. The two articles by Hannan and Hannan and Mavinga may suffer from specifi-
cation error. The dependent variables are all the natural logarithms of an
expense category for an individual bank. However no scale variable is directly
introduced as an independent variable. It is a near tautalogy to state that
larger banks will spend more money on expenses. While taking the logarithm
of the variables will reduce the problem to an extent it is safe to assume
that scale effects are being proxied by other variables which are closely
correlated with bank size. In Hannan's article the variable is probably the
bank's share of deposits. In Hannan and Mavinga the candidate is the manager-
ial control variable, as well as the market share variable. The control var-
iable is suspect because the larger the bank the lower is the probability that
it is controlled by an individual.
15. Heggestad, Arnold A. op. cit.
Heggestad, Arnold A. and John J. Mingo. "The Competitive Condition of
U.S. Banking Markets and the Impacts of Structural Reform." The Journal
of Finance, June 1977, pp. 649-661.
Heggestad, Arnold A. and Stephen A. Rhoades. "Concentration and Firm
Stability in Commercial Banking." The Review of Economics and Statistics,
November 1976, pp. 443-452.
Heggestad, Arnold A. and Stephen A. Rhoades. "Multi-Market Interdepend-
ence and Local Market Competition in Banking." The Review of Economics and
Statistics, November 1978.
16. Graddy and Kyle, op. cit., analyze the statistical problems of the banking
market literature. They are the first (and to my knowledge only) to employ
simultaneous estimating techniques to analyze bank decision making.
17. Fellows, op. cit., provides a general equilibrium model of bank--decision
making using graphical techniques which incorporates much of the earlier work.
The unfortunate result of employing a Fellows-type model is that there is no
role for risk and it is assumed that all classes of assets are equally avail-
able to all banks. These two assumptions seriously weaken the ability of
the model to predict local bank behavior. This is an extension of:
Klein, Michael A. "Theory of the Banking Firm." Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, May 1971, pp. 205-218.
18. Edwards, op. cit.
Heggestad, op. cit.
19. Edwards and -Heggestad. "Comment on 'Uncertainty, Market Structure and
Performance."' op. cit., p. 729.
20. In Chapter 3 the motivation behind-most regulation on the state level was
described. Banks receive their charters from state regulatory agencies. These
agencies require that the potential investors in a new bank demonstrate that
there is a public need for a new bank in the market area. Since the regulators
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do not want to see existing banks fail, the petitioner can most easily demon-
strate the need for a new bank if existing banks are earning profits which are
determined to be excessive. In this way bank managers can increase their own
utility by spending a portion of excess profits on expense items which are
considered to be factor inputs.
21. The exact definition of the variables are presented in Appendix 3. The
data file is discussed in detail in Appendix 4. The data were obtained from
the December 31, 1977 Reports on Income and Condition which all insured banks
submit to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The best technical index
to these reports is contained in:
F.L. Garcia. How to Analyze a Bank Statement. (sixth edition). Boston:
Bankers Publishing Company, 1979.
22. Henderson, James M. and Richard E. Quandt. Microeconomic Theory (second
edition). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971, pp. 235-239.
23. Scherer, F.M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (second
edition). Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980, pp. 56-64.
24. Baltensperger. op. cit., pp. 2-4.
25. During interviews bankers said that there were well established rules of
thumb on hedging which influenced the way in which they invested. These
rules effectively tried to match the standard deviation of liability and asset
turnover. Core deposits were invested in long term assets. One rule was
heard several times from managers of small banks; that 80% of savings deposits
should be invested in mortgage loans. These type of rules applied in 1977
but began to break down during 1978 when investors began to move their savings
into certificates of deposits and money market funds.
26. Gardner, op. cit. was quoting from:
Flechsig, Theodore G. Banking Market Structure and Performance in Metro-
politan Areas. Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1965.
27. This difference in market area is reflected in the advertising of New
England banks. First National Bank of Boston has been running a series of
advertisements which stress its role in providing financing to major corporations
and its investments in the international area. State Street Bank and Shawmut
have also been advertising the fact that they are national or international
banks. It is also the focus of advertising in the New York area where New Jersey
and Long Island banks are emphasizing their local connections and contrasting it
with the international allegiance of the major New York City banks.
28. Garcia, op. cit., pp. 169-172.
29. The correlation coefficient between EOOP% and the purchase liability var-
iable, LPUR%, is 0.603.
30. The data are cross-sectional so that all of the rates of return are real
rates. The lack of influence of RIRFA and RILRA implies that the rate of return
from the local risky asset is purely demand driven.
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31. The five year average change in local employment is, more accurately,
a variable which lags behind the demand for capital. This is because changes
in capital spending predates changes in employment by some unspecified period
of time.
32. The absolute impacts look small due to the scale of the total income var-
iable. It is not scaled, so that the proper interpretation is that a dollar
increase in total market income causes a 2.68E-10 increase in the share of
assets which are invested in the risk free asset. This is equivalent to say-
ing that a $10 billion increase in total market income causes a 2.68% shift
in the risk free asset.
33. The earning assets of banks have been divided by $1,000.
34. There is less variation in the aggregated data used to estimate the
market model than in the bank data. Appendix 5 is a table listing the co-
efficients of variation of the variables which were used in the market model.
35. TOTALY was scaled in the market model, it was divided by one million. In
the first equation a $10 billion increase results in a 1% increase in the
rate of return from the local risky asset.
36. Graddy and Kyle, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
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Chapter 7
THE BANKING INDUSTRY: PROSPECTS
Smaller banks are a prominent and distinctive feature of the American
banking system and they are organized as a powerful lobbying group at the
state level. There were nearly 15,000 commercial banks and another 4,650
thrift institutions operating in the United States at year's end 1980.1
Most of these banks are small, only 2,000 of the commercial banks have
assets in excess of $50 million, and nearly half of the commercial banks
belong to the Independent Bankers Association (the Independent Bankers
Association is the national lobbying organization for smaller banks). But
there is a question as to how important they will be during and after the
current decade. The changes that the banking system faces will be compar-
able in scope and impact to those of the early 1930s. They are expected
to be so sweeping that the outgoing president of the American Bankers
Association, C. C. Hope, said that he would not be surprised if the
number of commercial banks dropped to 8,000 or 9,000.3 This would repre-
sent a loss by merger or acquisition of nearly half of the banking insti-
tutions in the nation.
However, the size of this shake-out is not what is of importance to
a development economist; the result is what is of importance. How will
the structure of the banking industry change? And how will this change
influence the economy? The broad public policy problem is to formulate a
set of controls which will challenge local market concentration without
stimulating unwarranged levels of concentration in the region or nation
and at the same time promote efficiency in the credit markets. The possible
public policy prescriptions are more easily understood if several intermediate
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steps are undertaken. Recent events which have stimulated interest in
the proposals for the spatial deregulation of the banking industry must be
examined; as well as the laws which have been enacted since 1977 and those
that are expected to be enacted. The impact which these forces have had
on the structure of the banking industry must be understood. Once this
has been accomplished it will be possible to discuss the role of the bank-
ing industry in financing local economic development.
The focus of this chapter is on structural change, those institutional
changes which will affect the number and size distribution of competitors.
The material presented in the earlier chapters, the theoretical model,
statistics and literature are the basis for making educated guesses about
the way in which the banking industry will react to these changes. Three
things are clear at the outset. First, the proposed changes will greatly
alter the ground rules under which the industry has operated. Banks may
have to make drastic adjustments in the way in which they operate if they
want to continue to exist as independent entities in 1990. Secondly, once
these changes are made there is a low probability of reversing them. This
is especially important in the banking industry because it is connected to
virtually every major segment of the nation's economy. Change in this one
sector of the economy will be felt in nearly every other sector. Finally,
it should be recognized that economic regulation has become a political
scapegoat, it is easily blamed for the poor performance of the economy, and
it has few defenders. It is politically popular to insist that freeing all
industries of economic regulation will be of great benefit to the nation.
While it is true that lowering barriers to competition are usually bene-
ficial, this is one area where deregulation warrants closer scrutiny.
The role which banks are going to play in local economic development '
is derived from the expected structure of the banking industry. Banks are
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reacting to pressure from four areas. Risk has entered the banking industry
from a quarter which was unexpected 10 to 15 years ago, inflation risk. This
new source of risk has changed the conditions under which banks make long term
loans. New sources of competition have emerged on both sides of the banks'
ledger books from non-banking institutions, and legislation is now in effect
to gradually abolish Regulation Q, which controls the maximum interest rates
which banks may pay on deposits over a six year period. The most dramatic
source of potential change comes from proposed legislation which will allow
interstate branch banking, mergers and acquisitions by multibank holding
companies across state lines.
A. Forces Promoting Structural Change
Non-banking firms perform services which were at one time restricted
to banks, or depository institutions. Now there are only two sets of restric-
tions which clearly identify an intermediary as being a bank. Banks are
companies which can accept deposits and they cannot make equity investments
in commercial ventures which are not directly related to banking; those
activities must be approved by the Federal Reserve.4
The growth of non-bank intermediaries has done much to ease the plight
of the small saver. Money market funds and other institutions have given
the small saver an opportunity to reap market determined rates of interest;
however, it has also led to a massive exodus of funds from traditional
institutions. The resulting disintermediation caused the banks a great
deal of concern. Their asset and liability portfolios became unhedged,
as they were financing long-term low-yielding assets with increasingly
short-term and high-interest liabilities. This caused banks to actively
lobby for the abolition of interest rate controls on their liabilities,
Regulation Q. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
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Act of 1980 was signed into law on March 31, 1980 and took effect on January 1,
1981.5 This law will phase out Regulation Q over a 6 year period. Three
changes will be felt immediately. NOW accounts are legal nation-wide and
thrift institutions can invest up to 20% of their loan portfolios in commer-
cial loans and corporate bonds.6 They can also issue credit cards and offer
trust services. These actions will close the gap between commercial banks
and thrift institutions. All commercial banks will have to keep their
reserves in a regional Federal Reserve Bank, a move made to restrict the
movement of banks out of the system. The Fed can also charge for its clear-
ing house activities.
The major effect of the new act is to broaden the range of competitors
on the liability side of the banks' balance sheet. This has done much to
free small savers from the onerous effects of Regulation Q. Banks must now
compete with thrift institutions and money market funds for the assets of
savers, a move which directly increases the banks' operating costs. It is
not clear if these new liabilities will be as unstable as purchased liabil-
ities were in 1977. This is an important question because the threat of
withdrawal risk is nearly as important to banks as is the cost of their
liabilities. If they are unstable, then some core deposits will have been
converted into purchased liabilities.
On the demand, or asset, side of the ledger large banks will continue
to face competition for commercial loans from the commercial paper market.
Banks will also have to remove themselves from the market for long term debt
due to uncertainties over the impact of changes in Regulation Q on the term
structure of the liability portfolio. Uncertainty over the future course
of inflation has also been a major'inhibiting factor in the market for
long term commercial debt.
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As the federal government and state governments allow thrifts to invest
in commercial and industrial loans and corporate bonds, the previous equil-
ibrium in local markets will be upset. Banks which had dominated state
and local banking markets will face increased competition in all asset
categories from thrift institutions. The impact will vary depending on
the market segment in which thrift institutions will specialize, and the
size of the thrifts relative to that of the commercial banks and the degree
of competition in the local market before thrift institutions were allowed
to compete. This move will aid in the efficient use of capital at the local
level. It will also help insulate the thrifts from the shocks of extreme
disintermediation, which they have experienced during the past two periods
of tight credit.
The last area where commercial banks are facing increased competition
under the existing set of laws is in the area of consumer credit. They com-
pete directly with non-depository financial institutions, which raise funds
to loan in either the commercial paper market or from retained earnings.
These firms range from large retail organizations, such as Sears Roebuck
(which also owns a savings and loan bank in California) and the automobile
companies, to finance and credit card companies. Before the mid-1970s many
of these alternative forms of consumer credit were available but they were
not seen by banks as major competitors. This is no longer true.
What is the possible impact of these regulatory changes on the decision
variables which were modeled in the previous chapter? They will all be
affected by a decrease in market concentration which means that the largest
expected impact will be on the rate of return from the portfolio of local
risky assets. The relative -impact will depend on two factors: the share
of total market assets held by thrift institutions and the share of their
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asset portfolio which they can legally invest in local risky assets. Howeverl
the end result is unequivocable; there will be a decrease in the real rate of
return from the portfolio of local risky assets.
The second major change which has taken place is the movement of bank
liabilities into small denomination certificates of deposit. The impact
of this shift, which has taken place from 1977 to the present, on the form
of bank liabilities is very interesting. Based on the line of reasoning devel-
oped in the fifth chapter, it appears that this movement may actually expand
the share of assets which are invested in local risky assets. Assuming that
small savers are moving funds from core deposits to liabilities which are not
only more expensive for the bank but which also have a higher risk of with-
drawal, in other words they will have many of the characteristics of purchased
liabilities. In the bank model investment in the more narrow definition of
local risky assets was negatively correlated with core deposits. The higher
the withdrawal risk present in the portfolio of liabilities the more banks
invest in local risky assets. More funds will also be shifted into the risk
free asset. Potentially the largest losers are going to be ubiquitous risky
7
assets and mortgage loans. It is doubtful if the shift in the composition
of the liability portfolio will increase the real gross rate of return from
the portfolio of local risky assets. The shift in the liability portfolio
will be accompanied by an increase in the nominal gross rate of return, but
this will be due to other forces such as inflationary pressures and efforts
to retard growth in the money supply. However, the shift in the composition
of the liability portfolio will probably affect the net return to the bank.
It is the marginal cost of liabilities which influence the price charged for
bank's assets. Essentially the shift in the composition of the liability
portfolio will radically increase the average cost of liabilities but the
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marginal cost will be unchanged. The marginal cost of purchased liabilities
has always been established by the cost of purchased liabilities, large denom-
ination certificates of deposit and federal funds. The shift will not affect
these rates, all it will do is allow small savers access to these rates of
return.
The current range of pro-competitive legislation is clearly beneficial to
the economy. The full impact is yet to be felt as state banking commissions
are only beginning to enact rules which are necessary companion measures to
the federal legislation. This, too, is fortunate as it provides banks time
to formulate strategies to react to these new forces.
B. The Prospect of Interstate Branch Banking
The most intriguing, and potentially the most important, set of struc-
tural forces are those which would remove restrictions on the formation of
interstate banking organizations. Unfortunately, the arguments over the
removal of these restrictions have been couched in terms of "fairness"
and the economics of self-interest. The arguments need to be delineated
and examined.
The existing laws on the spatial regulation of the banking industry
were reviewed in Chapter 3, and a recent article by Rhodes discusses anti-
trust law as it has been applied to the banking industry.8 Essentially,
the Supreme Court ruled in 1963, in United States versus Philadelphia National
Bank (PNB), that bank mergers are subject to section 7 of the Clayton Anti-
trust Act.9 Violation is found to exist if a merger produces a firm which
controls an undue percentage share of the relevant market. It should be
noted that a purely local definition of market area has been used in review-
ing merger applications based on the PNB decision. The three firm concentra-
tion ratio of area bank deposits is the litmus test used to determine if a
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proposed merger is anti-competitive. The measures which have been developed
by the Department of Justice appear to be strict. The Department will
S...ordinarily challenge a horizontal merger where the acquired firm accounts
for approximately 2% or more of the market, if either the acquiring or acquired
firm is among the eight largest in the relevant market and if the aggregate
market share of any set of the largest firms (from the two to the eight largest)
has increased by approximately 7% or more over any period of five to ten years
prior to the merger...." This rule applies in markets where the four firm
concentration ratio is less than 75%.
This rule applies to mergers among banks in a geographical market and
it assumes that all banks in that market area compete directly with each
other. This is an assumption which has not been supported by the material
presented in this work. Another problem with this merger rule is that it
has little direct bearing on inter-market mergers and it is less binding
on mergers in larger metropolitan areas than it is in more isolated markets.
These problems are related.
National and regional money center banks compete among themselves and
the market for commercial paper for the loans of major corporations and
institutions, they are largely divorced from the demand side of the local
market. A more accurate measure of concentration on the demand side of
the market for local risky assets would involve some method of deducting
the loans made by the largest banks if they were not important factors in
the market for local risky assets. The measure of concentration which is
currently used is acceptable on the liability side of the ledger sheet but
not on the asset side. In this way a regional money center bank may merge
with a bank in another market, not change the three firm concentration ratio
of assets or deposits in that market and still increase the effective level
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of concentration. It could do so by changing the way in which the acquired
bank invests its assets, shifting purchases of local risky assets to pur-
chases of ubiquitous risky assets.
The merger rule would also tend to understate the degree of concentration
in major metropolitan areas. The largest banks in these market areas are not
interested in those markets per se. They do serve the largest institutions
in those markets, but on the whole they tend to operate aspatially. The
market for smaller customers is left to the smaller banks in the market area.
A partial result of the PNB Supreme Court decision, and those which
followed, and the passage of legislation which established guidelines for
the operation of bank holding companies is that important local banks have
concentrated their efforts on expansion outside of their home markets but
within their home state (these are inter-market, intra-state mergers). 1 1
I have consciously used the term merger because few banks have entered new
markets afresh, or de novo. They usually enter by taking over another bank
through either merger or acquisition under the umbrella of a holding company.
There are two types of holding companies, one bank and multi-bank, and
they act as legal vehicles for expanding the scope of a bank's business.
OBHCs are formed to enter new lines of business activity. MBHCs can expand
into the same lines of business as OBHCs, but their main function is to serve
as a way for banks to enter new spatial markets. In 1956 there were just
47 MBHCs in the nation; 21 years later there were 306 with 2,301 affiliated
banks. Their share of all commercial bank deposits has exploded from 7.5
percent in 1956 to 34.6 percent in 1977.12
The statistical model indicates that this form of organization influ-
ences bank behavior. Banks with a statewide presence generate a higher
return from their portfolio of local risky assets, and they appear to invest
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more heavily in ubiquitous risky assets.
Holding companies use a different method of organization to expand
across state lines. These banking firms have established loan generation
offices in major markets throughout the nation. Only the largest national
and regional money center banks have been involved in this form of expansion.
These offices do not accept deposits, so they do not violate the McFadden
Act. But they do meet the needs of the bank's largest commercial customers
and provide just about any bank service. Walter B. Wriston, chairman of
Citicorp was quoted as saying that: "We now have offices in 40 states....
In the event that the law should change...we would just change the sign on
the door and put deposit slips on the counters...."13 Citicorp is not alone.
Manufacturers Hanover has 742 offices and in 32 states and U.S. possessions
and the Bank of America has over 350 offices in 41 states.
These figures include both loan acquisition offices and Edge Act bank
subsidiaries. Edge Act subsidiaries are authorized by two laws, the Edge
Act of 1919 and the International Banking Act of 1978. These laws allow
U.S. banks to cross state lines to establish subsidiaries to finance export
business for domestic firms. The latter act broadened the operating rules
to the point that within the limit that they finance export business these
subsidiaries can look and behave as branches of their parent bank.1 4
Domestic money center banks have felt particularly aggrieved by exist-
ing restrictions on interstate expansion.15 They feel that it is not equitable
that foreign banks could purchase banks in any state, while they are restricted
to purchases in their home state. It particularly rankled domestic bankers
that foreign firms could purchase banks in more than one state; the practice
has been for the foreign bank to own, at most, banks in two major markets
(usually one on the west coast and the other in New York City.16,17 However,
as was noted earlier, new purchases by foreign banks of domestic banking
institutions have been temporarily embargoed under the International Bank
Act of 1978. This act has satisfied the complaints by large domestic banks
that they are being treated on less than equal footing with foreign institu-
tions. But the passage of the law has not met a central complaint of money
center bankers. Quoting from a statement made by James H. Higgins, chairman
of the Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh: "In my judgment, the most crucial barrier
to conpetitive equality is the continued prohibition of interstate banking."1 8
Questions remain as to how banks will expand if interstate branching is allowed
and what will be the likely economic impact of interstate branching. Empir-
ical work cannot bear directly on thse questions. But data which were pre-
sented in earlier chapters and the work of others provides indirect evidence
which allows the formation of a likely scenario.1 9
If banks were restricted to entering markets across state lines de novo,
that is they could not enter by merging or acquiring a bank which already is
operating within the market, then the result would unequivocably enhance
competition in the local market. However, if the bank were to take over an
existing institution the competitive environment would not be enhanced unless
the acquiring bank desired to increase the local market share of locally
invested assets by the acquired firm. There are several intermediate ques-
tions which must be answered before the desirability of inter-state entry
by merger or acquisition can be judged. Will banks be interested in de novo
entry? If they do enter a new market area through acquisition what types of
institutions will they be interested in acquiring? What are the likely
impacts on the supply of of funds available for investment in local risky
assets?
De novo entry is the most desirable form of entry for the local economy.
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Concentration is automatically reduced and the bank must market itself in
an aggressive manner to be successful, as it does not have an established
market share or a cushion of good will on which to operate. However, 3 Q novo
entry is expensive and it is the riskiest form of market entry for a bank.
The best evidence on the difficulty of de novo entry was generated in New
York state.20 In 1970 several major New York City banks opened branch
offices in upstate New York. After five years of operation the four largest
New York City banks obtained only 4 percent of the deposits in the upstate
area. These banks incurred large start up expenses and high loan losses.
The upstate branches were judged by the New York Federal Reserve Bank to
be (at best) only marginally profitable. Chase Manhattan and Citibank
found out that smaller local banks could be vigorous competitors. The
consensus which developed on the part of bankers is that it is cheaper
to acquire an established customer base than it is to start up a retail
banking organization. This is especially true when the potential enterant
does not possess detailed knowledge about the local market (the large
loan losses of the city banks in upstate New York have been partially
attributed to a lack of local knowledge) and a way of maintaining a stable
core of liabilities.
De novo entry into banking markets in New England has been rare.21
Larger banks in the New England states are expanding through acquisition
rather than by setting up new branches. There is no reason to believe
that if interstate branch banking were to be allowed banks would enter
de novo. It is most likely that out-of-state banks would enter by acquir-
ing existing banks.
This leads to other question: which local banks would be purchased
and what would the impact be on the supply of funds for local assets?
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There is only a handful of banking finns which are in a position to
expand aggressively across state, or regional, borders. These are the
national money center banks and the largest regional money center banks,
most of which are listed in Table 4.4. These are the banks which are the
strongest backers of interstate banking legislation. In fact the Independ-
ent Bankers Association is bitterly opposed to any legislative effort in
this area, and its membership views the prospect of interstate banking
purely from the perspective of the acquiree.2 2
However, it is not clear that money center banks will gobble up small
banking entities throughout the nation. It is most likely that the money
center banks will follow two separate strategies. On the asset side of
the ledger money center banks will attempt to make at least foothold
acquisitions in regions of the nation with expanding economies. They will
also convert existing loan acquisition offices into branch banks to service
their existing customers. Regions which appear to have been targeted are
the west coast, Texas and other new energy producing states.- Florida is
also being eyed as it develops into a major banking center for South
American trade and trust business. The other strategy will be undertaken
on the liability side of the ledger. Money center banks are currently
paying a premium for their liabilities because a large portion is purchased.
They will be shopping for banking networks with two important attributes: A
deep pool of capital and a small ratio of purchased to core liabilities.
The most likely targets will be banks with well developed branching networks
and assets ranging from $100 to $500 million. Purchasing such banks is a
relatively inexpensive way of deepening the capital structure of the banking
organization and, more importantly, it will help lower the average cost of
the liabilities for the parent bank.
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The economic benefits of these two strategies are not totally apparent.
It is true that new banking resources may benefit those areas of the country
which are experiencing sustained economic growth, but only if demand in
these regions is currently not being met by the correspondent banking system.
If not, it is possible that regional banking associations can be formed to
broker loans to banks outside the region. These associations could serve
as a rating service and broker in much the same way that bond brokers oper-
ate. This would partially negate the need for interstate super-banks.
It appears that banks within state boundaries are beginning to expand
by purchasing smaller banks to ward off takeover attempts by money center
banks. This movement would accelerate if interstate banking were allowed.
Currently the New England states, especially Massachusetts, are experiencing
a wave of very visible mergers. The wave of mergers and acquisitions may
have two causes. The first is that small banks may be selling in a panic
because of the "...unsupported, but currently widespread, fear that small
banks cannot compete in a new environment...."23 The second is based on the
same premise. Larger local banks may be using this premise as a means of
justifying their merger activities. They may also be engaging in this activ-
ity to dilute the capital of the acquiring bank, thereby making it a less
attractive takeover target in the advent of interstate banking. In this
way the anticipation of interstate banking is acting to stimulate concentra-
tion at the local level for business reasons, not economic reasons. Entry
by out-of-state banks through acquisition will not dilute local market con-
centration, at best it will preserve the status quo, at worse it will aid
in concentrating the industry nationally as well as locally.
How will the market for local assets be affected if large banks cross
state lines through acquisition instead of de novo entry (assuming that their
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primary purpose is to acquire core deposits and capital)? The statistical
model offers some insight. Banks which have branches throughout a state,
or are members of state-wide bank holding companies, behave differently
from those which are not. This difference appears to increase with the
size of the parent firm. These firms receive a higher average rate of re-
turn from their portfolio of local risky assets and they invest more heavily
in ubiquitous risky assets. It is also reasonable to assume that a por-
tion of the loans which are made by the largest banks in this class and
classified as local risky assets in the data set were made to large
national corporations. These loans would have characteristics more in
keeping with ubiquitous risky assets than with local risky assets. In
other words, New England banks which are part of state-wide organizations
invest more heavily in non-local ventures. This was shown in the model
in two ways. Their rate of return from the portfolio of local risky
assets is higher, indicating that they are either not moving as far down
the demand schedule as other banks; or they are investing in accordance
with the monopoly portfolio model. They are investing a smaller share of
their assets locally and in so doing they are making riskier investments
to maintain their rate of return.
Citibank derives 35 percent of its profits from investments overseas;
20 percent comes from loans to multinational corporations and 15 percent
from loans to less developed nations.24 The bank's largest domestic cus-
tomers are the same set of multinational firms and members of Fortune 1,000.
This is clearly a loan market which is not directly available to all banks.
It is reasonable to assume that if Citibank were allowed to branch across
state lines it would participate portions of these loans to its inner-state
affiliates. The new corporate parent will influence the portfolio selections
of its affiliates. The real purpose of the acquisition is to enable the
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parent to substitute core deposits for purchased liabilities. This will
lower its cost of funds relative to the corporate bond market. In other
words, on the asset side of the acquired bank's ledger the acquisition
should lead to a substitution of ubiquitous risky assets for local risky
assets.
The bank model and logic indicate that the investment behavior of a
smaller bank will be influenced by a change in the bank's ownership;
especially if the new owner is a nationally prominent bank. If interstate
branch banking legislation is passed without any restrictions on mergers
and acquisitions there will be three major changes in the structure of
local banking markets. A number of banks, which have been purchased by
money center banks, will be physically present in the market and active
competitors for liabilities, but they will be much less prominent in the
market for local risky assets (this will change local market concentration
indirectly, without changing the statistical indicators of concentration
which are used currently. A wave of.defensive mergers will take place
where in-state banks will be purchasing smaller banks, thereby increasing
concentration directly. Finally, the banking institutions which appear to
be most desirable for acquisition, if interstate banking is allowed, are
not the small institutions. Mid-sized retail banks which have a relatively
large share of their assets supported by core deposits would be the most
desirable for money center banks. A premium would be paid for those which
are well capitalized.
Four legislative options have been mentioned in the press on the issue
of interstate banking.25 The first is the position of the Independent
Bankers Association: do not allow it to come to pass. The second is a half
step: allow banks to branch, or acquire, banks in contiguous states. Congress
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considered a third proposal during the summer of 1980. Allow interstate
acquisitions of only near-bankrupt institutions which cannot find buyers
in their own states. The fourth is to allow branching and acquisitions
nation-wide.
The first proposal protects the vested interest of the banks in exist-
ence and offers little help to markets which are currently concentrated. It
also offers no incentive to banking firms to form new institutions which
would channel funds into regions which are capital poor. The second is a
half-step, it is a way of experimenting with interstate branch banking. It
enables the government to limit the damage of interstate branching if it
proves to be undesirable, but the damage cannot be reversed unless regional
oligopolies are formed which run afoul of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
fourth case has been discussed above, it is fair in that it treats all banks
equally, but its economic effects can be far-reaching and irreversible.
The third proposal is an attempted legislative solution to the problem
of foreign banks being able to purchase bankrupt institutions once the
embargo on such purchases is lifted. This proposal is a solution which is
likely to be opposed by many and it also has many administrative problems.
Do in-state bidders obtain the bankrupt institution if they cover all of the
exposed liabilities or can they be outbid by an out-of-state bank, thereby
protecting the best interests of stockholders and creditors? If the bank-
rupt institution is a money center bank, such as Franklin National, will
the relevant market be defined as the geographic market or will it be
restricted to the set of large money center institutions? The latter inter-
pretation would be an extension of the way in which the Clayton Act has
applied to banks. It should be noted that in the case of the U.S. versus
the Third National Bank of Nashville the court restricted the use of the fail-
26ing 'Afirm defense. The failing firm delfense has been permitted when the
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acquired company is unlikely to survive without a merger. The courts
have narrowly construed this defense in the case of The Third National
Bank. The court determined that managerial weakness which could be solved
by introducing new management to the firm is sufficient grounds for void-
ing a merger. The court has also halted merger activities of banks if
such a merger were to take place in concentrated market, or would serve
to concentrate a market, and if the acquiring firm were located on the
fringe of the market. The court determined that such a merger hurts
potential competition, as the acquiring bank was a potential enterant
in the market.27
A desirable program of interstate competition can be achieved if
several steps are taken simultaneously. First, banks must be able to
compete on equal footing for liabilities with all intermediaries, both
depository and non-depository, such as money market mutual funds. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank should be empowered to
establish a common set of regulations covering minimum reserves which
should be kept on deposit in a regional reserve bank for all depository
and non-depository intermediaries. Secondly, all interstate branching
should be restricted to de novo entry. Recent legislation blurs the
distinction between thrifts and commercial banks. Differences will
continue to disappear and this trend should be encouraged legislatively.
Fourth, legislation should be passed allowing banks to own, on a -
cooperative basis, clearinghouses which can act as independent risk
appraising services. This would allow smaller banks to participate
attractive loans to banks in different regions. If such activities
can exist on a fee for service basis they should also be allowed, as
long as they are undertaken by a firm which is not legally connected
to a bank.
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A major problem exists in the above five point program: what to do
with failed banks. Previously the FDIC arranged a marriage between a
failing and a successful bank. Problems arouse when no bank in the
state wanted to take over the failure. Under existing law authorities
had to look for an overseas investor; as was noted this made domestic
out-of-state banks very upset. Several special regulations can be
created to account for this contingency. The bank could just be allowed
to bankrupt or reorganize under existing bankruptcy laws. But the
liabilities of large depositors would be destroyed and a fundamental
regulatory policy, which has been in existence since 1933, would be
abandoned. Takeover by an out-of-state banking firm could be allowed
as long as the prospective parent held less than a specified share of
the nation's, region's, and market's banking assets. A third possi-
bility is that banks could bid for liabilities which were not covered
by federal insurance. If this were the case, additional deposit insur-
ance should be directly available to all depositors. The bank's prem-
ium would be determined by regulators based on its risk exposure. Deposit-
ors could also purchase additional insurance based on their degree of risk
aversion. A scheme which is similar to the one currently in existence
should be retained to protect the small saver. This proposal goes a long
way toward eliminating the economic problem of failed banks.
C. The Future Role of Small Banks
A question has been asked of me many times over the past two years:
is there going to be room for small commercial banks in the future? There
will be a place for them in the market if they work for it and, somewhat
surprisingly, their major source of competition will not come from larger
commercial banks. Once deregulation is in full effect, their competitors
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will be local thrift institutions. However, there is going to be a decrease
in the number of banking firms during the next decade and those which will
be absorbed are the small full service commercial banks which have not
developed a specialty. There are enough banks in existence which will
take one of three courses of action to fulfill both ends of the predic-
tion. The banks which will fail first are those which are managed by
bankers who see the competitive future and decide to sell the banking
firm and find a new line of work. The banks which will follow the first
group will be those which sit on their assets and hope that their state
banking commi-ssions or legislatures will hold the competition at bay.
The last of the small banks to be absorbed will be those which are run
by managers who will try to provide the full gamut of banking services
equally well and provide no service better than anyone else. Eventually
this firm will either exhaust its capital base or lose its customers
to small banks which provide specialized services or larger banks which
can afford to offer all services.
Smaller banks can specialize in one of several areas and still main-
tain a well diversified asset portfolio. They can specialize in consumer
credit, small business development, or trust management aimed at segments
of the market. This can be done by taking existing management resources
and investing its depth in one area, hopefully one in which the bank
has already developed expertise and a reputation.28
The experience that New York City banks have had in upstate New
York demonstrates that small banks can compete with larger banks. The
experience in California is much the same. In California smaller unit
banks have competed successfully with major banking organizations, such
as the Bank of America. There are 78 unit banks in the state and they
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compete in markets which contain some of the 1,000 branches of the largest
bank in the United States. 2 9
The way in which smaller banks position themselves in the marketplace
is a problem of business strategy, not of economics. But if interstate
branch banking becomes legal this work offers several hints as to the place
of the smaller bank in the future. A market exists for the services of
smaller banks. It appears that important local banks, state-wide banking
organizations and local banks with more than $100 million in assets will
be under the most pressure to sell to interstate organizations. The re-
sults of the statistical model indicate that these larger banking organi-
zations will be shifting assets into ubiquitous risky assets, leaving
the traditional market of small bankers untouched.
If legislation is introduced which only allows de novo entry, then
the smaller bank will have a store of goodwill to draw upon, an asset
which the new entrant does not have. There will be increased competition
for local business but it would appear that if the existing banks were
competently managed they should outperform the entrant.
There will be increased competition for liabilities. This is where
the smaller banks face their greatest challenge. The bank could tie its
asset and liability portfolios together by actively pursuing the liabili-
ties of the market segment to which it is trying to sell its assets. Again,
the range of locally based specialties has not been fully investigated by
the industry. Some banks are offering trust services and estate planning
to middle income families. Other banks are pursuing the high-risk consumer
loan market; it is hoped that they are well capitalized and well diversified
in the risk free asset. Fewer small banks are competing for a market which
exists and should grow stronger over time, developing local businesses which
are part of the community's export base.
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D. Financing Local Economic Development
Smaller local banks would be in a position to finance and encourage
local ventures for several reasons. There has been a major shift in
the way new and expanding firms obtain their capital. This shift opens
new opportunities for the banking community. Branch plants and manufactur-
ing firms usually purchase their debt for plant and equipment from indus-
trial revenue bonding authorities. This quasi-governmental vehicle has
replaced a major portion of the market for long term debt. This is a mar-
ket which lending institutions have been happy to abandon due to increased
risk from inflation and disintermediation. The working capital of larger
firms is provided by the commercial paper market and larger banks. This
source of lending will become more difficult to obtain by new, or smaller,
firms. The field will be open to banks which can provide these smaller
firms with a variety of services which will become more difficult to obtain.
Banks can provide a guide or access to venture capital and long term
subordinated debt, as well as directly financing the short term of needs
of the firm. They can. also employ a business development specialist.
This is a person who could assist the firm in finding consulting and pro-
fessional help, aid in marketing and planning, and market the longer term
financial needs of the new firm to the relevant government authority. The
bank can also help the firm in its planning by requiring the firm to produce
meaningful quarterly, semiannual or annual reports. These would be reports
which transcend the cash position of the firm. The bank would be willing to
help the firm in the production of these reports, as part of its loan agree-
ment or on a fee for service basis. This service helps the firm grown and it
reduces the risk of the bank; it would give the lending institution warn-
ings of financial trouble before the firm falls behind on its payments
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to the bank.
Granted, this must be a strategy which is used selectively. But it
is one which would insure the long term growth, and existence, of the bank.
The new firm would, or should, continue to use the bank in the future. The
bank could also use the firm as a marketing tool, to obtain liabilities from
the firm's owners and employees.
The small bank will be in a position to compete in a segment of the
capital market which is important to the continued health of the local
economy. It can fill the short term financing demands of local businesses.
This is the market segment which will be essential to smaller commercial
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Appendix 1. The Structure of New England's 31 Largest Banking Organizations
Total Number Assets of
Assets of Subsid- Subsidi-
TYPE Member Bank iary Banks ary Banks
1 First Nat'l Boston Corp
2 Shawmut Corp
3 Industrial Nat'l Corp
4 Baybanks Inc 7
5 Hartford Nat'l Corp
6 CBT Corp
7 State St Boston Fin
8 New Eng Merchants Co
9 Hospital Trust Corp











21 Indian Head Banks Inc




26 First Connecticut Bancorp
27 Maine Nat'l Bank
28 Northeast Bankshares
29 Chittenden Corp
30 The Howard Bank





















































































































































Appendix 1. The Structure of New England's 31 Largest Banking Organizations (cont'd.)
Total Return Share of
Loans Equity Net Over- on Return Share First
Total to Interest Head Earning on State 6 District
Assets3 Assets Assets 4 Ratio5 Assets Equity Assets Assets
1 First Nat'l Boston Corp MA 47.8 5.55 3.17 48.87 0.57 8.71 26.1 13.4
2 Shawmut Corp MA 42.9 5.19 3.76 71.55 0.36 5.78 12.9 6.6
3 Industrial Nat'l Corp RI 61.3 6.09 4.26 40.18 0.87 12.40 43.9 5.1
4 Baybanks Inc7  MA 50.6 6.48 4.98 62.70 0.69 9.44 11.6 5.9
5 Hartford Nat'l Corp CT 41.6 3.58 3.83 68.57 0.24 5.03 27.3 5.2**
6 CBT Corp CT 57.0 5.30 4.76 59.68 0.60 9.35 24.7 4.7**
7 State St Boston Fin MA 51.2 6.02 4.24 59.76 0.21 2.79 8.7 4.4
8 New Eng Merchants Co MA 47.6 4.42 3.81 56.49 0.63 11.71 7.3 3.7
00 9 Hospital Trust Corp RI 61.9 6.88 4.09 52.18 0.71 8.88 23.1 2.7
10 Old Stone Corp RI 80.0 4.87 3.34 49.10 0.70 13.74 23.4 2.7
11 Northeast Bancorp CT 61.8 7.60 5.24 57.51 0.98 11.32 12.0 2.3
12 Colonial Bancorp CT 58.2 6.25 5.05 67.46 0.60 8.54 11.7 2.2
13 Multibank Financial MA 66.3 5.39 5.39 73.51 0.39 6.37 4.0 2.0
14 Worcester Bancorp MA 55.3 5.88 4.35 72.51 0.25 3.43 3.6 1.8
15 Connecticut Nat'l CT 54.3 6.29 5.36 61.97 0.81 11.18 NA NA
16 State Nat'l Bancorp CT 59.2 6.55 5.41 72.06 0.66 8.48 NA NA
17 Citytrust Bancorp CT 62.8 6.02 5.16 62.83 0.63 9.08 NA NA
18 T.N.B. Financial MA 52.3* 8.16 4.13 78.88 0.88 9.13 2.0 1.0
19 Casco-Northern ME 66.1 5.19 4.76 62.61 0.78 13.53 18.0 1.2
20 Arltru Bancorporation MA 65.2 4.37 3.85 66.65 0.49 10.28 2.1 1.1
21 Indian Head Banks Inc Nil 62.2 6.35 4.82 66.72 0.60 8.20 13.6 0.9
22 The Conifer Group7  MA 66.3 5.43 5.33 72.32 0.43 6.95 2.0 1.0
23 Depositors Corp ME 65.2 6.26 5.56 62.27 0.84 12.03 14.9 1.0
24 First Bancorp CT 64.4 7.74 6.11 68.63 0.70 7.68 5.3 1.0
25 Merrill Bankshares ME 56.3 8.13 5.35 48.33 1.42 15.39 14.2 1.0
26 First Connecticut Bancorp CT 54.9 8.81 5.51 50.09 1.19 12.31 4.4 0.8
27 Maine Nat'l Bank ME 56.1 7.11 4.76 61.78 0.76 9.23 12.2 0.8
28 Northeast Bankshares ME 64.7 7.86 5.37 60.82 0.89 10.29 12.1 0.8
29 Chittenden Corp VT 64.3 5.98 4.41 65.28 0.65 9.84 17.5 0.8
30 The Howard Bank VT 65.6 4.58 4.43 66.13 0.59 11.95 14.2 0.6
31 First Bancorp of NH Inc NH 65.1 8.95 5.76 68.34 1.20 11.41 8.8 0.6
rnr A F 72.3 IL.
Appendix 1.
SOURCES: Keefe, Bruyette and Wooks: Keefe Bankbook: 1980 for columns
1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. FDIC Reports on Income and Condition for other columns.
NOTES
NG. Data not given but is approximately 500,000.
NA. Data not available in FDIC data base as bank is located in the Second
Federal Reserve District.
* Estimated by: [(Equity to Loans%)/100] 1*[(Equity to Assets%)/100]
=(Loans to Assets)*100.
** The bank has some branches or a subsidiary in Fairfield County, Connecticut.
1. MBHC multibank holding company, SW state-wide branching network,
LB local branch bank.
2. Member of Federal Reserve System or not.
3. Total loans as a percentage of total assets of the banking
organization.
4. Net interest income:(interest income less interest expense) divided
by average earning assets multiplied by 100.
5. (Non-interest expense-Non-interest income) divided by net interest
income multiplied by 100.
6. The denominator is total state assets, except in the case of
Connecticut where the denominator is total state assets except for
Fairfield County. The numerator in all cases is the sum of columns
4 and 6.
7. There is an inconsistency between the Keefe data and the FDIC data
tape. Keefe reports total assets which are less than the sum of the
reported assets of the firm's subsidiaries.
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Appendia 2. Aelative Composition of Assets and Liebilities Among
Class of U.S. Commercial Bank* (December 31. 1971)
State/Local
Total Cash Total U.S. Govt. Govt.












Liability I Liability I Liability
4
6s.b ts New Taae
ASS dthe. esmbet bank"
tdu he.Ae Samba







0.2 6.1 2.3 49.5 24.4 1.7 4.2
9.2 6.4 6.3 13.1 19.2 14.0
14.0 12.4
14.3 10.7
4.2 $4.9 14.0 19.4
10.3
16.0
4.9 51.9 11.2 13.1 14.2
12.0 10.0 4.4 $3.3 17.3 15.7 12.4
7.3 100% 75.4 39.1
6.2 1002 82.4 32.3
7.2 1001 94.8 14.6
6.8 1001 90.7 16.4
7.0 1001 88.3 23.7
d*AC.ERa "Coamarcial bnk Aest* And Llebite*S Detailed Salence Sheet. December 31. 1917." Table 1.26.
9-thbl e4elve Bulletin. Joao, 1II$.
I. 1jist secatiglee held lacludtag oteche and bends.
2. U.S. overmest securitlee lecludee those of the Teoeny sad other government agenciae.
1. Groes loans. lncludIng loan lee reeerveu mad u*earned Iacome
4. tuachaaed liabIlitlee are federal fund purchased. other borrowed money. plus large demosaoateion






Definitions of the Variables Used in the Statistical Models
Most of the variables which were employed in the statistical models
presented in Chapter 6 were calculated from the Reports of Income and Condi-
tion which banks submitted at years end 1977 to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (see Appendix 4). Definitions of the variables and the way in
which they were calculated are given below.
RILRA
Average rate of return from the portfolio of local risky assets. The
variable was calculated by dividing reported income from local risky assets
by the total amount invested in the local risky asset, multiplied by 100.
Local risky assets (ALRAl%) were difined as all loans (gross) plus invest-
ments in leases.
ARFA%
Share of earning assets invested in the risk free asset This was cal-
culated by dividing the bank's total investment in the risk free asset by
earning assets, multiplied by 100. The risk free asset is defined as: federal
funds sold, treasury securities, other government securities, and interest
bearing balances in domestic banks. Earning assets are defined as risk
free assets, ubiquitous risky assets and local risky assets. Ubiquitous
risky assets (AURA%) were defined in the model as investments in other secur-
ities and state and local (municipal) bonds.
ALRAl%
Share of earning assets invested in the brcad definition of the local risky
asset. This variable corresponds to the definition of RILRA.
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ALRA2%
Share of earning assets invested in the narrow defintion of the local
risky asset. This is defined as all consumer loans, commercial and industrial
loans, leases, agricultural loans, all other loans (loans not classified else-
where in the Report), and all commercial mortgages.
LCORE%
Share of earning assets which are supported by core deposits. The variable
was calculated by dividing core deposits by earning assets and multiplying the
decimal fraction by 100. Core deposits are defined as total time and savings
deposits, less time deposits of more than $100,000.
LPUR%
Share of earning assets which are supported by purchased liabilities. The
variable was calculated by dividing purchased liabilities by earning assets
and multiplying the decimal fraction by 100. Purchased liabilities are defined
as all certificates of deposit of more than $100,000, all other deposits of
more than $100,000, federal funds purchased and other borrowed money.
RIURA
Average rate of return from ubiquitous risky assets. The variable was
calculated by dividing reported income from ubiquitous risky assets by the
total amount invested in the ubiquitous risky asset, multipled by 100. Ubiqui-
tous risky assets were defined as investments in other securities and state
and local bonds.
RIRFA
Average rate of return from the risk free asset. The variable was cal-
culated by dividing reported income from the risk free asset by the total
amount invested in the risk free asset, multiplied by 100.
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AEM%
The bank's share of earning assets in the local banking market. This
variable was calculated by dividing the earning assets of the bank by total
earning assets in the local banking market and multiplying the resulting deci-
mal fraction by 100.
TOTALY
Total income in the market area. This variable was calculated by multi-
plying per capita income for the county aggregation which approximates the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's definition of the local banking market area
by the population of that county aggregation. The per capita income statistics
were obtained from:
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
No. 882, "1977 Per Capita Money Income Estimates for States, Counties, Incor-
porated Places and Select Minor Civil Divisions in the Northeast Region of
the United States." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
The population data were obtained from:
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
No. 873, "Estimates of the Population of Counties and Metropolitan Areas:
July 1, 1977 and 1978." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
EMP5YR%
The five year percentage change in private employment in the local banking
market from 1973 to 1977. The variable was calculated from data obtained in
the 1973 and 1977 volumes of:
U.S. Bureau of the Census. "The State-Establishments, Employees, and
Payroll, by Counties." Table lE. County Business Patterns. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
SWB*APARENT
This is the bank organization variable. SWB is a dummy variable which
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was scored 1 if the bank was present in three-quarters or more of the banking
markets in the state, either directly by the use of branch banks or through
membership in a MBHC. APARENT is the combined assets of the banking and
non-banking activities of the bank. In the case of a MBHC the assets of
the entire holding company are used. The asset data for the largest hold-
ing companies in New England were obtained from Keefe, Bruyette and Woods,
Keefe Bankbook: 1980. Some MBHCs were too small to be followed by Keefe,
Bruyette and Woods. APARENT for these companies was computed by adding to-
gether total assets of the banks owned by the MBHC from the Report on Income.
IFID%
Income from the bank's fiduciary activities per dollar of earning assets.
This variable was calculated by dividing the reported income from the bank's
fiduciary activities by earning assets and multiplying the decimal fraction
by 100.
ACNIB%
The portion of bank core deposits invested in non-interest bearing balances
in domestic banks. This variable was calculated by dividing the bank's re-
ported non-interest bearing balances in domestic banks by the core liabilities
of the bank, multiplied by 100. This is the correspondent banking variable.
EOOP%
Advertising expenditure per dollar of earning assets. This variable was
calculated by dividing other operating expenses by earning assets and multiply-
ing the decimal fraction by 100.
CONCENL
Local banking market concentration. This variable was used exclusively
in the market model. It is the three firm concentration ratio of deposits
in the local banking market in 1976. The data were obtained from:
Gibson, Katherine. ed. Changing Commercial Bank Structure in New England:
1975-1976. Boston: The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1978.
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Appendix 4
The Banking Data Set Used in Chapter 6
The data on the individual banks which were used to estimate the econo-
metric models developed in Chapter 6 were obtained from the banks' call report.
The "call" report of condition is published for all insured commercial banks
in response to calls for statements from federal and/or state regulators. The
call report consists of the bank statement, which lists the assets and liabilities
of the bank as of a specified date. All insured banks must file this statement
twice a year, as of 1976. Larger banks, those with assets of $300 million or
more, file these statements quarterly. The second report which is often
associated with the call report is the "Regulatory Report of Income." This is
sometimes called the "back of the call" because the information is printed on
the back of the bank statement.
The bank statement consists of a fairly complete listing of the assets
and liabilities of the bank. The share variables used in the model were cal-
culated from this source. The report of income is less detailed than is the
bank statement; it uses more aggregate asset and liability categories. How-
ever, it does list all income, expense, and capital accounts in great detail.
The rate of return and expense variables were calculated by using the two data
sources.
The data were all obtained from reports filed by all commercial banks in
the First Federal Reserve District for December 31, 1977. The First District
includes all of New England, except for Fairfield County Connecticut. The
data have been transcribed onto data tapes which are available from the FDIC.
The particular tape used was made available by Data Resources Incorporated,
along with computer time and software.
The most comprehensive review of laws, regulations and accounting conven-
tions which govern the way in which banks compile the bank statement and the
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regulatory report of income are found in:
Garcia, F.L. How to Analyze a Bank Statement. sixth edition. Boston:
Bankers Publishing Company, 1979.
The data used to estimate the market model were compiled from the individ-
ual bank data. Each bank was assigned to the market area in which it is
headquartered. Banks which were members of MBHCs were assigned to the
local markets in which each member bank was located. Branch banks were
all assigned to the market of the headquarters office.
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AEMPCAPITA; Earning assets in the market area per capita.
ACNIB2%; Share of total liabilities in non-interest bearing accounts.
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